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troyjs
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Posted 07/10/11
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#1
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In order for the Ontological Argument, as favoured by Craig and Plantinga to stand, it must be true that necessary synthetic propositions exist, and that the Modal Ontological Argument only commits one to believe that God's existence is necessary de re, rather than necessary de dicto.
This is because Kant's and Russell's objections to ontological arguments, de dicto, are valid refutations.
Please provide good reasons to believe that necessary synthetic propositions exist or are possible, and that the ontological argument is not analytic, but synthetic.
kind regards
I am a Christian and if it can be shown that there can be necessary synthetic propositions, I may be persuaded to believe that a form of the ontological argument is possibly valid.
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chuckg1982
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Posted 07/10/11
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#2
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Quote: Originally Posted by troyjs
In order for the Ontological Argument, as favoured by Craig and Plantinga to stand, it must be true that necessary synthetic propositions exist, and that the Modal Ontological Argument only commits one to believe that God's existence is necessary de re, rather than necessary de dicto.
This is because Kant's and Russell's objections to ontological arguments, de dicto, are valid refutations.
Please provide good reasons to believe that necessary synthetic propositions exist or are possible, and that the ontological argument is not analytic, but synthetic.
kind regards
I am a Christian and if it can be shown that there can be necessary synthetic propositions, I may be persuaded to believe that a form of the ontological argument is possibly valid.
I agree that "God exists" is synthetic a priori, but the possibility of such propositions should not be the foundation on which the ontological stands or falls. Instead, you should judge the argument on its own merits; is it deductively valid, and are all of its premises true? If so, then there's at least one synthetic a priori proposition.
Kant had a few arguments for the possibility of such propositions, his most famous being that a mathematical truth such as 7 + 5 = 12 is necessary even though "7 + 5" is not contained in the concept "12." However, I've read that this is contradicted by relatively recent developments in mathematics. But again, I don't think your acceptance of the ontological argument should have anything to do with this.
One thing that I should note is that every premise of the ontological argument, at least the version with which I'm most familiar (that's valid in S5), is necessary de dicto. Either the premises are instances of strict implication (e.g., "Necessarily, if God exists, then it is necessary that God exists"), possibility (e.g., "Possibly, God exists," which, if true, is necessarily true in S5), or theorems (e.g., "[g=>Lg]-->[Mg=>g]," which is necessary in accordance with RN).
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troyjs
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Posted 07/11/11
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#3
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My objection is that for any synthetic proposition, observation is required. The ontological argument is Rational rather than Empirical, and I would suspect that all ontological arguments can only be analytically true, rather than synthetically so. Also, the 'Uniqueness of Conceptual Framework Objection' is a stumbling block in the way of affirming the validity of any argument dependent upon ontology.
I will concede that the ontological argument, if sound and not analytic, may be it's own support as to the possible existence of synthetic necessary propositions. It does however, if sound, appear to be analytic considering intensionality.
kind regards
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chuckg1982
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Posted 07/11/11
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#4
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Quote: Originally Posted by troyjs
My objection is that for any synthetic proposition, observation is required.
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troyjs
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Posted 07/12/11
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#5
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Quote: All a posteriori claims are synthetic, but not all synthetic claims are a posteriori.
But all synthetic propositions can not be verified by reason alone, and require observation,ie. can only be true by virtue of fact, and not by virtue of meaning.
The proposition, 'water is H20', seems necessarily true, but it is only known by observation. It is not analytic because the concept of H20 is not contained in the concept of water. But Quine's two Dogmas allows us to assign a meaning to the word 'water', which does contain the concept of 'H20'. Given that the meanings of words are determined a posteriori, which affetcs synonymy between words, and all analytic propositions are susceptible to this charge, then there is no difference between an analytic proposition, and a synthetic necessary proposition.
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chuckg1982
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Posted 07/12/11
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#6
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Quote: Originally Posted by troyjs
But all synthetic propositions can not be verified by reason alone, and require observation,ie. can only be true by virtue of fact, and not by virtue of meaning.
My point is precisely that the opposite is true. It is not necessary that a synthetic proposition is true by empirical observation. For example, "Something cannot come from nothing" is not true by meaning (otherwise, it would be a tautology), nor is it true inductively (otherwise, it would be sort of a scientific law, and it is not). The notions of "synthetic" and "analytic" pertain only to the relationship between the subject and predicate--the terms have no underlying epistemological baggage. "Synthetic" and "analytic" are semantic notions; "a priori" and "a posteriori" are epistemological notions. Quote: The proposition, 'water is H20', seems necessarily true, but it is only known by observation. It is not analytic because the concept of H20 is not contained in the concept of water.
Yes, it is.
Quote: Given that the meanings of words are determined a posteriori, which affetcs synonymy between words, and all analytic propositions are susceptible to this charge, then there is no difference between an analytic proposition, and a synthetic necessary proposition.
The proposition "We use 'water' to refer to H2O" is not the same as "Water is H2O."
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troyjs
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Posted 07/12/11
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#7
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If 'H20' was contained in 'water' then it would be analytic. We believe that water is H20, because of observation. But as we know, induction is a poor arbiter of truth. It is conceivably possibly for water not to be H20. Ofcourse, before the chemical composition of water was discovered, people referred to the same object we do, with the name 'water'. The chemical composition of water, is inferred from a limited data set, and this is why it is not analytic to affirm that 'water is H20'. Kripke's 'rigid designators' allows us to affirm that there is a possible world, in which water is not H20, and yet is referring to the same object that we call water.
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chuckg1982
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Posted 07/12/11
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#8
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Quote: Originally Posted by troyjsIf 'H20' was contained in 'water' then it would be analytic.
It is. If we thought that something was water, but then found out later on that it contained no oxygen, then we would no longer call it "water." The reason is that the essence of water is two oxygen atoms bonded with one hydrogen atom.
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DrewMazanec
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Posted 07/13/11
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#9
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Kripke did a lot of work on necessity de re modality, as well as giving counterexamples to the idea that a priori, necessary, and analytic entail one another.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/#CarQuiKriPut
Quote: One of Kripke's counterexamples to (i) is the identity statement ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’. - ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is true and knowable only a posteriori.
- ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are both rigid designators.
- ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is necessarily true.
- So, ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is necessary and a posteriori.
Given that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are rigid designators, if they refer at all, they refer to the same things in all possible worlds, in which those things exist. And since, ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is true in the actual world, it follows that it is true in all possible worlds in which the terms refer. Given that it can only be known a posteriori that Hesperus = Phosphorus we have arrived at a statement that is both necessary and a posteriori. One of Kripke's counterexamples to (ii) is the statement ‘I exist’. - ‘I exist’ when asserted by a person, is true and known by that person a priori.
- No human person necessarily exists, each human person has a contingent existence.
- So, ‘I exist’ is contingent and known a priori.
Quote: Kripke employs this in an example to justify the coherence of de re modal statements, which at least suggests that Kripke takes the intuitiveness of the content of some de re modal propositions to be evidence for their truth. Suppose that someone said, pointing to Nixon, ‘That's the guy who might have lost’. Someone else says ‘Oh no, if you describe him as “Nixon”, then he might have lost; but, of course, describing him as the winner, then it is not true that he might have lost’. Now which one is being the philosopher, here, the unintuitive man? It seems to me obviously to be the second. The second man has a philosophical theory. The first man would say, and with great conviction, ‘Well, of course, the winner of the election might have been someone else. The actual winner, had the course of the campaign been different, might have been the loser, and someone else the winner; or there might have been no election at all. So, such terms as “the winner” and “the loser” don't designate the same objects in all possible worlds. On the other hand, the term “Nixon” is just a name of this man’. When you ask whether it is necessary or contingent that Nixon won the election, you are asking the intuitive question whether in some counterfactual situation, this man would in fact have lost the election. (1980: 41).
In addition, Plantinga's book on The Nature of Necessity gives a thorough defense of essentialism and of the idea of de re modality. Kant's objections are grossly out of date.
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troyjs
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Posted 07/14/11
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#10
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Drew,
Thanks for your input. Understanding that a discussion on metaphysically necessary propositions must consider Kripkean modality, it is needful to address his 'rigid designators' and his revival of essentialism.
I still maintain that this debate between Quine and Kripke is not over yet. Quine's Mathematician-Cyclist arguments against essentialism still stand, as far as I am aware, and I for one believe that Quine's famous paper, 'the Two Dogmas of Empiricism', not only undermine that analytic propositions are always necessary truths, but also undermines the validity of any proposition being necessarily true. Atleast from epistemological grounds.
As far as the 'Nixon winner-loser argument', it only works if object x, which we refer to as Nixon, is properly referred to as Nixon in all possible worlds. What makes proper names rigid, whereas some descriptions may not be?
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DrewMazanec
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Posted 07/14/11
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#11
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First, the criterion that Nixon needs to be called "Nixon" in each possible world would make our modality dependent on our language. We would never be able to even speak of possible worlds or even states of affairs that lack creatures that speak English!
I am not sure it is Kripke as much as it is Plantinga who has defended essentialism, and in my opinion, quite successfully. Much of Plantinga's career has been spent refuting Quine's objections and defending both essentialism and de re modality.
In fact, Plaintinga does have responses to the mathematician cyclist argument, such as the one here: http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/plantinga01.htm
In the argument, Quine wants us to accept two premises:
1. Mathematicians are necessarily rational but not necessarily bipedal
2. Cyclists are necessarily bipedal but not necessarily rational
Quine then says "Zwier is both a cyclist and a mathematician. Can we infer that Zwier is necessarily raitonal but not necessarily bipedal? Can we infer that Zwier is necessarily bipedal but not necessarily rational?
The problem with Quine's arguments is that they are so poorly worded that they can be interpreted in multiple ways. They are the equivalent of the old joke: "I once met a man with a wooden leg named Smith and asked him 'what is the name of the other leg.'" Once Quine's sentences are re-worded to be more explicit,
1' Necessarily, all mathematicians are rational
or
1'' For any person, if that person is a mathematician, then that person has the property of being necessarily rational
the problem disappears, as do Quine's objections.
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troyjs
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Posted 07/16/11
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#12
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I think there is a misunderstanding with regards to what Quine's intent was in putting forward the argument. It was to show that what we count as being essential to x, depends on how we refer to x. If we refer to x as a mathematician or a cyclist, the meaning of mathematician or cyclist necessarily implies certain attributes, but these attributes are not essential to the ontology of x. Kripe's refutation of this argument was his Nixon winner/loser argument, where he provides an example of where x, that is Nixon, can be referred to as the winner, and yet it is still meaningful to speak of Nixon whereis he is not the winner.
However, Quine did not accept intuition, or the 'man-on-the-street's' natural way of speaking on things, as support that speaking of essences or kinds to be a correct use of language, or determining what is essential, and what is accidental. Quine's question is, 'how do we determine between an essential, necessary property, and an accidental, contingent property? Kripke says intuition is inescapable and presupposed. Quine says that, when not dealing with abstractions, it is necessary to empirically validate our hypotheses.
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DrewMazanec
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Posted 07/21/11
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#13
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I would argue that the difference between rigid and non-rigid designators is that the former preserves aboutness when placed in various contexts. The latter does not.
The mathematician/cyclist argument features ambiguous phrasing, and that is where the problem lies. If we refer to Zwier as "the mathematician cyclist" is this phrase about Zwier or about mathematicians and cyclists? Are we saying that Zwier is by definition a mathematician and cyclist? Or are we referring to a specific person, who, as things stand in the actual world, is a mathematician cyclist?
The statement "Cyclists are necessarily two-legged" is not a well-formed premise, and no argument containing such a statement can be a valid argument. Instead, the statement needs to be re-worded as "Necessarily, cyclists are two-legged" or "Every cyclist has the property of being necessarily two-legged." Then and only then can we evaluate the argument.
As long as we clear up Quine's phrasing so that the aboutness does not change based on context, his problem disappears. But until Quine's arguments are re-worded to be more explicit, they are not even arguments. They are gibberish.
Plantinga agreed that we can specify an object according to its non-essential properties. And on top of that, the way we specify an object need not reveal all of an object's essential properties.
Here Quine’s central complaint is this: a given object, according to the essentialist, has some of its properties essentially and others accidentally, despite the fact that the latter follow from certain ways of specifying the object just as the former do from others. So far, fair enough. Snubnosedness (we may suppose) is not one of Socrates’ essential attributes; none the less it follows (is the sense in question) from the description ‘the snubnosed teacher of Plato’. As we construe him, furthermore, the essentialist holds that among the essential attributes of an object are certain non-truistic properties—properties which, unlike the property of being red or not red, do not follow from every description; so it will indeed be true, as Quine suggests, that ways of uniquely specifying an object are not all on the same footing. Those from which each of its essential properties follows must be awarded the accolade as best revealing the essence of the object.
But what, exactly, is “unreasonable” about this? And how, precisely, is it baffling? The real depth of Quine’s objection, as I understand it, is this: he holds that ‘A’s are necessarily B’s’ must, if it means anything at all, mean something like ‘necessarily, A’s are B’s’; for “necessity resides in the way we talk about things, not in the things we talk about” (Ways of Paradox, p. 174). And hence the bafflement in asking, of some specific individual who is both cyclist and mathematician, whether he is essentially rational and contingently 2-legged or vice versa. Perhaps the claim is, finally, that while we can make a certain rough sense of modality de dicto, we can understand modality de re only if we can explain it in terms of the former. I turn to such explanation in Chapter III
In fact, there seems to be a fallacy here that confuses necessity of the consequence with necessity of the consequent. Calvinists and Open Theists often mix this up, and Dr. Craig clarifies this in The Only Wise God.
1. Necessarily, if God knows x, x will happen
2. God knows x
3. Necessarily, x will happen
Dr. Craig points out that this is fallacious. The proper form of the argument:
1. Necessarily, if God knows x, x will happen
2. Necessarily, God knows x
3. Necessarily, x will happen
This is valid, but now 2 is false when we talk of future contingent events. While it is true that necessarily, God knows the truth value of x (whether x is true or false), this is different than saying "necessarily, God knows x" (in which case x can only be true)
Similar problems seem to occur in Quine's thought experiments. He seems to be arguing:
1. Necessarily, if I specify Jones as the guy in the yellow shirt, then Jones is the guy in the yellow shirt
2. I specify Jones as the guy in the yellow shirt
3. Necessarily, Jones is the guy in the yellow shirt
This argument commits the same fallacy. 3 does not follow from 1 and 2. It should be restated as either:
1. Necessarily, if I specify Jones as the guy in the yellow shirt, then Jones is the guy in the yellow shirt
2. Necessarily, I specify Jones as the guy in the yellow shirt
3. Necessarily, Jones is the guy in the yellow shirt
(2 is false, as neither of us are necessary beings)
or
1. Necessarily, if I specify Jones as the guy in the yellow shirt, then Jones is the guy in the yellow shirt
2. I specify Jones as the guy in the yellow shirt
3. Jones is the guy in the yellow shirt
(in which case Quine's objection disappears)
Then we can evaluate the argument.
And Quine's statement that "when not dealing with abstractions, it is necessary to empirically validate our hypotheses"
That is a textbook example of verificationism. And verificationism is self-refuting.
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troyjs
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Posted 08/04/11
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#14
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Thanks for your response,
Quote: Similar problems seem to occur in Quine's thought experiments. He seems to be arguing:
1. Necessarily, if I specify Jones as the guy in the yellow shirt, then Jones is the guy in the yellow shirt
2. I specify Jones as the guy in the yellow shirt
3. Necessarily, Jones is the guy in the yellow shirt
This is exactly Quine's point. Quine does not want to allow for such modalities in regards to physical states-of-affairs. Quine's 'planets' argument was designed to show this, that it is absurd to conclude that the number of planets is necessarily greater than seven.
Where Kripke would affirm that gold necessarily has the atomic number it does, regardless of whether a substance of the same atomic number is blue, or green, or gaseous -- it is still gold because the essential attribute is it's atomic number. This may be true for us today, but prior to the discovery of the atomic nature of gold, the essential attribute of gold then might have been quite different. Suppose that all of our previous calculations and observations of gold were incorrect, and that gold has a different atomic number altogether? What then? Rather, Quine would maintain that what we regard as an essential property, is dependent on how fundamental it is to our understanding of the world en toto. Much of our knowledge depends on our understanding of chemistry as tabulated in the periodic table, and therefore it seems essential, even necessary to us, that water is H20.
As regards validating/confirming the truth of propositions relevant to the physical world, it is not required of one to be a positivist in order to agree that it is important to confirm our observations. From an epistemological point of view, Phosphorus and Hersperus may refer to the same object -- the evening and morning star, but it does little good to claim that they are necessarily the same, without first making the observation. This however, will undermine Kripke's attempt to justify his modal logic in regards to science. Intuition is insufficient as evidence in the scientific arena, not only because our intuitions about the physical world are dependent on our current scientific knowledge, but because what seems to be essential to an object, is often revised as our understanding develops, eg. taxonomy.
There are also other philosophical arguments against essentialism such as the 'verification/idealism objection', and 'the uniqueness of conceptual framework objection'. Although meant as objections to Kant's transcendentals, they are relevant to this discussion.
Proposition: Object p necessarily has property x.
How do we justify such a proposition? If object p is material, then we must empirically verify this claim. If it is abstract, then it is only known to be true to the extent that it is true in my mind.
Suppose that it is inescapable for us to think of object p, without also thinking of it having property x.
How do we determine whether our understanding of object p is correct or not? We can not, and rather than it's inescapability being a justification, it becomes it's downfall in that we can never objectiely justify it to be true.
..And this brings us back to Quine. After Quine had destroyed Logical Positivism with his piece, the 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', Kripke's lectures become famous for reviving necessary truths, not in the way the Positivists like Carnap had thought of it, but in terms of Aristotelian-essentialism. However, just like Quine had shown the circularity of analyticity, Kripke had not escaped the charge of circularity in regards to essentialism. How do we know that 'a bachelor' is synonymous with 'an unmarried man', Quine asked? Because it is analytic/necessary responded the positivists. And how do we know that it is analytic? Because the words are synonymous. The only escape from circularity is to take the empiricist route and say that, "I know what 'bachelor' means because I looked it up in a dictionary", or something similar. But then, how do we know the dictionary was correct? The proposition that 'bachelors are unmarried men', could not be justified to be necessarily true. What then of essentialism? How do we know that water is necessarily H20? Any posited justification can only be either circular or empirical in nature, and the use of the term 'necessarily' becomes hardly meaningful.
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Tisthammerw
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Posted 08/04/11
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#15
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Quote: Originally Posted by troyjs
In order for the Ontological Argument, as favoured by Craig and Plantinga to stand, it must be true that necessary synthetic propositions exist, and that the Modal Ontological Argument only commits one to believe that God's existence is necessary de re, rather than necessary de dicto.
This is because Kant's and Russell's objections to ontological arguments, de dicto, are valid refutations.
Please provide good reasons to believe that necessary synthetic propositions exist or are possible, and that the ontological argument is not analytic, but synthetic.
kind regards
I am a Christian and if it can be shown that there can be necessary synthetic propositions, I may be persuaded to believe that a form of the ontological argument is possibly valid.
At least some moral truths seem to fit the bill. “It is morally wrong to torture infants just for fun” seems to be true in every possible world, yet the proposition is not an analytic statement.
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