| chuckg1982 |
| Posted 07/10/11 at 09:51 AM | Reply with quote #1 |
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| Let me know what you think:
God = df. [That being who is eternal, self-existent, omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect]
(1.) If God does not exist in reality, then it is true that he does not exist insofar as either (a) the conditions that would bring about the existence in reality of a being such as God have not been met, (b) the notion of such a being is logically contradictory or vacuous, or (c) "God" merely refers to an abstract entity like a number.
(2.) Neither (a), (b), or (c) are true (or at least there are no good reasons for supposing that they are true); (a) cannot be true because God (if he exists in reality) is not the sort of being whose existence is conditioned, (b) does not seem to be true because the concept contains no prima facie contradictions and we more or less understand what we mean when we use the term, and (c) is not the case because no theist (at least the majority of which I'm aware) is conceiving of God to be merely abstract in that way.
(3.) Therefore, God exists in reality.
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| squirrelman |
| Posted 07/10/11 at 11:50 AM | Reply with quote #2 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by chuckg1982Let me know what you think:
God = df. [That being who is eternal, self-existent, omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect]
(1.) If God does not exist in reality, then it is true that he does not exist insofar as either (a) the conditions that would bring about the existence in reality of a being such as God have not been met, (b) the notion of such a being is logically contradictory or vacuous, or (c) "God" merely refers to an abstract entity like a number.
(2.) Neither (a), (b), or (c) are true (or at least there are no good reasons for supposing that they are true); (a) cannot be true because God (if he exists in reality) is not the sort of being whose existence is conditioned, (b) does not seem to be true because the concept contains no prima facie contradictions and we more or less understand what we mean when we use the term, and (c) is not the case because no theist (at least the majority of which I'm aware) is conceiving of God to be merely abstract in that way.
(3.) Therefore, God exists in reality.
I guess my concern is with respect to (C). Perhaps there is a possible world where all sentient creatures do is suffer? I understand what it means for sentient creatures to suffer & I don't see any incoherence in a world entirely composed of this suffering. This is significant because this world is incompatible with a maximally great being. So either my world of suffering is possible or God is possible--both of them cannot be possible.
At best we have a stalemate & at worst we have justification to believe God does not exist. While my world of suffering is filled with things that we definitely can understand, many of the properties of a maximally great being cannot be fully understood & are ambiguous or obscure. So we have prima facie more reason to think a world of pure suffering is possible compared to a MGB and so more reason to reject the existence of a MGB.
What you need to do is offer me some sort of argument that shows that we have more reason to think that a maximally geat being is coherent over a world of pure suffering (or something along those lines). Some people, notably Robert Maydole, have attempted to prove that denying the possibility of a MGB leads to a self-contradiction.
Also, there have been some proposed inconsistencies in the properties of God. For example, God is said to be both merciful & perfectly just. I don't see how you can be both.
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| chuckg1982 |
| Posted 07/10/11 at 12:24 PM | Reply with quote #3 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by squirrelman
I guess my concern is with respect to (C). Perhaps there is a possible world where all sentient creatures do is suffer? I understand what it means for sentient creatures to suffer & I don't see any incoherence in a world entirely composed of this suffering. This is significant because this world is incompatible with a maximally great being. So either my world of suffering is possible or God is possible--both of them cannot be possible.
Thanks for your response.
Actually, a Christian would be more than willing to grant that, in fact, the actual world is a possible world where all sentient creatures (with the possible exception of God) suffer. We all feel pain, experience disappointments, and desire things we do not have; and even when we get what we want, we only enjoy it for a little while before seeking something else. This is a fallen creation, and we are part of it.
It seems that your argument can be stated as follows:
(1) If maximal greatness--that is, maximal excellence in every possible world--is instantiated, then maximal well-being (we can define this as the collective privation of suffering amongst all things) is instantiated in every possible world.
(2) There are possible worlds where maximal well-being is not instantiated.
(3) Therefore, maximal greatness is not instantiated; that is, there are possible worlds where no maximally excellent being exists.
Your argument only works if the first premise is true, and I can't see that it is. It may be that God has morally permissible reasons for allowing suffering to occur, but that we simply do not know what those reasons are. That God exists does not in any way entail that we would know all of his thoughts, wants, or goals for creation. Quote: At best we have a stalemate & at worst we have justification to believe God does not exist. While my world of suffering is filled with things that we definitely can understand, many of the properties of a maximally great being cannot be fully understood & are ambiguous or obscure. So we have prima facie more reason to think a world of pure suffering is possible compared to a MGB and so more reason to reject the existence of a MGB. I don't see that the properties of God are in any way nebulous, but only that we have no experience of other human beings who have such properties. But if we recognize, for example, finite intellect in ordinary people, then I'd say that we at least have a rough idea of what it is to possess intellect limitlessly. The same negative theology can be used to abstract the notions of spirituality, omnipotence and eternity, and then apply it to a thing.
Quote: Also, there have been some proposed inconsistencies in the properties of God. For example, God is said to be both merciful & perfectly just. I don't see how you can be both. The requirements of justice do not necessarily preclude mercy. In Christian theology, justice requires all penalties to be paid, and this is accomplished in the sacrifice of Jesus. On the other hand, God was merciful insofar as he allowed the penalty to be paid by someone other than ourselves. |
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| squirrelman |
| Posted 07/10/11 at 01:56 PM | Reply with quote #4 |
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Quote: Thanks for your response.
=D
Quote: Your argument only works if the first premise is true, and I can't see that it is.
Premise one is analytically true once you understand what maximal greatness means & you know about possible world semantics. Quote: It may be that God has morally permissible reasons for allowing suffering to occur, but that we simply do not know what those reasons are.
All that P2 demands is that there be a possible world that contains gratuitious suffering--I'm not claiming that this is true of the actual world. I don't see any logical contradiction in such a world and I think we have a better grasp of that world's properties than the properties entailed by a MGB.
As long as we have equal epistemic grounds to think a world which contains gratuitous suffering is possible as we have for the possibility of a MGB, then the ontological argument becomes question begging.
Quote: I don't see that the properties of God are in any way nebulous, but only that we have no experience of other human beings who have such properties.
I think there are a lot of ambiguities in the concept of a MGB. For example, is it greater to have a body or not? Is conquering prior limitations a perfection? Would a perfect being be temporal or atemporal? There are reasons for & against these that are debated among theologians who practice perfect being theology. The concept of a MGB is harder to grasp than the world I have in mind because we haven't even definitively worked out all of the properties entailed by maximal greatness.
Quote:
The requirements of justice do not necessarily preclude mercy. In Christian theology, justice requires all penalties to be paid, and this is accomplished in the sacrifice of Jesus. On the other hand, God was merciful insofar as he allowed the penalty to be paid by someone other than ourselves.
I don't think the penal theory of atonement makes much sense out of this problem. I don't see how God releasing judgment on Christ allows him to forgive the sins of someone else. It's like me whipping myself in order to forgive the person who killed my parents--it just doesn't make any sense to me. There are other theories of atonement but I don't think they really grapple with my objection.
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| chuckg1982 |
| Posted 07/10/11 at 03:06 PM | Reply with quote #5 |
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Quote: Premise one is analytically true once you understand what maximal greatness means & you know about possible world semantics. I can't see how it is analytically true. Plantinga defines "maximal greatness" as the instantiation of omnipotence, omniscience, and morally perfection in every possible world. Why is the existence of a being who's necessarily omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect, inconsistent with the existence of suffering? The only way you could defend this is to say that it is morally wrong in all circumstances to allow the suffering of others, which I see no reason to accept. If the existence of a maximally great being is consistent with the existence of evil (or to stick with the argument, the nonexistence of maximal well-being), then such a being exists in those possible worlds where maximal well-being is not instantiated. Quote: I think there are a lot of ambiguities in the concept of a MGB. For example, is it greater to have a body or not? I've heard Quentin Smith use this objection. The short answer is that a body is an imperfection, predicated only of contingent things. Any conglomeration of form and matter requires an explanation outside of the form/matter conglomerate for why the material is arranged in one form instead of some other. If God had a body, it would follow that God has a cause, and the only thing that could cause God to exist is something more powerful. Quote: Is conquering prior limitations a perfection? Would a perfect being be temporal or atemporal? I don't want to digress too much, but for the purposes of the argument I think that the question of God's relationship to time is inconsequential. God is eternal, meaning that neither begins to exist nor stops existing (this would have to be true of God, insofar as anything capable of bringing God in or out of existence would have to be more powerful than he is--a logical impossibility); you could take this to mean either that he exists at all times, or that he exists in one present moment where everything is at once realized (that is, there are no potentialities). Quote: I don't think the penal theory of atonement makes much sense out of this problem. I don't see how God releasing judgment on Christ allows him to forgive the sins of someone else. It's like me whipping myself in order to forgive the person who killed my parents--it just doesn't make any sense to me. There are other theories of atonement but I don't think they really grapple with my objection. Your objection is that mercy is inconsistent with justice. My point is that the requirements of justice are fulfilled so long as the penalty is paid, and this makes room for God to have mercy on this while at the same time fulfilling the requirements of justice. Think about it this way (please note that this analogy, albeit useful, is not exact): If you get a speeding ticket, then to law enforcement you make amends for what you did by paying the fee. Mind you, the police department does not care who pays the fee; they only care that the fee is paid. So if your father, out of a selfless act of generosity, decides to pay it, the police department is not going to cry foul and say that it must be paid by you. This is similar to God's legal system. Now you may unhappy with it and that's your right, but it is what it is.
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| squirrelman |
| Posted 07/10/11 at 03:38 PM | Reply with quote #6 |
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Quote: I can't see how it is analytically true. Plantinga defines "maximal greatness" as the instantiation of omnipotence, omniscience, and morally perfection in every possible world.
I was referring to this premise:
(1) If maximal greatness--that is, maximal excellence in every possible world--is instantiated, then maximal well-being (we can define this as the collective privation of suffering amongst all things) is instantiated in every possible world. This premise is analytically true, right? I think we just misunderstoof each other on this note. Quote: Why is the existence of a being who's necessarily omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect, inconsistent with the existence of suffering? I'm referring to a particular brand of suffering that is gratuitous. A MGB is incompatible with suffering that has no greater good. For example, a MGB would be inconsistent with a world where there is only machine that pops out human beings at random, incinerates them, and continues to do this ad infinitum throughout eternity. Such a world is not compatible with a MGB. Is a world like this possible? Well, I don't see any reason to think its not possible. Since I have (at least) equal epistemic claim to think that kind of world is possible as you do that a MGB is possible, then we're at a stalemate and your argument becomes question begging. Quote: I've heard Quentin Smith use this objection. The short answer is that a body is an imperfection, predicated only of contingent things. Any conglomeration of form and matter requires an explanation outside of the form/matter conglomerate for why the material is arranged in one form instead of some other. If God had a body, it would follow that God has a cause, and the only thing that could cause God to exist is something more powerful. The point of all of this was to say that while a world of gratuitious evil can be understood, it's not always clear what maximal greatness entails. The fact that there are debates within perfect being theology is testimony to this fact. In the case of God having a body, you're right that having a body would not be necessary property of God, but it's not clear whether or not God would want to get a contingent body to be greater. In the case of God's relationship to time, philosophers have argued that a MGB would have a stronger grip on reality and so must exist atemporally. Other philosophers have argued that God more genuinely interacts with the world (among other arguments) if he is temporal so a MGB must be temporal. Does maximal greatness entail having multiple centers of self-awareness? Some have argued that the trinitarianism is more plausible than unitarianism because trinitarianism better exemplifies the property of being all loving. Does this entail that a large community of personalities (over 3) would be an even greater being? How can a MGB have the perfection of overcoming difficulties if He is omnipotent? All of this is on topic because I'm trying to demonstrate how its not totally clear that we even understand all the entailments of maximal greatness. Contrast this with the concept of a world containing gratuitous evil. I think we can understand a world of gratuitous suffering much better than a MGB and so we have more warrant to think the former is possible. Quote: Think about it this way (please note that this analogy, albeit useful, is not exact): If you get a speeding ticket, then to law enforcement you make amends for what you did by paying the fee. Mind you, the police department does not care who pays the fee; they only care that the fee is paid. So if your father, out of a selfless act of generosity, decides to pay it, the police department is not going to cry foul and say that it must be paid by you. Let me quote Christian philosopher Robin Collins on this matter: "...people commonly try to make sense of these theories by appealing to legal cases in which one person pays the debt of another, such as a parent paying her child's traffic ticket. This response, however, fails, for although this type of event commonly happens, the laws that allow it to happen, such as speeding laws, are not designed to institute the demands of justice, but rather to keep order in society (i.e., they are civil laws). Instead, the truly analogous legal cases are those in which we think that justice demands punishment, such as in murder cases (i.e. those involving criminal laws). But these are the very cases in which we do not think that justice is satisfied by someone else paying the criminal's penalty, such as a mother going to the electric chair in place of her son. In Anselm's time, however, even criminal offenses such as murder were handled like traffic tickets with the payment of money, because the concern of that society was not so much to ensure justice for the victim as to prevent violent retaliation by the victim's family, and the social chaos which would result from blood feuds of this sort. In the medieval legal system, therefore, not only could money substitute for punishment, but it didn't even matter who paid the money. This is why the notion that a third party could pay a criminal's debt of obligation, and that this could adequately substitute for a criminal punishment such as a death penalty, made some sense within Anselm's culture, but we now feel it doesn't really satisfy the demands of justice." |
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| chuckg1982 |
| Posted 07/10/11 at 04:34 PM | Reply with quote #7 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by squirrelmanI was referring to this premise: (1) If maximal greatness--that is, maximal excellence in every possible world--is instantiated, then maximal well-being (we can define this as the collective privation of suffering amongst all things) is instantiated in every possible world. This premise is analytically true, right? I think we just misunderstoof each other on this note.
I don't actually think the premise is true at all. I think the existence of a maximally great being is consistent with the privation of maximal well-being in some possible world or other.
Quote: I'm referring to a particular brand of suffering that is gratuitous. A MGB is incompatible with suffering that has no greater good. For example, a MGB would be inconsistent with a world where there is only machine that pops out human beings at random, incinerates them, and continues to do this ad infinitum throughout eternity. Such a world is not compatible with a MGB. Is a world like this possible? Well, I don't see any reason to think its not possible. Since I have (at least) equal epistemic claim to think that kind of world is possible as you do that a MGB is possible, then we're at a stalemate and your argument becomes question begging.
I see what you're getting at, mainly because you've stipulated that this brand of suffering has no greater good. On this, we can agree, perhaps for no other reason than that it is simply impossible for a maximally great morally perfect being to exist and for there to be a possible world where there's no justice whatsoever--given that the privation of justice is itself a moral transgression (at least, it is according to Christian theology). I think your argument would look more like this:
(1) If maximal greatness is exemplified, then maximal suffering--which we may define as suffering of things such that the scale of justice forever remains out of balance--is not exemplified in any possible world.
(2) There's a possible world where maximal suffering is exemplified.
(3) Therefore, maximal greatness is not exemplified.
But what this truly amounts to is the claim that you can conceive of a possible world where God--whose essence, we've stipulated, includes moral perfection--exists and he's not morally perfect, which is a logical contradiction. My response is that such a world is inconceivable, and whatever it is you have in mind is not really such a world and that all testimony to the contrary amounts to mere lip service.
Can we conceive of a world where all human beings are incinerated at birth? Sure. We've witnessed enough horrible suffering in our world that it's quite easy to imagine all sorts of horrible things. But are we within our epistemic rights to say that we can conceive of a world where there's no justice whatsoever? That's more or less claiming that we can conceive of a world where there is no God, and that's the question of the argument itself; can the nonexistence of God be conceived without contradiction? My argument attempts to address this. Quote: The point of all of this was to say that while a world of gratuitious evil can be understood, it's not always clear what maximal greatness entails. The fact that there are debates within perfect being theology is testimony to this fact. In the case of God having a body, you're right that having a body would not be necessary property of God, but it's not clear whether or not God would want to get a contingent body to be greater.
All of this is on topic because I'm trying to demonstrate how its not totally clear that we even understand all the entailments of maximal greatness. Contrast this with the concept of a world containing gratuitous evil. I think we can understand a world of gratuitous suffering much better than a MGB and so we have more warrant to think the former is possible.
So it's ultimately a question of whether I'm paying lip service to the premise that the concept of God is not logically contradictory. Your argument may be stated as follows:
(1) Given only two alternatives both of which are mutually exclusive, we ought to accept whichever one is more rational to accept.
(2) The truth of the statement "Possibly, a being is maximally great" and that of "Possibly, there is maximal suffering" is mutually exclusive (i.e., maximal greatness is exemplified in some possible world if and only if maximal suffering is not exemplified in any possible world).
(3) It is more rational to accept the truth of "Possibly, there is maximal suffering."
(4) Therefore, we ought to accept that a maximally great being is impossible.
Your only justification for the third premise, it seems, is that there is more disagreement surrounding the implications of God's nature over those of maximal suffering. It's inevitable that powerful ideas such as unlimited knowledge or unlimited power will give way to lots of debate and discussion. Even if we don't understand their implications for, say, mathematics or science, I don't see that it somehow lends credence to the claim that maximal greatness may be logically impossible. Why should the answer be so difficult anyway? Show me how maximal greatness entails a logical contradiction. If your contention is that maximal greatness is simply vacuous, I would go back to my point about negative theology and the fact that--at the very least--there is some surface clarity to the ideas themselves insofar as we are familiar with finite instantiations of such things (e.g., we know what it is for someone to have a high IQ--we should have a rough idea of what it is for someone to have an infinitely high IQ).
I would make a stronger claim that the presupposition of injustice in a world where there's maximal suffering presupposes the existence of God, whose nature is all that can constitute the basis for an objective ethical system whereby a judgment can be made that the circumstances in this or that possible world are unjust. If there is no maximally great being, then there is no objective moral standard; and if there is no objective moral standard, then maximal suffering cannot exist. Quote: Let me quote Christian philosopher Robin Collins on this matter:
I'm struck that this is coming from a Christian. Does Robin Collins believe that Jesus did in fact pay our debts? I'll read the article later, perhaps. |
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| squirrelman |
| Posted 07/10/11 at 05:37 PM | Reply with quote #8 |
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Quote: (1) Given only two alternatives both of which are mutually exclusive, we ought to accept whichever one is more rational to accept.
(2) The truth of the statement "Possibly, a being is maximally great" and that of "Possibly, there is maximal suffering" is mutually exclusive (i.e., maximal greatness is exemplified in some possible world if and only if maximal suffering is not exemplified in any possible world).
(3) It is more rational to accept the truth of "Possibly, there is maximal suffering."
(4) Therefore, we ought to accept that a maximally great being is impossible.
That's right. Thanks for formalizing this. Would you grant (1) and (2) keeping in mind the suffering I'm referring to really is gratuitous?
Quote: Your only justification for the third premise, it seems, is that there is more disagreement surrounding the implications of God's nature over those of maximal suffering.
That's right but I would add that there seems to be no clear answer to these debates & they yeild either self-contradictions (is it better to be timeless or temporal; how could God have attained the perfection of overcoming difficulties) or things unfriendly to Christian theology (must God attain a physical body; must the godhead contain far more than 3 persons?). Because of (1) & I believe that the world containing gratuitous suffering (WGS) does not face those difficulties, prima facie, it's more rational to believe a WGS is possible.
Plus, all I must do to undercut your defense of the ontological argument is offer a mutually exclusive possibility that has equal epistemic standing with the possibility of a MGB. So, if you want your argument to go through, you have to show me why a MGB is bette than a WGS.
It seems you didn't respond to Collin's claim that the legal analogies are inappropriate to save penal theory of atonement. Thus, I still see no way to retain belief in a being who is simultaneously merciful and perfectly just.
Quote: Even if we don't understand their implications for, say, mathematics or science, I don't see that it somehow lends credence to the claim that maximal greatness may be logically impossible.
Epistemically, the concept of a MGB doesn't have to be coherent like we know science (insofar as it really describes the world) & mathematics must be.
Quote: I would make a stronger claim that the presupposition of injustice in a world where there's maximal suffering presupposes the existence of God, whose nature is all that can constitute the basis for an objective ethical system whereby a judgment can be made that the circumstances in this or that possible world are unjust. If there is no maximally great being, then there is no objective moral standard; and if there is no objective moral standard, then maximal suffering cannot exist.
This is an entire debate within itself that I'm considering. Would you mind working under the assumption that the ontological argument can be defended independent of the moral argument?
Quote: I'm struck that this is coming from a Christian. Does Robin Collins believe that Jesus did in fact pay our debts?
Collins thinks of atonement differently than most western Christians. He sees the incarnation as God's means to make two radically different things (the infinite God & finite man) enter into communion. Perhaps this is a coherent way of thinking of the atonement but it doesn't solve the conflict between justice & mercy like the penal theory supposedly does.
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| chuckg1982 |
| Posted 07/10/11 at 07:01 PM | Reply with quote #9 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by squirrelman
That's right. Thanks for formalizing this. Would you grant (1) and (2)?
Yes, I would. Quote: That's right but I would add that there seems to be no clear answer to these debates & they yeild either self-contradictions (is it better to be timeless or temporal; how could God have attained the perfection of overcoming difficulties) or things unfriendly to Christian theology (must God attain a physical body). Because of (1) & I believe that the world containing gratuitous suffering (WGS) does not face those difficulties, prima facie, it's more rational to believe a WGS is possible.
Ultimately, disagreement amongst interlocutors cannot speak for the veracity of a particular idea. We'll have to judge the ideas on their own merits, and much like the moral debate this is a discussion unto itself--though certainly one worth having.
I would define "omniscient" as knowing the values of every proposition, "omnipotent" as the ability to do anything that does not entail a logical contradiction, and "moral perfection" as the inability to commit moral transgressions. Any other attribute of God--eternity, spirituality, aseity, self-existence, and what have you-- is an implication of these three basic properties. Quote: All I must do to undercut your defense of the ontological argument is offer a mutually exclusive possibility that has equal epistemic standing with the possibility of a MGB. So, if you want your argument to go through, you have to show me why a MGB is bette than a WGS.
As a matter of full disclosure, you've been addressing Plantinga's formalization of the argument. With regard to my formalization (the title of this thread is "My ontological argument," after all), since you've yet to express anything to the contrary, I'm presuming that you agree with the first premise in my original post--that on the condition of God's nonexistence, his nonexistence is accounted for either by his contingency, logical inconsistency, or abstract nature. On those grounds, I'm assuming that your contention here is that the notion of God is logically contradictory.
It seems, then, that your support for this is not in any actual contradiction that you can derive formally, but rather that you can conceive of a set of circumstances which would logically preclude the existence of God--in which case, there must be a hidden contradiction in there somewhere. For the time being, I'll accept that; for I would agree that any debate that's reduced to "my conception is better than yours!" is clearly boring for everybody involved, in which case I have no problem doing extra work for my premises.
I will say once more that disagreement amongst interlocutors, to my perception, does not seem to be a strong argument; for people may disagree for a variety of reasons, many of them bad. Certainly, you wouldn't recant your position if the sociological data suddenly shifted in my favor (indeed, there are possible worlds where every philosopher agrees on the implications of maximal greatness and disagrees that maximal suffering is logically coherent).
We can start by noting that the idea of a world with maximal suffering--again, we can define "maximal suffering" as the suffering of things such that the scale of justice is forever out of balance--brings with it certain epistemological and ontological underpinnings. It assumes of this possible world, first, that there is an ethical standard, and secondly, that we know what this ethical standard is. (Now this in itself undercuts your argument, insofar as this issue brings about more debate and discussion than does the issue of God's nature; however, I've already agreed that this wasn't a strong argument, so I won't go there.)
Are you a moral objectivist?
Quote: It seems you didn't respond to Collin's claim that the legal analogies are inappropriate to save penal theory of atonement. Thus, I still see no way to retain belief in a being who is simultaneously merciful and perfectly just.
I haven't read the entire article (and I probably should, as it seems interesting). Eyeballing it, I would say that I am in agreement with anyone who suggests that God's legal system is, at face value, counterintuitive. At the same time, that does not mean that Jesus's death fails to satisfy the requirements of justice.
On the face of it, it seems repugnant to suggest that someone else could make amends for a crime that you've committed. But also keep in mind that according to the theology, anyone whose judgment fell upon Christ is understood to have been rejuvenated in a personal transformation. In a way, the lawbreaker in you has died, and your life is redeemed in God; you've come to regret your sins, and vow only to serve Christ.
Viewed in this light, there seems to be a balance of justice. (Have you ever enjoyed a movie where the villain, in lieu of his comeuppance, instead becomes a good guy at the end? Would Return of the Jedi have been as exciting if Darth Vader didn't turn into a good guy?)
So my answer still stands--justice is preserved in the sacrifice of Jesus and makes room for God to be merciful--but I'll check out the whole article when I get a chance.
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| troyjs |
| Posted 07/11/11 at 09:37 AM | Reply with quote #10 |
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To my mind, the argument rests on the incoherence of the idea 'non-existent objects', and the analyticity of the proposition, 'God exists'.
In order for God to exist, it must be true that there is no possible state-of-affairs in which God does not exist, ie. the conditions required for God not to come into existence do not exist because God is not contingent upon fact, but upon logical rule -- and therefore God exists so far as His existence is not self-referentially incoherent. This is true, if and only if any proposition affirming God's existence is true by virtue of semantic rule alone, and not by virtue of fact. That is, God's existence is analytic.
However, the same can be said of Meinong's 'existent golden mountain'. The existent golden mountain is necessary, coherent, and material. It would seem that it fulfills your criterion for existence, as regarding necessarily existent objects. It also seems analytic to affirm that the 'existent golden mountain' exists. But this is the problem -- existence described ontologically, whether necessary or contingent, are only nuclear or constitutive properties. Whether the object exist or not, apart from the descriptive propositions regarding it's ontology, is extranuclear and independent of it's attributes. And extranuclear properties can not be determined be means of ontology.
kind regards
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| chuckg1982 |
| Posted 07/12/11 at 07:24 AM | Reply with quote #11 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by troyjs
However, the same can be said of Meinong's 'existent golden mountain'. The existent golden mountain is necessary, coherent, and material. It would seem that it fulfills your criterion for existence, as regarding necessarily existent objects. It also seems analytic to affirm that the 'existent golden mountain' exists. But this is the problem -- existence described ontologically, whether necessary or contingent, are only nuclear or constitutive properties. Whether the object exist or not, apart from the descriptive propositions regarding it's ontology, is extranuclear and independent of it's attributes. And extranuclear properties can not be determined be means of ontology.
Materiality as an essential property is something that can only be had by a contingent being. Firstly, there are possible worlds where matter never comes into existence (this is true both logically and scientifically). Secondly, there is no matter without form, and all material things have an account external to themselves for why the matter is arranged one way instead of some other. So, the idea of a necessary mountain, which is essentially material (for the idea of an immaterial mountain is absurd), is logically incoherent. |
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| troyjs |
| Posted 07/12/11 at 09:37 AM | Reply with quote #12 |
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Quote: Materiality as an essential property is something that can only be had by a contingent being.
It is impossible for an existing entity, to be a non-existing entity -- it is self-contradictory. An essential property of matter is that it is not abstract, but exists physically. Therefore, there is no possible world where there is non-existing matter, or matter not come into existence. In order for matter to be matter, and not just the 'idea' of matter, it must exist. Existence is essential to materiality. I know this seems absurd. Rather, I would say that 'matter' is a meaningless word in counter-factual states-of-affairs. Given that 'matter' is meaningful, we can not invoke possible-world semantics.
Quote: Secondly, there is no matter without form, and all material things have an account external to themselves for why the matter is arranged one way instead of some other. So, the idea of a necessary mountain, which is essentially material (for the idea of an immaterial mountain is absurd), is logically incoherent.
If 'having been caused' is essential to material objects, and 'having been caused' is sufficient for a material object to exist, then a material objects essence is sufficient to account for it's existence.
I think you are confusing the idea of a physical object, with the physical object itself.
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| squirrelman |
| Posted 07/12/11 at 11:10 AM | Reply with quote #13 |
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Quote: Ultimately, disagreement amongst interlocutors cannot speak for the veracity of a particular idea. We'll have to judge the ideas on their own merits, and much like the moral debate this is a discussion unto itself--though certainly one worth having.
Although the different conclusions may be purely epistemic, I think it does give evidence that perfect being theology is contradictory. For example, a Christian who rejects biblical inerrancy may point out the fact that so many theologians vigorously defend contradictory interpretations supports the proposition that the text really says contradictory things. Another example would be from aesthetics. Some take the vast amount of disagreement on what constitutes physical beauty to support the conclusion that there is no objective standard of physical beauty. Similarly, I'm inclined to think that perfect being theology leads to ambiguities & seeming contradictions and I would give the same examples. (is it better to be temporal or timeless? Must God attain a body? Must God have a very large number of persons in the Godhead? How can God be both merciful and just? How can an omnipotent being obtain the perfection of overcoming difficulties?)
Epistemically prior to the above argument being made, I would suppose that a WGS & a MGB had equal epistemic standing (which is sufficient to undercut the ontological argument). I needn't claim there is a huge epistemic advantage for a WGS over a MGB, but there's definitely a slight advantage given the ambiguity, unfriendliness to Christian theology, & seeming contradictions present in maximal greatness. If the two concepts were equal before, I think the reasons I gave push a WGS slightly ahead of a MGB.
Quote: On those grounds, I'm assuming that your contention here is that the notion of God is logically contradictory.
Right.
Quote: Are you a moral objectivist?
Yes I am. I would grant you that if the moral argument is sound, then my specific example of a WGS is a wrongheaded. Do you think this is the only route to show that my world is incoherent over a MGB? It may be a good way to tackle this objection, but that's a highly controversial argument that requires a huge discussion on its own.
Quote: But also keep in mind that according to the theology, anyone whose judgment fell upon Christ is understood to have been rejuvenated in a personal transformation. In a way, the lawbreaker in you has died, and your life is redeemed in God; you've come to regret your sins, and vow only to serve Christ.
The demands of justice are not met on the scenario that you sketched out. On your view, God merely blinks at your prior sins because you have become a new person. It's like a judge excusing a prisoner from the death penalty because he offers a sincere apology & promises not to murder again. This seems like a case of mercy, not justice. So I ask, how can you be both just & merciful when the definitions are almost meant to be in contrast with each other?
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| chuckg1982 |
| Posted 07/12/11 at 01:10 PM | Reply with quote #14 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by squirrelman
Although the different conclusions may be purely epistemic, I think it does give evidence that perfect being theology is contradictory. For example, a Christian who rejects biblical inerrancy may point out the fact that so many theologians vigorously defend contradictory interpretations supports the proposition that the text really says contradictory things. Another example would be from aesthetics. Some take the vast amount of disagreement on what constitutes physical beauty to support the conclusion that there is no objective standard of physical beauty. Similarly, I'm inclined to think that perfect being theology leads to ambiguities & seeming contradictions and I would give the same examples. (is it better to be temporal or timeless? Must God attain a body? Must God have a very large number of persons in the Godhead? How can God be both merciful and just? How can an omnipotent being obtain the perfection of overcoming difficulties?)
Quote: Yes I am. I would grant you that if the moral argument is sound, then my specific example of a WGS is a wrongheaded. Do you think this is the only route to show that my world is incoherent over a MGB? It may be a good way to tackle this objection, but that's a highly controversial argument that requires a huge discussion on its own.
To your credit, what you show is that if one endorses the possibility premise of the argument, then he or she must work for it. You have posited a possible world with no God, and my job now is to show that your possible world is either self-contradictory or such that God must be included in it. You've narrowly focused on the possibility of a world with no justice, for which the moral discussion seems apropos. Similarly, if someone's response to the argument was that there's no God at a possible world with infinite parallel universes, then the discussion might be different.
Quote: The demands of justice are not met on the scenario that you sketched out. On your view, God merely blinks at your prior sins because you have become a new person. It's like a judge excusing a prisoner from the death penalty because he offers a sincere apology & promises not to murder again. This seems like a case of mercy, not justice. So I ask, how can you be both just & merciful when the definitions are almost meant to be in contrast with each other?
The demands of justice are met insofar as the unforgiving unregenerated wicked culprit has spiritually transformed, and that Christ accepted the punishment on this person's behalf. Your analogy plays to common everyday human experience, but the reason this goes against our ordinary ethical sensibilities is that we epistemically cannot place as much confidence in what other people claim about their own mental states; we can't sense them, and we are fallible--we have no way of knowing with certainty that this or that person is being genuine. On the other hand, God is omniscient and thus is capable of knowing this; in which case, you only have God to answer to for violating God's law, for only God can properly deal with someone who does. For civil law, we can only deal with it as human beings can; there is a God, and we are not him.
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| chuckg1982 |
| Posted 07/12/11 at 06:21 PM | Reply with quote #15 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by troyjs
It is impossible for an existing entity, to be a non-existing entity -- it is self-contradictory. An essential property of matter is that it is not abstract, but exists physically. Therefore, there is no possible world where there is non-existing matter, or matter not come into existence. In order for matter to be matter, and not just the 'idea' of matter, it must exist. Existence is essential to materiality. I know this seems absurd. Rather, I would say that 'matter' is a meaningless word in counter-factual states-of-affairs. Given that 'matter' is meaningful, we can not invoke possible-world semantics.
If what you say is true, then real existence is included in the individual essences of all things such that everything necessarily exists. There are no possible worlds where anything has the property of nonexistence; in order for anything--let's say "x"--to be what it is, x must exist.
The problem is that we have experience of things coming in and out of existence. And even if you reject this, you would still have to account for our experience of change; for example, at 10:00 am this morning, this discussion board did not include this response to your post, but at a later time it does include this response--if everything necessarily exists, how is change possible (given that change requires the coming to be or annihilation of individual non-essential properties--if everything is necessary, then attributes are no exception)?
I don't think this is a tenable position.
That there are no possible worlds containing nonexistent things is a semantic issue--one that can be resolved simply by clarification; what we really mean when we say "nonexistent thing," obviously, is not that there are really things that don't exist, but rather that certain ideas are not exemplified in the real world. For example, I can think of a purple dragon, but the term "purple dragon" has no instantiation on Earth, the universe, or anywhere else in non-mental reality (as far as we know). In this case, the term has meaning, but no instantiation. On the other hand, unqualified, a term such as "jkagklafg" neither has meaning nor instantiation; this has no synonymity with "purple dragon."
Taking all of this into account, I can't see that the essence of matter must include real existence in order for the term "matter" to have meaning. Matter did not always exist; the Big Bang confirms this. And I see no reason why we can't say that there are possible worlds where the only existing things are spirits and abstract entities.
Quote: If 'having been caused' is essential to material objects, and 'having been caused' is sufficient for a material object to exist, then a material objects essence is sufficient to account for it's existence.
No, if contingency is included in the essence of matter, then by the very meaning of "contingent" essence cannot account for existence. Quote: I think you are confusing the idea of a physical object, with the physical object itself.
Not at all. |
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