Proposition H may be broadly logically possible, but like P3, we are only justified in believing it to be true, given the content of our existent knowledge.

Take the statement S: There is a swan, that is not white.

Before the discovery of the black swan, it was believed, as I am sure you are aware, that all swans are white. From this historical context, hypothetical ‘John’ may have affirmed:

A) It is broadly logically possible, that S is true.

B) It is broadly logically possible, that S is false.

From within the constraints of all true propositions, either A or B is correct, but John has epistemic warrant in affirming B, ie. that all swans are white, unless a swan of different colour is presented to him.

(H) entails the positive claim, that there is a true proposition that contradicts the existence of a maximally great being. P3 entails the absence of one. The absence of such a proposition in our beliefs is compatible with both P3 and H, ie, we don’t have to know it for it to exist. However, I am warranted in affirming that the next new proposition I believe to be true, will be compatible with the existence of a maximally great being.

John’s experience was that the meaning of the term ‘swan’, was indicative of an object, attached to it the predicate of ‘whiteness’. It may be broadly logically possible that there is not a being that has maximal greatness, just as it is true that not all swans are white, but measured against my existing belief-set, P3 has always found to be compatible, and in my conceptual experience, every proposition to be believed as true, was indicative of something attached to it the predicate of, ‘compatible with P3’. The more propositions I believe, which upon discernment are compatible with P3, the greater my belief that P3 is true. What about H, can the same be said for it? H is also compatible with all the propositions I believe to be true, in that it is always possible that we may come to believe a proposition, which happens to contradict P3, ie. We may discover the black swan. But I have no reason to believe that there is such a black swan.

The agnostic with respect to P3, would have, upon comparing P3 with his’ own believed propositions, would not be an agnostic if he had found a contradiction. His own experience seems to indicate there is nothing incoherent in the idea of a maximally great being. Ofcourse, his own experience would seem to indicate that there is nothing incoherent in the idea of a maximally great being, not existing. Because we are dealing with the idea of a maximally great being, we are not left at an impasse. To say that atheism is possibly true, is to say that it is possible that there exists a true proposition which contradicts the idea of the existence of a maximally great being. The fact that atheism does not contradict any of the believed propositions, is no evidence for the existence of a true proposition which contradicts the existence of such a being. All that P3 requires is the absence of such a proposition. The existence of a proposition, contradicting the idea of there existing a being which has maximal greatness, is out of the ordinary, for the agnostic.

He withholds belief in P3, because there is conceptual space for P3 to be false, but this is as rational as withholding believing that the sun will rise tomorrow, because there is conceptual space to think the proposition, “the sun will rise tomorrow”, is false. The sun not rising tomorrow, is out of the ordinary, and one is not warranted in believing that it is true. Of course it is possible, and the proposition is compatible with every other proposition held to be true – if it were not, I would not believe it to be possible. I however, am justified in believing that the sun will rise tomorrow, because that is the ordinary course of events. The ordinary course of events in my mind is that the existence of a maximally great being, is coherent, and I am warranted in believing that there is no true proposition which will contradict this. I place this elusive, defeater for the possibility of the maximally great being, in the same category as the Loch Ness monster, and Bigfoot. Until I am provided with good reasons, I will believe that all plesiosaurs are dead, all bigfoot photographs are doctored, and all true propositions are compatible with the maximally great being existing.

hatsoff,

You seem to understand me quite well, except that you disagee.

I hope that by the end of this post, you will see that the qualification I have made to (Q), is not arbitrary.

We are justified in not believing the existence of p, unless we have reasons to believe in p, but if the nonexistence of p implies the existence of q, where q is a universe more likely given that p does not exist, and we have no reasons to believe in q, then we are not justified in believing in the nonexistence of p.

In our context:

We are justified in not being theists, unless we have reasons to believe theism, but if atheism implies the existence of a universe more likely given that atheism is true, and we have no reasons to believe that what we know about the universe is more likely given that atheism is true, then we are not justified in believing that there is no God.

This seems to be the position of the agnostic. He sees no evidence in the universe which confirms either the existence or the non-existence of God. When he considers the Ontological Argument, since he is an agnostic, he must see no contradiction in the properties of a maximally great being – so in the spirit of agnosticism, he neither affirms nor denies the existence of such a contradiction. However, the fact that the idea of a maximally great being seems consistent with every held belief, seems to be evidence that the idea of a maximally great being is coherent.

You told me that the 76^th digit of pi is broadly logically possibly 6. I have never calculated pi to the 76^th digit, but I don’t see anything incoherent in 6 being the 76^th digit of pi. I don’t have the means to confirm it to be true, and I don’t have the means to confirm that confirmation, ad infinitum. Nevertheless, I am warranted in presuming it to be logically possible, until I have reasons to believe otherwise.

This seems to be the case with all statements, ie. We assume that a statement in all of it’s elements, is meaningful, unless we can find it to be self-referentially incoherent. The statements: “God does not exist” and “God exists”, are to be taken as meaningful unless it is proven otherwise. The situation is different in the case of these two statements:

1)“A necessarily existent being, exists”, and

2)“A necessarily existent being, does not exist”.

In the second case, we can only affirm it to be coherent, if we presuppose that an element of itself, “A necessarily existent being”, is not coherent. This violates the principle I am following, in presuming the intelligibility of a statement in all its elements, unless we have reason to believe otherwise. The more critical the analysis of the statement in which it is not found to be incoherent, the more reasonable it is for one to believe that it is coherent.

(Q) as I understand it:

If we cannot find a logical contradiction in S and S does not require us to affirm a logical contradiction in p, where p is the referrent of S, then we are justified in believing (or tentatively assuming) S to be broadly logically possible.

Language presupposes the meaningfulness of statements and the referrents of those statements. Statements which entail the impossibility, or the self-referential incoherency of things, such as (H), make an unjustified, arbitrary assumption. (3) assumes the cogency of a maximally great being, without asserting the impossibility of another entity. Ofcourse, all propositions entail the opposite truth-value of their negations, and in respect to contingent entities, we are able to affirm the broadly logical possibilities of both their existence, and non-existence, but in regards to necessary entities, just as we assume that a contingent thing is coherent unless otherwise demonstrated, we also assume the coherencey of those things which, if possible, must exist.

As regards to statements. we assume that a proposition is meaningful unless we have reason to believe otherwise. We do this in the case of both necessary propositions, and contingent propositions. In the case of contingent propositions, we can also affirm the coherency of their negations. But with necessary propositions, we can not do this. If we are to assume the meaningfulness of a proposition unless it is shown to be incoherent, then we are to assume a necessary proposition, to be necessarily true unless shown to be otherwise.

The 76th digit of pi, if 6, is necessarily 6. If it is not 6, then it is necessarily not 6. But there is an important distinction between:

The 76th digit of pi is 6, and

The 76th digit of pi is not 6.

The first assumes that the property of being the 76th digit of pi, and the property of being 6, are compatible. The second assumes that those properties are incompatible. The reason why we don't presume that it is in fact 6, is because it could just as likely be 5 or 7. We don't assume any incompatibility between any of the digits between 0-9, and being the 76th digit of pi, but (H) does presume such an incoherency, which (3) does not. The dichotomous nature between the broadly logical possibility of there being a maximally great being, and the broadly logical possibility of there not being a maximally great being allows us to, in the rejection of the latter, to accept, albeit tentatively, the former.

kind regards