I was not claiming that an omnipotent being could create another omnipotent being. I agreed with Craig that this was impossible (see my initial post). You probably interpreted my reference to “other beings” as other omnipotent beings. I had contingent, non-omnipotent beings in mind. I should have been clearer.
You argue that we can imagine/conceive of a possible world in which only one necessary being is exemplified. Since a being cannot be necessary unless it exists in every possible world, and we have just discovered a possible world in which additional necessary beings do not obtain, there cannot be additional necessary beings. I think I understand your argument, but I am skeptical. My skepticism may be due to my ignorance of possible world semantics (I only know enough to be dangerous J), so bear with me.
Yes, we can imagine/conceive of a possible world in which there exists only one metaphysically necessary being, but does that mean such a world is actually possible? After all, I can imagine/conceive of a world in which God does not exist. Why? Because God’s existence is not logically necessary (denying the existence of God does not entail a logical contradiction). Just because I can imagine a world without the existence of God, however, does not mean such a world is broadly logically possible. Indeed, theists can marshal good arguments for thinking God is a metaphysically necessary being (such as the Leibnitzian Cosmological Argument and the Ontological Argument), so the ability to imagine a world without God does nothing to detract from the truth that God is a metaphysically necessary being. Likewise, even though we can imagine/conceive of a world containing only one necessary being, that does not necessarily mean it is broadly logically possible. Maybe there are two necessary beings, both of whom are omnipotent, and they exist in every possible world even though there is no logical contradiction in thinking that there is a world in which only one of those metaphysically necessary beings exist. Have I gone awry in my reasoning somewhere?
One might ask, “But why should there exist more than one metaphysically necessary, omnipotent being?” I have no idea—anymore than I have any idea why there is even one. If the sufficient reason for the existence of one necessary being is that he carries within himself sufficient reason for his own existence, then I don’t see why the same could not be true of a second necessary being. It would just be a brute fact that there are two rather than one.
Granted, apart from any reason to think there are two metaphysically necessary beings there is no reason to postulate more than one (Ockham’s Razor), but likewise, apart from some reason to think such is logically impossible, I see no reason to rule it out as a possibility. The best reason I have heard so far is Joel’s: that an omnipotent being must have the ability to destroy other beings, and yet two omnipotent beings could not destroy each other. That seems very reasonable to me, but I thought it presented a problem for Trinitarianism. I think your explanation resolves that problem, however. Since each of the three persons share the same being, for person A to destroy person B would require person A to destroy His own being as well, and thus both persons would cease to exist. And yet, a metaphysically necessary being cannot cease to exist, therefore it is logically impossible for person A to destroy person B. The omnipotence of all divine persons in the Trinity is safeguarded. For the sake of what it’s worthy, do you see omnipotence as a property belonging to the essence or the persons of the Trinity? Why?
Let me end by saying how much I appreciate your presence on this forum. You always have well thought out responses, and you are very congenial. I enjoy dialoguing with you.