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silentmatt
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Posted 04/16/11 at 09:45 AM
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#31
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The content of the moral law is not really the problem being considered. You can arrive at a conclusion about what morality is grounded in without being mired in what the actual content of the moral law is.
This is an important question, because unless one has an answer for it, ethics is an ultimately vain pursuit. Yes, the practice of ethics is a complex thing taking into account our reason, the input of our moral faculties, reference to our moral codes, and so on. That doesn't mean that there isn't an absolute truth to be grasped. It is in disaffirming that there is such truth to be grasped, in not caring whether the morality one acts on is objective or not, that morality is itself gutted of its purpose and power.
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Sandspirit
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Posted 04/16/11 at 10:49 AM
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#32
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Quote: The content of the moral law is not really the problem being considered. You can arrive at a conclusion about what morality is grounded in without being mired in what the actual content of the moral law is.
I don't see how it's possible to say what something is grounded in when you can't explain what that something is. Both sides in the aetheist vs theist debate (in general, not just this one) assume a moral code that is held in common. Unfortunately neither side can explain what this code is, much less where it comes from or what role it really plays or should play in human decision making.
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silentmatt
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Posted 04/16/11 at 11:06 AM
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#33
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Quote: I don't see how it's possible to say what something is grounded in when you can't explain what that something is.
I can. We look to establish the qualities which must be common to every moral law (which I think are prescriptiveness, necessity and authority), and consider what sort of thing could ground them. (necessary, authoritative prescriber fits the bill, I think)
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Wes
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Posted 04/16/11 at 11:35 AM
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#34
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Quote: Notice that we can run the same argument against Craig:
(3) Goodness is identical to that which God commands.
(4) In an epistemically possible world, God's commands are not identical to goodness.
The idea behind (4) is that it is epistemically possible that an amoral God exists. Craig might want to defend against this by denying (3) in favor of
(4) is false, and I would argue that there is no possible world, in which God's commands are not identical to goodness. Taking into account Maximal being ontology, it is clear that the good must be grounded in God's perfect moral nature. If this were not the case, then we would not be referring to God, as "God".
I would argue that it is not ontologically possible that an amoral God exists, and I can assure you Craig would argue the same. Platinga has done excellent work on maximal being ontology, and I think his arguments for the good being a necessary condition for God stand if objective moral values are to stand.
And my further points would remain. Accepting either of your revised editions, one would be forced to utter relativism. Once you grant that it is possible that there exists a world in which the moral framework, could have been different, then you have no reason to accept the validity or necessity of the present moral framework. Since Morality must be grounded in an immutable standard of perfection, (God) if you grant that there could be a different standard, then God's character would also have to change. And at that point, we would no longer be arguing about morality, rather we would be arguing about the nature of God. But notice that we would be incapable of even arguing about the "good" or "evil" nature of God without first accepting our basic intuitions regarding morality. Therefore coupled with maximal being ontology, and properly basic beliefs regarding the nature of morality, one must either accept that if any God does exist, then God must be "morally perfect", or simply be silent on the matter entirely. To even begin arguing about the matter would be to grant the basicality of our moral intuitions.
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Sandspirit
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Posted 04/16/11 at 12:03 PM
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#35
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Quote: I can. We look to establish the qualities which must be common to every moral law (which I think are prescriptiveness, necessity and authority), and consider what sort of thing could ground them. (necessary, authoritative prescriber fits the bill, I think) Again, same question, how do you determine the qualities of something you can't define?
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silentmatt
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Posted 04/16/11 at 12:18 PM
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#36
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Quote: Again, same question, how do you determine the qualities of something you can't define?
You don't have to have a perfect knowledge of the members of a category in order to see what kind of qualities define that category. It seems to me that moral truths have to be prescriptive, necessary and authoritative, or else they wouldn't be moral truths at all. A moral truth which is not prescriptive makes no demands, and thus cannot entail any sort of ought relation. A moral truth which is not authoritative is a mere prescription, and lacks any sort of compelling power. A moral truth which is not necessary is arbitrary, but we intuit that moral truths are not arbitrary. Further, it seems that if a certain prescription is necessary and authoritative, there simply would exist a moral law. |
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belorg
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Posted 04/16/11 at 12:54 PM
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#37
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Quote: Originally Posted by silentmattQuote: Again, same question, how do you determine the qualities of something you can't define?
You don't have to have a perfect knowledge of the members of a category in order to see what kind of qualities define that category. It seems to me that moral truths have to be prescriptive, necessary and authoritative, or else they wouldn't be moral truths at all. A moral truth which is not prescriptive makes no demands, and thus cannot entail any sort of ought relation. A moral truth which is not authoritative is a mere prescription, and lacks any sort of compelling power. A moral truth which is not necessary is arbitrary, but we intuit that moral truths are not arbitrary. Further, it seems that if a certain prescription is necessary and authoritative, there simply would exist a moral law.
A moral truth has to be prescritive and authoritative? How can a truth be anything like that?
How is 1+1 = 2 prescritive and authoritative?
And how does e.g. some sort of God prescribing X make X an 'ought'? Why ought I follow anything God says? Because He will throw me into hell if I don't?
Well, I don't care because He'll throw me into hell anyway beacsue I am an atheist?
Because following the precription is in my best interest? Who says I ought to do what's in my best interest?
Is it logical to do what's in my best interest? If yes, then the reason I would follow these precriptions have nothing to do with the fact that they are precribed, not with whoever or whatever authoritative entity precribes them, but just with my well-being, which means Sam Harris is right.
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Sandspirit
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Posted 04/16/11 at 01:11 PM
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#38
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Quote: You don't have to have a perfect knowledge of the members of a category in order to see what kind of qualities define that category. It seems to me that moral truths have to be prescriptive, necessary and authoritative, or else they wouldn't be moral truths at all. A moral truth which is not prescriptive makes no demands, and thus cannot entail any sort of ought relation. A moral truth which is not authoritative is a mere prescription, and lacks any sort of compelling power. A moral truth which is not necessary is arbitrary, but we intuit that moral truths are not arbitrary. Further, it seems that if a certain prescription is necessary and authoritative, there simply would exist a moral law. Well, perhaps, but all you've done is to give an abstract defintition where what's important is real life practise. My point is not that we have unsatisfactory abstractions, it's that in real life dilemmas the Christian is no better equiped than anyone else to make a correct moral decision. Do you disagree?
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linkmeup2003
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Posted 04/16/11 at 06:02 PM
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#39
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"A moral truth has to be prescritive and authoritative? How can a truth be anything like that?
How is 1+1 = 2 prescritive and authoritative?"
You took what he said and turned it into a bizarre absolute. A *moral* truth can be stated as "One ought to do X" or "One ought not to do Y." Another example of prescriptive truths are how to win a game of chess. There are plenty of examples of truth statements that are prescriptive, not all of them are moral statements (e.g. chess) but nonetheless your objection fails to appreciate such an obvious facet of reality.
"Is it logical to do what's in my best interest? If yes, then the reason I would follow these precriptions have nothing to do with the fact that they are precribed, not with whoever or whatever authoritative entity precribes them, but just with my well-being, which means Sam Harris is right."
But who is to say what is good for your well-being? In other words, who or what is the best qualified to be a moral authority? It's can't be you or any human because we are all fallible. It can't be science because it relies on fallible epistemology. The best candidate is a morally perfect being, God.
If you still don't get it then ask yourself this: Why should children listen and obey their parents? If you think children should listen to their parents then you have all the reasons why we listen to God.
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silentmatt
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Posted 04/16/11 at 10:30 PM
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#40
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Quote: Originally Posted by belorg
A moral truth has to be prescritive and authoritative? How can a truth be anything like that?
How is 1+1 = 2 prescritive and authoritative?
A truth can be prescriptive and authoritative if it is a truth about authoritative precriptions, of course. 1+ 1 = 2 is a descriptive truth, not a prescriptive one.
Quote: And how does e.g. some sort of God prescribing X make X an 'ought'? Why ought I follow anything God says? Because He will throw me into hell if I don't?
Well, I don't care because He'll throw me into hell anyway beacsue I am an atheist?
Because following the precription is in my best interest? Who says I ought to do what's in my best interest?
Is it logical to do what's in my best interest? If yes, then the reason I would follow these precriptions have nothing to do with the fact that they are precribed, not with whoever or whatever authoritative entity precribes them, but just with my well-being, which means Sam Harris is right.
None of these reasons. It is because God by nature imbues his commands with Authority, which is that quality which adds bindingness to prescriptions, but cannot be instantiated apart from prescriptions. To say that an authoritative being commands something and then to say that one has no obligation to obey that being seems internally contradictory. Punishment, where it occurs, is simply the just consequence of one's actions, and only in a secondary sense is it supposed to be a deterrent.
Quote: Originally Posted by linkmeup2003
Another example of prescriptive truths are how to win a game of chess.
Hrm. I wouldn't call this a prescriptive truth. Methods for winning at chess are descriptive, that is, they describe how to win, but do not make any sort of demand or issue any imperative to follow them. I think it implausible that there could be prescriptions which are not expressions of someone's prescriptive intent. Ordinary prescriptive truths would be truths about what is prescribed, like, say, truths about what a certain general's standing orders are.
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silentmatt
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Posted 04/16/11 at 10:32 PM
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#41
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Quote: Originally Posted by SandspiritMy point is not that we have unsatisfactory abstractions, it's that in real life dilemmas the Christian is no better equiped than anyone else to make a correct moral decision. Do you disagree?
I guess I would. The Christian has access to traditions built upon the word of God to guide his moral sense of God's will, while the atheist simply has his own sense of God's will to guide him, even as he disavows the existence of that very will. |
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belorg
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Posted 04/17/11 at 03:03 AM
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#42
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Quote: Originally Posted by silentmattQuote: Originally Posted by belorg
A moral truth has to be prescritive and authoritative? How can a truth be anything like that?
How is 1+1 = 2 prescritive and authoritative?
A truth can be prescriptive and authoritative if it is a truth about authoritative precriptions, of course. 1+ 1 = 2 is a descriptive truth, not a prescriptive one. That's just circular and doesn't get you anywhere.
Quote: And how does e.g. some sort of God prescribing X make X an 'ought'? Why ought I follow anything God says? Because He will throw me into hell if I don't?
Well, I don't care because He'll throw me into hell anyway beacsue I am an atheist?
Because following the precription is in my best interest? Who says I ought to do what's in my best interest?
Is it logical to do what's in my best interest? If yes, then the reason I would follow these precriptions have nothing to do with the fact that they are precribed, not with whoever or whatever authoritative entity precribes them, but just with my well-being, which means Sam Harris is right.
Quote: None of these reasons. It is because God by nature imbues his commands with Authority, which is that quality which adds bindingness to prescriptions, but cannot be instantiated apart from prescriptions. Again, sheer circularity. Why ought I to follw God's precriptions? Because they are authoritative, which means they ought to be followed. Quote: To say that an authoritative being commands something and then to say that one has no obligation to obey that being seems internally contradictory. I have not a single reason to think that any being has that sort of authority. It does not follow logically from anything you've said.
Quote: Quote: Originally Posted by linkmeup2003
Another example of prescriptive truths are how to win a game of chess.
Hrm. I wouldn't call this a prescriptive truth. Methods for winning at chess are descriptive, that is, they describe how to win, but do not make any sort of demand or issue any imperative to follow them. I think it implausible that there could be prescriptions which are not expressions of someone's prescriptive intent. Ordinary prescriptive truths would be truths about what is prescribed, like, say, truths about what a certain general's standing orders are.
So, as I said, it's not the thruth of aprecription that makes it auithoritative but the entity precribing it. And that is just circularr.
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belorg
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Posted 04/17/11 at 03:08 AM
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#43
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Quote: Originally Posted by linkmeup2003
"A moral truth has to be prescritive and authoritative? How can a truth be anything like that?
How is 1+1 = 2 prescritive and authoritative?"
You took what he said and turned it into a bizarre absolute. A *moral* truth can be stated as "One ought to do X" or "One ought not to do Y."
"One ought to do X" has no truth value. What makes it a prescription is that a certain entity orders it.
Quote: "Is it logical to do what's in my best interest? If yes, then the reason I would follow these precriptions have nothing to do with the fact that they are precribed, not with whoever or whatever authoritative entity precribes them, but just with my well-being, which means Sam Harris is right."
But who is to say what is good for your well-being? In other words, who or what is the best qualified to be a moral authority?
That's an epitemic question and , as WL Craig is correct in saying; it has nothing to do with the ontology of morality.
Quote: It's can't be you or any human because we are all fallible. It can't be science because it relies on fallible epistemology.
If that's your only objection to science providing a base for moral understanding, you basically agree with Harris.
Quote: If you still don't get it then ask yourself this: Why should children listen and obey their parents? If you think children should listen to their parents then you have all the reasons why we listen to God.
Because most of the time what the parents say is in their best interest and parents in most cases do know best. But parents are not the ontological base for the child's morality. Again, this is epistemology, and that's not what we are discussing.
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Sandspirit
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Posted 04/17/11 at 03:22 AM
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#44
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Quote: I guess I would. The Christian has access to traditions built upon the word of God to guide his moral sense of God's will, while the atheist simply has his own sense of God's will to guide him, even as he disavows the existence of that very will.
Accepting your frame of reference here I'm not sure that tradition can be assumed to be superior to the sense of an individual. Christian tradition is pretty diverse and fragmented. I once talked with a fundamentalist who was so fundamental he felt only he and his family had the correct interpetation of God's word. Consequently there was no church he could belong to. When I asked him how he knew his interpretation of the Bible was correct he said the Holy Spirit guided him. And I guess for a Christian this is what it must come down to. Your sense of right and wrong is a product of your relationship to God and so morality cannot be precisely defined because to do so would be to anticipate the will of God in any particular situation, and this is not permitted. Is this a correct interpretation?
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silentmatt
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Posted 04/17/11 at 07:44 AM
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#45
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Quote: Originally Posted by belorg
That's just circular and doesn't get you anywhere.
It's no more circular than to say that a truth can be descriptive if it is a truth that describes how something is.
Quote: Again, sheer circularity. Why ought I to follow God's precriptions? Because they are authoritative, which means they ought to be followed.
How is this circular? If something has the property of authority, and has it necessarily, as God does, how is that not a good explanation of why it ought to be followed? Certainly, it cannot be said that anything other than a prescriber could have authority.
Quote: I have not a single reason to think that any being has that sort of authority. It does not follow logically from anything you've said.
If no being has such authority, then morality cannot exist, since there would be no necessary, authoritative prescriber to issue the necessary, authoritative prescriptions that constitute morality. However, our moral intuitions indicate that an objective morality does exist- we perceive necessary, authoritative prescriptions in our sense of moral truth. We thus have good reason to suppose that there is indeed such a being with such authority.
Quote: So, as I said, it's not the truth of a prescription that makes it auithoritative but the entity prescribing it. And that is just circular. The truth that a necessarily made prescription carries the quality of authority is what makes it authoritative. Of course, this seems to entail, given the nature of prescription, that some being makes these prescriptions and imbues them with authority. I don't see how this is circular.
I get the feeling, however, that when you talk about the "truth of" a prescription, you're not referring to the truth that the prescription is made. I think, however, that such a conception of the "truth of" a prescription as you seem to want to construe it is incoherent, and it's not one I endorse anyway.
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