| maximus8975 |
| Posted 05/06/11 at 01:28 AM | Reply with quote #1 |
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In an online discussion regarding the ontological argument, a few criticisms came by that just ring to me so obviously fallacious but can't really articulate why. "Okay, so when you conceive of this being, what is now stopping me from conceiving of one that "Is stronger than the strongest conceivable being"? How is this different than you coming up with the largest number possible? Give me the largest number, I'll show you one bigger.
Unless there is a defined limit to what is the strongest being possible(which is something I have said several times) then its assumed there is no limit. If we are saying that which can be conceived of is possible, and that which is possible is real, the limit is only that which can be conceived of. One can't say "Its the strongest possible" without defining what is possible. Anything they come up with I can conceive of something stronger." He seems to be assuming the concept of 'maximal greatness' leads to self contradictions and an infinite amount of possibilities. "you thought of yours, but I can think of a God who hates jesus and throws him into a firy hell." Can you help? -Marc |
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| Captain_jim |
| Posted 05/08/11 at 10:19 AM | Reply with quote #2 |
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Here's what I see as a potential problem, let me know if you think it hits the mark or not. The issue I see is that the objection assumes that in order for the ontological argument to go through you, or be valid, one needs to be able to actually fully conceive of the greatest conceivable being. But that's not the argument. The argument doesn't hang upon whether we can actually fully conceive of this being - in fact, I would think one "great making" attribute of this being would be that we, as finite beings, could never fully conceive of or understand this being in totality!
So whether or not this being is fully conceivable, or not, doesn't affect the argument. Now all we need to conceive of is that the greatest being conceivable would in fact have the attributes given in the (specific) ontological argument (such as this being would exist in a possible world, exist in all possible worlds, etc.).
If someone says that they can conceive of a being that can "do more" than your being, I'd simply define the maximally greatest conceivable being as being able to do all things logically possible and, of course, which would adhere to the moral perfection of this being (as I think moral perfection would be another "great making" attribute). I don't see how one could conceive of a greater being than that. But this specific objection doesn't touch the ontological argument at all. It's a red herring. It has nothing to do with whether this being actually exists or not.
Once again, actually fully conceiving of this being doesn't affect the argument. As long as the attributes listed in the actual ontological argument are agreed upon, then that's all you need to go on! So I'd suggest to decide which version of the ontological argument you would want to use (or is being objected to), and then see which premise the objector is denying - and why. Chances are, it seems, this type of objection wouldn't even touch on the premises of most versions I've seen.
It may be that the objector could conceive of a great being than you can conceive of! But that doesn't matter, as long as you both agree that an attribute of this being would be that it must exist in a possible world, every possible world, etc.
Let me know what you think. |
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| maximus8975 |
| Posted 05/09/11 at 03:28 AM | Reply with quote #3 |
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That's a valid point. I mentioned previous times in the conversation that the point doesn't necessarily refute the argument, but rather admits it and leaves us with a question of "well then who is it?" and not "is it possible that it exists?'
When saying comments like 'maximal greatness' and 'all surpassingly great being' how do you avoid complete subjectivism when defining what might be considered great?
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| Marshall |
| Posted 05/09/11 at 03:03 PM | Reply with quote #4 |
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| Dr. Craig took a question the other week (#209) where he talked a little about problems with the "positivist" view of God.
Whenever you "conceive of [God as] a Being" you're already in an exposed position, since one of God's 'attributes' is "beyond anything we can conceive; inclusive of every possibility we could ever imagine." The Atheist call that a copout, but in ordinary life we often refer to God by pointing to those things we humans don't understand, or understand incompletely.
Could God make a rock he couldn't lift? No, because if He did, He could lift that one too.... ;-)
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| jmischley |
| Posted 05/09/11 at 04:57 PM | Reply with quote #5 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by maximus8975In an online discussion regarding the ontological argument, a few criticisms came by that just ring to me so obviously fallacious but can't really articulate why. "Okay, so when you conceive of this being, what is now stopping me from conceiving of one that "Is stronger than the strongest conceivable being"?
I would say that this is a self-contradiction. If the highest strength of being that you can conceive of is X, then it is impossible to conceive of something stronger than X, because you just admitted that it was the highest strength you could conceive. If you could conceive of something stronger, then that would have been X. On a side note, I also don't see how this point refutes any part of the argument anyway.
Quote: Originally Posted by maximus8975How is this different than you coming up with the largest number possible? Give me the largest number, I'll show you one bigger. Unless there is a defined limit to what is the strongest being possible(which is something I have said several times) then its assumed there is no limit. If we are saying that which can be conceived of is possible, and that which is possible is real, the limit is only that which can be conceived of. One can't say "Its the strongest possible" without defining what is possible. Anything they come up with I can conceive of something stronger." He seems to be assuming the concept of 'maximal greatness' leads to self contradictions and an infinite amount of possibilities. "you thought of yours, but I can think of a God who hates jesus and throws him into a firy hell."
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| Captain_jim |
| Posted 05/09/11 at 07:12 PM | Reply with quote #6 |
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| I think jmischley's comments were right on the mark. I'd like to simply offer a response to maximus8975's second post.
Quote: "I mentioned previous times in the conversation that the point doesn't necessarily refute the argument, but rather admits it and leaves us with a question of "well then who is it?" and not "is it possible that it exists?'
When saying comments like 'maximal greatness' and 'all surpassingly great being' how do you avoid complete subjectivism when defining what might be considered great?"
As per the first paragraph, exactly! The ontological argument isn't arguing for a specific God as, for example, Yahweh, Allah, Brahma, etc. All we are arguing for with the ontological argument is that a supreme being exists (or maximally great being exists) - that's it. In regards to that being's attributes, other than the ones given in the premises of the ontological argument, they are completely irrelevant to the argument. We could be talking about a theistic God, or a pantheistic God, etc. I think there are good reasons for thinking this being must be a theistic God, but I definitely don't see it as being relevant to the ontological argument.
Now, if your objector agrees that a maximally great being exists, then that's the point in which it would be relevant to discuss some further attributes of who that being is - and like I said, I think you can have great arguments for a theistic God. But if the objector doesn't agree that a maximally great being exists, then he or she is just going off on what could be considered a red herring - it just doesn't apply.
Like I said in my previous post, I'd just encourage the objector to tell me which premise(s) he doesn't think is plausible. If he doesn't understand what you mean by asking this question, then maybe he should take a quick study on how arguments are built, defended, and broken (I say this honestly, not sarcastically - the hard part would be to suggest this gently and respectfully!). You could always quickly explain how an argument has to be objected to and then ask again. Sometimes we need to be able to walk people through arguments step by step if they don't understand it - which can be difficult since everyone thinks on a different level. I suppose sometimes certain arguments themselves can be intrinsically difficult to grasp, and we have to be able to simplify (if possible).
As per your second paragraph, how do you avoid subjectivism? I think jmischley gave a great response.
I would also add that the way I would approach discussing which attributes are "great making" is to simply offer an attribute which you think is "great making", and provide some reasons why you think so. Basically, formulate an argument for why this attribute is a great making property. Then the other person involved can either agree, or disagree. But if they disagree then they have to point out a flaw in the argument you just created! If they just say "I don't think so..." and don't address the reason(s) you gave, then all you need to do is point out that your argument has not be defeated and it still stands.
Not everybody will agree as to what properties are "great making", but I think the kinda bare bones ones are great to discuss - things like being an uncaused eternal being, morally perfect, the source of all reality, the embodiment of great attributes such as love, just, compassionate, logical, etc. It's one thing to be loving and logical, but to be the very anchor or referent for these I think is the greatest property a being could have.
But, none of that should come up during discussion of the ontological argument - only after the ontological argument is agreed upon (unless you are specifically on the topic of "what are the great making properties of the maximally greatest being?").
So how do we avoid subjectivity? Well, if we agree that a maximally great being exists then we at the very least can say this being objectively exists! jmischley's comment comes in cogently here.
My last point: we may or may not be able to discover these attributes - but we should do our best to try and provide logical inferences and solid reasons. The issue shouldn't be subjectivity because nobody can be completely objective - in any realm! But no disputes their knowing that their mother exists is perhaps subjective therefore wrong! The real issue here is 'can we rationally and respectfully discuss and attempt to discover what this being is like?' It's all about being honest in approaching the question and having reasons for why you think what you think, right?
Hope that helps! Let me know you further thoughts!
In Christ.
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| Leviny |
| Posted 09/06/11 at 01:55 PM | Reply with quote #7 |
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Help me understand the Ontological Arguement, because it sounds completely and obviously false.
If I can conceive of a an earth that is flat, is the earth flat? or does another earth exist which is flat? or does a flat earth exist in my mind?
The O.A. is merely a testament to our limited ability to experience and comprehend the reality around us, and to the fact that if God exists, he exists only in the minds of those who believe he exists.
Or am I compleltely misunderstanding the argument?
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| Captain_jim |
| Posted 09/08/11 at 05:15 PM | Reply with quote #8 |
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The basic foundation of the argument is that because God is by definition a necessary being, he must necessarily exist in every possible world. Since our world is one of those possible worlds then God must necessarily exist in it. Thus, if God is even possible, He must exist. For example, I am a contingent being so I may exist in some possible worlds, but not in all. But God, on the other hand, is not contingent, but necessary, so He must exist in every possible world - otherwise He would not be a necessary being.
Maybe I'll give you Plantinga's form of the argument and perhaps that will help, since you may be basing your knowledge of the ontological argument off of a form that's not so great. I'm not sure if you've seen this form or not, but the key here should be premise 1. Most objections I've seen don't address 2-6. So the ultimate question becomes "is it more plausible that God is possible, or not?" If God (defined as a necessary being) is at least possible, then He must be present in all possible worlds (once again) since He's a necessary being - not a contingent being.
1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists. 2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. 3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. 4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world. 5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists. 6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
I hope that helps somehow. |
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| Leviny |
| Posted 09/08/11 at 06:53 PM | Reply with quote #9 |
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Thanks for the response!
"God is by definition a necessary being"
explain, please. I look at the world and I see a world without any gods.
I do have some issues with 2-6. seems to me you're jumping to conclusions. let me add a few words you left out (in CAPS)
1. it is possible that (whatever) exists. (I have no problem with this one)
2. if it is possible that (whatever) exists, then IT IS POSSIBLE that (whatever) exists in some possible world.
3. if IT IS POSSIBLE that (whatever) exists in some possible worlds, then IT IS POSSIBLE that it exists in every possible world.
4. if IT IS POSSIBLE that (whatever) exists in every possible world, then IT IS POSSIBLE that it exists in the actual world.
5. if IT IS POSSIBLE that (whatever) exists in the actual world, then IT IS POSSIBLE that (whatever) exists.
6. Therefore, IT IS POSSIBLE that (whatever) exists.
compare 1 with 6...
you can't say "(whatever) exists" (which you did in #2) unless you have a reason to assert this. just because the world is hypothetical doesn't mean anything hypothetical ACTUALLY EXISTS in it! it's a hypothetical hypothetical! two question marks don't make an exclamation mark.
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| gregwilson |
| Posted 09/10/11 at 01:24 AM | Reply with quote #10 |
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| This did confuse me, but the debate needs to be centered on premise 1. Plantinga is arguing that either (a) it is possible God exists or (b) it is impossible God exists. Of course, he is arguing (a) above (b), but his logic is that either (a) or (b) must be true in the universe we live.
However, no philosopher debates 2-6, so it would be silly to get hung up on those. The argument is air tight logically, and to argue against God's existence would require a refutation on premise 1. So, if God does not exist premises 2-6 are irrelevant because 1 is necessarily untrue. So the argument becomes is there sufficient argument for God's existence? |
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| belorg |
| Posted 09/10/11 at 03:26 AM | Reply with quote #11 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by gregwilsonThis did confuse me, but the debate needs to be centered on premise 1. Plantinga is arguing that either (a) it is possible God exists or (b) it is impossible God exists. Of course, he is arguing (a) above (b), but his logic is that either (a) or (b) must be true in the universe we live.
However, no philosopher debates 2-6, so it would be silly to get hung up on those. The argument is air tight logically, and to argue against God's existence would require a refutation on premise 1. So, if God does not exist premises 2-6 are irrelevant because 1 is necessarily untrue. So the argument becomes is there sufficient argument for God's existence?
Plantinga's OA indeed states that God is either necssary or impossible.
But that's so trivila it hardly needs an argument at all.
Some theists tend to misuse this argument to shift the burden of proof on the non-beliver. According to them,the non-believer must prove, not just that God does not exist, but that God does not possibly exist. That seemsa quite hevay burden. Fortumately for the non-theist it isn't. Becasue the qame S5 logic Platinga uses here can be used in reverse. it also follows from the definition of a necessary being that if it possibly does not exist, it cannot exist.
So, in short. The burden for the theist as well as the non-theist is exactly the same before and after the ontological argument.
It's really useless.
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| silentmatt |
| Posted 09/10/11 at 09:16 AM | Reply with quote #12 |
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| I disagree that the OA is useless. It seems eminently within one's rational rights to suppose that it's possible that God exists, especially if one has other arguments for the instantiation of some of God's properties, like independent arguments for an immaterial being, a supreme moral authority, a necessary being, and so forth. By contrast, it's hard to think of any argument that might be offered for the possibility of God's nonexistence. I think that accepting that it's possible that God exists, rather than that it's possible he doesn't exist, is eminently reasonable, even if we exclude Maydole-style logical proofs for the possibility of God's existence.
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| belorg |
| Posted 09/10/11 at 02:02 PM | Reply with quote #13 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by silentmattI disagree that the OA is useless. It seems eminently within one's rational rights to suppose that it's possible that God exists, especially if one has other arguments for the instantiation of some of God's properties, like independent arguments for an immaterial being, a supreme moral authority, a necessary being, and so forth. By contrast, it's hard to think of any argument that might be offered for the possibility of God's nonexistence. I think that accepting that it's possible that God exists, rather than that it's possible he doesn't exist, is eminently reasonable, even if we exclude Maydole-style logical proofs for the possibility of God's existence. If you cannot prove that God is possible, then it is possible that he isn't. I am not claiming that you cannot have rational reasons to think God is possible, and that you are entitled to your opinion that he exists, but that is true with or without any sort of ontological argument. What is important in a discussion is to examine the arguments for and against God's existence. Modal tricks like Plantinga's OA uses try to establish a conclusion without solid arguments.
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| Leviny |
| Posted 09/10/11 at 04:06 PM | Reply with quote #14 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by belorg
What is important in a discussion is to examine the arguments for and against God's existence. Modal tricks like Plantinga's OA uses try to establish a conclusion without solid arguments.
Exactly. Logic not limited by language, but the expression of logic is. these are word tricks, without a logical equivalence. If you cannot support the assertion that god exists, or that he may exist, then the burden of proof remains on you.
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| Captain_jim |
| Posted 09/10/11 at 04:36 PM | Reply with quote #15 |
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It was said, "If you cannot prove that God is possible, then it is possible that he isn't."
It seems there are some misunderstandings which seem to be derived from a misunderstanding concerning how deductive arguments are supposed to work - and what they are supposed to do. Deductive arguments aren't an "all or nothing" sort of argument, as seems to be what most here are assuming. The strength of any deductive argument is contingent upon the degree to which a person thinks the premises are plausible (assuming they are logically valid), not whether we can prove a premise.
As with any deductive argument, one may not accept a premise as being 100% plausible. But with such arguments we aren't looking to see whether the premise in question is 100% true (although that would be the best case), we just want to see if it is plausible. That is to say, do you think that it's degree of plausibility is more than 50%? If so, and assuming that the other premises are accepted as being plausible, we then have a strong argument. This is simply the case with all deductive arguments - they don't prove absolutely because the strength of the argument is derived from the degree to which one thinks the premises are plausible. Therefore, if I accept premises 2-6 as being 100% plausible, and I accept the 1st as being 75% plausible, then the strength of the argument hangs on that first premise, which would give the argument a rating of 75 out of a hundred.
So, if one has good reasons for thinking that a maximally great being is possible, he therefore has good reasons for thinking He also exists. That's all the argument shows. However, if one accepts every premise as being 100% plausible then it would be considered a knockdown proof for this person.
But it may be that one has good reasons for thinking a maximally great being isn't possible, in such a case, the argument would not be considered a strong one if the plausibility of the premise is lower than 50%.
So, once again, the question isn't "is God possible?", the question is to what degree do you think the 1st premise is plausible?"
It's not a logical "trick", we just need to understand how arguments work.
So, once again, what Plantinga is showing (assuming premises 2-6 are logically valid and 100% plausible - which is considered the case by most) is that the degree of plausiblity to which you think a maximally great being is possible is the same degree to which you think a maximally great being exists! That's all.
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