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ReasonableFaith.org > Forums > Ontological Argument > MOA and possible worlds #2
 
 


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jbiemans
Posted 02/24/12 at 07:55 AMReply with quote #1 
I thought that I would put this in a new thread, since it does not exactly fit with the topic of the last one.

Is there a possible world where God does not exist ?
RandyE
Posted 02/24/12 at 11:53 AMReply with quote #2 
Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
I thought that I would put this in a new thread, since it does not exactly fit with the topic of the last one.

Is there a possible world where God does not exist ?

No. Not that I expect agnostics, skeptics, atheists, or even some theists to agree!

jbiemans
Posted 02/24/12 at 11:57 AMReply with quote #3 
So to you, it is impossible for God to not exist then ?
RandyE
Posted 02/24/12 at 12:04 PMReply with quote #4 

Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
So to you, it is impossible for God to not exist then ?

Yes, I believe God's non-existence to be impossible.

jbiemans
Posted 02/24/12 at 12:13 PMReply with quote #5 
Do you simply believe that, or do you believe that because of an argument ?  Would you be willing to entertain the possibility of a 'possible world where God does not exist ' ?
RandyE
Posted 02/24/12 at 01:09 PMReply with quote #6 

Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
Do you simply believe that, or do you believe that because of an argument ?  Would you be willing to entertain the possibility of a 'possible world where God does not exist ' ?

The MOA is my basis. Before I knew of the argument, I wasn't sure. Hadn't really considered it, and I didn't even really know anything about modal logic. Since the maximally-great being is construed as necessary (that is, its necessary existence follows from the rules of modal logic), then I don't see how--unless we establish that its existence is necessarily false. Of course, if a necessary being does not exist in at least one possible world, then its existence is necessarily false. But someone such as myself wouldn't accept someone proffering an example of a supposedly possible world, for that would rely on the presumption that God does not exist necessarily (which is ex hypothesi false), or that necessarily, God does not exist (which would require some incoherence within his properties).

jbiemans
Posted 02/24/12 at 01:24 PMReply with quote #7 
So someone such as yourself that is familiar with the MOA, is able to say that:

"There is a possible world where God does not exist"

is false, because of your background knowledge, but what about someone who was unfamiliar with the MOA, and saw my premise first ?

1) If there is a possible world where God does not exist, then God does not exist necessarily.
2) There is a possible world where God does not exist.
3) .: God does not exist necessarily.
4) Maximally great beings exist necessarily.
5) .: God is not a maximally great being.

When you evaluate this argument, you look at (5) and see that you clearly disagree with it, since you define God as a maximally great being, so the problem must be somewhere else, it can't be in (1), so it must be in (2).  You said before though, that you cannot discard (2) simply based on what it entails, and I think you are wrong about that.  

I think it will be harder to discard (2) then you think though.  The only way that you can do it is if you first assume that God is a maximally great being, which would beg the question against the conclusion of the argument, would it not ?

Even if you define God as a maximally great being (necessary) there is still the chance that it does not exist, which means that it either is necessary (exists in all worlds), or not (does not exist in any):

RandyE
Posted 02/24/12 at 01:35 PMReply with quote #8 
Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
So someone such as yourself that is familiar with the MOA, is able to say that:

"There is a possible world where God does not exist"

is false, because of your background knowledge, but what about someone who was unfamiliar with the MOA, and saw my premise first ?

1) If there is a possible world where God does not exist, then God does not exist necessarily.
2) There is a possible world where God does not exist.
3) .: God does not exist necessarily.
4) Maximally great beings exist necessarily.
5) .: God is not a maximally great being.

When you evaluate this argument, you look at (5) and see that you clearly disagree with it, since you define God as a maximally great being, so the problem must be somewhere else, it can't be in (1), so it must be in (2).  You said before though, that you cannot discard (2) simply based on what it entails, and I think you are wrong about that.  

I think it will be harder to discard (2) then you think though.  The only way that you can do it is if you first assume that God is a maximally great being, which would beg the question against the conclusion of the argument, would it not ?

Even if you define God as a maximally great being (necessary) there is still the chance that it does not exist, which means that it either is necessary (exists in all worlds), or not (does not exist in any):

If someone who was unfamiliar with the MOA (and presumably, by extension, modal logic), why would they accept (1)? Now perhaps we can say we teach them about modal logic, what necessary means, and its entailments. Now it would be bizarre to insist we cannot inform them of the MOA. It is then suggested that this would be begging the question. But not quite. You see, (5) is analytically implied only from a separate conclusion, namely (3), and one other premise, namely (4). So a denial of (5) doesn't have to be done on the basis of a denial of (3). Rather, a denial of (5) can be done on the basis of the first premise of the MOA, and we discover that God's attributes match up with the MGB, and then run the rest of the argument, which is the support for (4) (if we don't teach them this through a virtually identical version of parts of the MOA, they won't know why to take it as true), we'll discover God's existence is either necessary or impossible. But in that case we'll have a reason to deny (2)--unless of course we think God's existence is impossible.

I don't understand what you mean by saying there's a chance a necessary being does not exist.
jbiemans
Posted 02/24/12 at 01:49 PMReply with quote #9 
What I meant is what you said; an MGB is either necessary or impossible.  I don't know what I must accept necessary if I cannot demonstrate impossible.  I would not expect you to accept that it was impossible if I could not demonstrate necessity.
RandyE
Posted 02/24/12 at 01:56 PMReply with quote #10 

Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
What I meant is what you said; an MGB is either necessary or impossible.  I don't know what I must accept necessary if I cannot demonstrate impossible.  I would not expect you to accept that it was impossible if I could not demonstrate necessity.

Because an entailment of something's not being impossible is that it is possible. But, in a true disjunction, at least one of the disjuncts are true (if not both). So if we say God's existence is either necessary or impossible, it can't be shown to be impossible, and it's shown as possible via coherence, then by logical implication it is necessary.

The situations are not symmetrical for that very reason. If one said "it is necessary or impossible," and you accepted this, and they could not demonstrate necessity, it still doesn't follow from a lack of necessity that it is impossible. Unless, of course, we mean he cannot demonstrate necessity because he cannot show possibility. But if he cannot show possibility, it must be because what he is proffering is incoherent. But if it's incoherent, it is by definition impossible.
jbiemans
Posted 02/24/12 at 02:17 PMReply with quote #11 
Is coherence enough to say that something is possible ?  Is a maximally great being even coherent ?

Is the MOA a sound argument without the use of possible worlds ?
RandyE
Posted 02/24/12 at 02:28 PMReply with quote #12 
Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
Is coherence enough to say that something is possible ?  Is a maximally great being even coherent ?

Is the MOA a sound argument without the use of possible worlds ?

The first question: I would say no. It needs to be coherent and there also needs to be a lack of a necessary truth entailing its falsehood. The second question, I think it is coherent, though some will disagree. The third question: I am not sure. This is because modalities is just a fancy way to refer to what is possibly the case and what must be the case, and possible worlds is just a fancy way to refer to complete descriptions of what is possibly the case and what must be the case. So perhaps we could dispense with possible world semantics, but in any case it seems quite useful.

jbiemans
Posted 02/24/12 at 02:37 PMReply with quote #13 
I think eliminating the possible world semantics would show the actual argument better and it would eliminate some confusion.
jbiemans
Posted 02/24/12 at 02:40 PMReply with quote #14 
Just out of curiosity, what if I said that a necessary leprechaun exists.  It is coherent, and there is no necessary truth entailing its falsehood, so does that mean it exists ?
RandyE
Posted 02/24/12 at 02:56 PMReply with quote #15 

Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
Just out of curiosity, what if I said that a necessary leprechaun exists.  It is coherent, and there is no necessary truth entailing its falsehood, so does that mean it exists ?

Why should we think it is necessary?

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