| chuckg1982 |
| Posted 07/16/11 at 10:54 AM | Reply with quote #1 |
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A not-so-common (as far as I can tell) objection to Plantinga's famous modal ontological argument is that the notion of maximal excellence is nebulous and arbitrary, such that the notion's inclusion of omnipotence, omniscience and moral perfection is no more epistemically justified than if we were to include the property of, say, having the desire for human beings to exercise.
My contention from the beginning is that this does not actually show where Plantinga's argument goes wrong; perhaps there exists a maximally great being and an omniscient omnipotent being who likes exercise--I need an actual fallacy in Plantinga's argument. Nevertheless, I think this is worth addressing.
The question is, why should we assume omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection to be great-making attributes? Why isn't, say, having a body great-making?
First, there's a difference between properties that are great in themselves and those that are great insofar as they lead to other things. Intelligence, for example, is intrinsically good; the desire to know seems to be an innate human dynamism, and to say that it is good to know does not seem to require any justification. This is at least true intuitively, more so than the notion that, say, the goodness of a body is somehow self-justifying. In fact, one can point to Eastern religions whose main tenets include the desire to escape the physical world, in which bodies are included. Likewise, is there any reason to doubt that potency just is a good thing? Do we really need to justify why we would want to have more ability? On the other hand, why do we exercise? We exercise in order to prolong our health, or to attract the opposite sex. Mind you, this is not absolute proof that "maximal excellence" should include these properties, but it does show that the more radical position here is not the theistic side (and yes, sometimes the radical position turns out in the end to be true, but this is just my starting point).
Second, a key difference between the attributes constituting maximal excellence and others is that the former have intrinsic maximums. Intelligence, for example, maxes out at omniscience; nothing can be more intelligent than an omniscient being. Similarly, omnipotence is the maximum of potency, moral perfection is the maximum of moral fiber, necessary existence is the maximum of de re modality, and eternity is the maximum of duration. In what sense can there be a maximal desire for exercise? Would that entail God wishing for us to do 50 jumping jacks, or 51 jumping jacks? If you say "51," then I can show that a God wishing for 52 jumping jacks has a greater desire for exercise than a God who has a maximal desire for exercise--a logical contradiction. Clearly, then, the idea of a maximal desire for exercise is logically incoherent.
The conclusion here is not that one isn't within his or her epistemic rights to reject the coherency of "maximal excellence"; rather, what I'm showing is that there are actual baselines for determining how such a notion should be defined, in which case Plantinga has real reasons for saying that the concept of maximal greatness does not necessarily include the desire for exercise. Granted, God may very well wish for us to exercise (the Bible does mandate us to care for our bodies), but this is merely a secondary attribute. The ontological argument does not work with secondary attributes--only those attributes that are included in God's essence.
In summation, God is the greatest conceivable being; the desire for exercise is not intrinsically great-making (for the desire for exercise is typically instrumental to something else and has no maximum); therefore, there are possible worlds where God exists but does not want us to exercise.
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| hatsoff |
| Posted 07/16/11 at 03:19 PM | Reply with quote #2 |
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Hi Chuck.
I'm guessing from your PM that this thread, though it's not directed to me in particular, was motivated by our beginning discussion here. I think it's important to recap one thing from my post there:
Quote: Originally Posted by hatsoff
Recall that Plantinga's argument proceeds thusly (quoted directly):
(34) The property has maximal greatness entails the property has maximal excellence in every possible world.
(35) Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection.
(36) Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified.
By the rules of Plantinga's underlying modal logic and the definitions of his terms, it deductively follows that
(41) There exists a being that has maximal excellence in every possible world (and "this being is God").
(cf. A. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, pp213-21.)
Since (34) and (35) behave like definitions, the only question here is whether or not we should accept premise (36).
So it's not that Plantinga's argument contains a fallacy. On the contrary, it's perfectly valid! The problem is, we need a reason to prefer (36) to its denial. But so far, I can't find any.
The greatness objection, as we might call it, doesn't aim to show that the argument is invalid, or even that it is unsound. In fact, (36)---and hence the conclusion---may well be true. Unfortunately, it could just as easily be false, and since Plantinga's comments (in my judgment) fail to provide a reason to think that (36) really is true, his argument ends up being unhelpful.
Noticing the arbitrary construction of "greatness" is not (by my reckoning) a direct criticism of the argument. However, it does, I think, help us see the difficulty in finding a reason to accept (36). For Plantinga's argument to work, we have to show that maximal greatness is possibly instantiated. But in order to even begin to do that, we must somehow figure out why we should privilege one bundle of properties over another. Since we can't seem to do that, the argument won't get off the ground.
Now, you haven't explicitly denied any of this in your response. Instead, you seem to want to argue that Michael is wrong to say in the first place that a given conception of greatness is arbitrary, whatever consequences his claim might have. To defend against this charge, you allege that (1) great-making properties are intrinsically good, and this makes them non-arbitrary; and (2) great-making properties must have extant maximums.
With regard to (2), it's not clear that the exemplars you mentioned---intelligence, for instance---really do have maximums. But leaving that aside, I don't see how (2) helps avoid arbitrariness. It may rule out certain properties as being "great-making," but there are still plenty of other options compatible with (2). For example, (2) disqualifies doing more and more jumping jacks as great, but not doing, say, exactly 50 jumping jacks each day. Moreover, (2) itself seems an arbitrary requirement. What is it about greatness that requires every great-making property must have an extant maximum? That idea seems cherry-picked to accord with the structure of Plantinga's argument, and not with greatness as typically understood.
Regarding (1), as Michael pointed out in his response, there's nothing stopping us from saying that jumping jacks are good for their own sake. God might just happen to find jumping jacks intrinsically pleasing, even apart from any instrumental value they have.
So anyway, those are some problems I see with Plantinga's argument. But I do appreciate your comments, and I will continue to think on it.
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| squirrelman |
| Posted 07/16/11 at 06:17 PM | Reply with quote #3 |
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I agree with most of what hatsoff said. I tried to point out further amiguities and even possible contradictions in the concept of a MGB: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/PageServer?pagename=message_board
All of this, I think, makes it hard to establish that the concept of a MGB is coherent.
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| chuckg1982 |
| Posted 07/16/11 at 07:07 PM | Reply with quote #4 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by hatsoff
So it's not that Plantinga's argument contains a fallacy. On the contrary, it's perfectly valid! The problem is, we need a reason to prefer (36) to its denial. But so far, I can't find any.
Now, if your greatest objection to the argument is that the concept of God may be inherently contradictory, then we may as well claim that we cannot know if anything is possible insofar as any concept may contain some contradiction that we are unaware of. Why can we not trust our modal intuitions with regard to God as opposed to, say, a twelve foot hot dog?
Quote: Noticing the arbitrary construction of "greatness" is not (by my reckoning) a direct criticism of the argument. However, it does, I think, help us see the difficulty in finding a reason to accept (36). For Plantinga's argument to work, we have to show that maximal greatness is possibly instantiated. But in order to even begin to do that, we must somehow figure out why we should privilege one bundle of properties over another. Since we can't seem to do that, the argument won't get off the ground.
I made it clear that I was criticizing Michael's argument, but you were the one who happened to respond. I don't see that Michael's criticism has any bearing on (36), for the simple reason that Michael fails to show why we shouldn't accept any other argument whose structure is the same but whose definition of "maximal greatness" differs.
What I show is that the notion of maximal greatness has a baseline, and thus, as Anselm showed Gaunilo, the structure of the argument cannot be the sole means by which you demonstrate that certain attributes are exemplified in reality.
Regarding omniscience, either it is logically impossible, or intelligence has a maximum. Would you agree that it is logically possible for someone to know everything that can possibly be known? If so, wouldn't you also agree that it is impossible for someone to be more intelligent than this person? If not, can you tell me what God, if he existed, would not know?
I'm not sure how you think "greatness" is typically understood. Plantinga's notions are merely following the trails set by Anselm and Augustine.
Maximal excellence entails the instantiation of certain attributes to their respective maximal degrees, which in turn requires them to have maximal degrees.
Now evidently, your claim is that we could argue that it's possible for God to have, say, a maximal desire for 50 jumping jacks. But this is no different than claiming that I'm a maximally somewhat-great being, in which case the term "maximally" becomes superfluous; for it is clear that "somewhat-great"--much like "50"--necessitates a limitation. It's just a contradiction in terms.
As for the supposed intrinsic goodness of jumping jacks, keep in mind that the point of this is to show that "maximum greatness" does not lack perspicuity as much as Michael would like people to believe it does; there are good reasons for presuming that certain properties just cannot apply to it. To say that jumping jacks are intrinsically good is intuitively unsatisfying, to say the least; do you know anyone who does jumping jacks solely because they are jumping jacks? This is not a defeater, so to speak; it's merely a starting point.
A defeater, working cooperatively with the aforementioned ideas, might be here: Jumping jacks require the existence of physical bodies; if God has a maximal desire for people to do jumping jacks, then does God have this same desire in the possible worlds where humans do not exist? If so, how is a world with no humans consistent with his maximal desire for them to do jumping jacks? If he truly had a maximal desire for jumping jacks, then wouldn't he have created beings in every possible world capable of satisfying that desire? Otherwise, he clearly doesn't have a maximal desire for jumping jacks if there's at least one possible world where he opts not to fulfill that desire.
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| troyjs |
| Posted 07/16/11 at 10:44 PM | Reply with quote #5 |
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Modern analytic philosophy is on 'chuckq1982's' side on this issue. If it seems, intuitively, that maximal greatness is possibly exemplified, then it is the onus of the detractor to provide an argument proving otherwise. Quote: In fact, (36)---and hence the conclusion---may well be true. Unfortunately, it could just as easily be false, and since Plantinga's comments (in my judgment) fail to provide a reason to think that (36) really is true, his argument ends up being unhelpful.
Apparently, it is agreed that 36 is possibly true. However, it is also asserted by some that 36 is possibly not, possibly true. These two beliefs are mutually exclusive.
x is possibly true, or (x is p)
x is possibly not, possibly true, or (x is p, or x is -p)
That is, it is claimed by some that 36 is possibly necessarily false.
But if something is possibly true, then there is a possible world in which it is true, and therefore can not be necessarily false. Therefore, it is impossible for 36 to be possibly, not possibly true, otherwise 36 is not possibly true.
However, although I believe that God is omniscient, I do have an argument against omniscience.
There are 2 main sets of propositions/beliefs: beliefs which refer to themselves(self-referential, SR), and beliefs which do not refer to themselves(non-self-referential, NSR). An example of an SR proposition is, 'This is a sentence'.
The belief (p), in the set of all and only NSR beliefs, is either SR, or NSR.
If p is SR, then it can not be a belief about itself, ie. it is NSR.
If p is NSR, then it must be a belief about itself, ie. SR.
Therefore, the set of all particular NSR beliefs is impossible.
Therefore, the set of or belief in all true beliefs/propositions, is impossible.
Therefore, God can not know all true beliefs.
Therefore, God is not omniscient.
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| warpedfx |
| Posted 07/17/11 at 03:39 PM | Reply with quote #6 |
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how do you know intelligence is intrinsically good?
maximal greatness has no value considering at best it is supported by a bare assertion that certain traits are the exemplification of maximal greatness.
not to mention platinga's ontological argument is useless.
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| troyjs |
| Posted 07/17/11 at 09:08 PM | Reply with quote #7 |
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Quote: how do you know intelligence is intrinsically good?
I can't speak for the OP, but I believe that goodness is determined by God's unchanging character. If our telos is derived from and contingent upon God, and the telos God has given us implies our existing in accord to certain attributes which reflect God's character, then to ask what is 'goodness' apart from God, is akin to, to use Hawking's analogy -- to ask what is north of the North Pole.
In regards to certain traits which maximal greatness exemplifies, the traits or attributes named in the OA are possible traits, which are descriptive of the definition of God. Remember that although the OA is a theistic argument, it is not an argument for any systematic theology. If the OA is sound, and there are other traits which the argument can be used to justify, then all the better.
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| DrewMazanec |
| Posted 07/21/11 at 12:58 PM | Reply with quote #8 |
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I think this discussion would be more appropriate in the Nature of God forums. The objection here that maximal greatness is nebulous or incoherent isn't just an objection to the ontological argument, but to perfect being theology in its entirety!
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