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jbiemans
Posted 02/14/12 Reply with quote  #1 
I have one question for the MOA.  It says that if God exists, then he exists in all possible worlds, right ?

Isn't there a possible world where nothing exists ?
RandyE
Posted 02/14/12 Reply with quote  #2 
Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
I have one question for the MOA.  It says that if God exists, then he exists in all possible worlds, right ?

Isn't there a possible world where nothing exists ?

Great question! Essentially, this is the penultimate premise (or first entailed conclusion) of the MOA, yes. That said, if the MOA is successful, then no--there is no possible world where nothing exists. Incidentally, I've heard this same claim often (minus any references to the MOA) from atheists! It's not even clear that there are entire and complete states of affairs of nothingness, even without the MOA. But suppose, for simplicity, there is no such conceptual problem. If the MOA is successful, then there is no such possible world. If there is such a possible world, then the MOA's first conclusion is false. But if the MOA's first conclusion is false, then so is its first premise. This means God's existence is impossible. At first glance, this might seem powerful--for many people's intuitions support, at least epistemologically, that a possible world such that nothing exists is possible. So what to do?

When one has competing premises that both cannot be true, he must appeal to plausibility. Which is more plausible? That it is possible God exists, and there is no possible world with nothing, or that it is impossible God exists, and there is a possible world with nothing? Clearly, most people won't take "there is a possible world with nothing" as plausible evidence on its own of God's impossibility. One should then examine the two criteria for metaphysical possibility: logical coherence and necessary truths that override its truth.

In short, it seems more plausible to me, at least on the face of it, that God's existence is at least possible than it does that his existence is impossible. To object to the first premise on the idea that there is a possible world where God does not exist is just to beg the question against the MOA; it would do so unless God's existence were shown to be impossible. Were it shown to be impossible, it would be this objection doing all the work, and not the possible world of nothing.
jbiemans
Posted 02/14/12 Reply with quote  #3 
I disagree that it would be begging the question however.  A possible world where nothing exists, is not self contradictory.  Perhaps a simpler, less controversial example:

Is there a possible world where no minds exist ?
Is there a possible world where no living things exist ?

To me, the answers to these are obviously, yes.  You would claim that they beg the question against God, but I am not doing that, all I am doing is describing a possible world and then comparing it to your definition of God.

If either of those is impossible, then there is no problem to the MOA, but if they are even at least possible, then they are defeaters for the argument, are they not ?


**Edit, I know that you will probably object that god is not a "living thing" or a "mind".


I have been thinking about your charge of begging the question, and I have a question:

If its begging the question to say that there is a possible world where God does not exist, isn't it begging the question to say that there is a possible world where God exists as well ?
RandyE
Posted 02/14/12 Reply with quote  #4 
Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
I disagree that it would be begging the question however.  A possible world where nothing exists, is not self contradictory.  Perhaps a simpler, less controversial example:

Is there a possible world where no minds exist ?
Is there a possible world where no living things exist ?

To me, the answers to these are obviously, yes.  You would claim that they beg the question against God, but I am not doing that, all I am doing is describing a possible world and then comparing it to your definition of God.

If either of those is impossible, then there is no problem to the MOA, but if they are even at least possible, then they are defeaters for the argument, are they not ?


**Edit, I know that you will probably object that god is not a "living thing" or a "mind".

On the contrary, I think God is both a mind and a living thing--depending upon how "life" is construed, of course.

I just wrote concerning begging the question on my blog; it is one of the most commonly misunderstood terms with respect to arguments and people making them. Begging the question for an argument occurs any time a premise or argument is affirmed on the basis of its conclusion being true. Begging the question against an argument occurs any time a premise or argument is rejected on the basis of its conclusion being false. Because one cannot reject the first entailed conclusion (since it is a valid deductive argument), one must reject one of the premises. But since all other premises but (1) of the MOA are entailments, or follow from (1), then it is (1) and only (1) that can be rejected in order for the possible world of nothing (PWN) to be truly possible.

But if (1) entails the conclusion under consideration, and the conclusion under consideration entails PWN's falsehood, one must assume the conclusion is false in order to deny (1). But that is just begging the question!

It seems as though you would argue that PWN is metaphysically possible, and hence not question-begging, but it's not enough that the test of internal consistency be met. That is a necessary, but not sufficient condition. The sufficient condition is that coherency and the fact that there are no known necessary truths which contradict it are in place. The two arguments are here asymmetrical. The MOA presents an argument whereby God's existence is entailed, and one won't see (as far as I can tell) a very good reason why they should affirm God's impossibility on the basis of PWN. PWN, meanwhile, has no argument other than its own coherence, and can but only assume that there are no necessary truths, which entails the MOA's falsehood. But in that case, one is merely assuming the MOA is false. The only way to avoid question-begging is to argue that God's existence is impossible. But if that objection succeeds, it will be that objection, and not PWN, doing all the work.
Thrasymachus
Posted 02/14/12 Reply with quote  #5 
The easiest case is just the possible world in which God does not exist. You can show conceding either will lead (via M5) to showing God necessarily does/not exist.

Both Theism and Atheism are epistemic possibilities, yet we know (if we like M5) only one is an actual possibility (indeed, one will comprise all actual possibilities).

So the OA doesn't seem that valuable, as I can't think of a reason that credits the 'God exists' possibility over the 'God does not exist' possibly short of full blown arguments, which we could use without worrying about OA.
RandyE
Posted 02/14/12 Reply with quote  #6 

Quote:
Originally Posted by Thrasymachus
The easiest case is just the possible world in which God does not exist. You can show conceding either will lead (via M5) to showing God necessarily does/not exist.

Both Theism and Atheism are epistemic possibilities, yet we know (if we like M5) only one is an actual possibility (indeed, one will comprise all actual possibilities).

So the OA doesn't seem that valuable, as I can't think of a reason that credits the 'God exists' possibility over the 'God does not exist' possibly short of full blown arguments, which we could use without worrying about OA.

Don't discount one's own modal intuitions, which may lead us to believe such a maximally great being is possible after all (over and against it being impossible). From that, the conclusion is entailed.
jbiemans
Posted 02/14/12 Reply with quote  #7 
Quote:
On the contrary, I think God is both a mind and a living thing--depending upon how "life" is construed, of course. 


I was going to support that by showing that according to the fine tuning argument, life is exceedingly rare, but then you would say that God is a different kind of life, so that would not go far.

Here is how I see the MOA summarized.

1) If it is possible that a necessary [being] exists, then that necessary [being] must exist. (since it is defined as necessary)
2) It is possible that a necessary [being] exists. 
3) Therefore that necessary [being] must exist.

Which can be turned around:

1) If it is possible that a necessary [being] does not exist, then that necessary [being] must not exist. (if it is possible that something does not exist, then it is not necessary)
2) It is possible that a necessary [being] does not exist exist. 
3) Therefore that necessary [being] must not exist.

It appears that we are at a standstill.
belorg
Posted 02/14/12 Reply with quote  #8 
Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
Quote:
On the contrary, I think God is both a mind and a living thing--depending upon how "life" is construed, of course. 


I was going to support that by showing that according to the fine tuning argument, life is exceedingly rare, but then you would say that God is a different kind of life, so that would not go far.

Here is how I see the MOA summarized.

1) If it is possible that a necessary [being] exists, then that necessary [being] must exist. (since it is defined as necessary)
2) It is possible that a necessary [being] exists. 
3) Therefore that necessary [being] must exist.

Which can be turned around:

1) If it is possible that a necessary [being] does not exist, then that necessary [being] must not exist. (if it is possible that something does not exist, then it is not necessary)
2) It is possible that a necessary [being] does not exist exist. 
3) Therefore that necessary [being] must not exist.

It appears that we are at a standstill.


Yes, of course we are at a standstill. It all depends on what you happen to find more plausible, as RandyE acknowledges.
But why do we need an ontological argument then in the first place. 
That's one of the reasons I think OA's are really a waste of valuable time.
RandyE
Posted 02/14/12 Reply with quote  #9 
Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
Quote:
On the contrary, I think God is both a mind and a living thing--depending upon how "life" is construed, of course. 


I was going to support that by showing that according to the fine tuning argument, life is exceedingly rare, but then you would say that God is a different kind of life, so that would not go far.

Here is how I see the MOA summarized.

1) If it is possible that a necessary [being] exists, then that necessary [being] must exist. (since it is defined as necessary)
2) It is possible that a necessary [being] exists. 
3) Therefore that necessary [being] must exist.

I disagree with the construal of the argument. While it is true this is what the first premise entails, it's not what it means. See WLC's question# 159 I believe. One need not believe "It is possible that it is necessary that a maximally great being exists" in order to believe, metaphysically, "it is possible that a maximally great being exists."
jbiemans
Posted 02/14/12 Reply with quote  #10 
I kinda agree with you, but I have heard WLC so often say that:

"If an argument is deductive, then its conclusion follows naturally and inescapabily from its premises".

So if you have a problem with the conclusion, then you must have a problem with the premises right ?

Actually, the more I think about it I was being charitable when I said we were at a standstill.  If something both necessarily exists, and necessarily not exists, then it is self contradictory, and therefore it is impossible. 

So there is either a problem with one of the premises of the arguments, or God is impossible.  You cannot simply choose to believe the argument you find more plausible and ignore the other.
jbiemans
Posted 02/14/12 Reply with quote  #11 
Quote:
I disagree with the construal of the argument. While it is true this is what the first premise entails, it's not what it means. See WLC's question# 159 I believe. One need not believe "It is possible that it is necessary that a maximally great being exists" in order to believe, metaphysically, "it is possible that a maximally great being exists."

Isn't necessary a component of "maximally great" ?

Quote:
It is possible that it is necessary that a maximally great being exists

This is not what I said.  What I said was:

It is possible that a necessary maximally great being exists.

Different premises.
RandyE
Posted 02/14/12 Reply with quote  #12 
Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
I kinda agree with you, but I have heard WLC so often say that:

"If an argument is deductive, then its conclusion follows naturally and inescapabily from its premises".

So if you have a problem with the conclusion, then you must have a problem with the premises right ?

Actually, the more I think about it I was being charitable when I said we were at a standstill.  If something both necessarily exists, and necessarily not exists, then it is self contradictory, and therefore it is impossible. 

So there is either a problem with one of the premises of the arguments, or God is impossible.  You cannot simply choose to believe the argument you find more plausible and ignore the other.

I'm a little confused as to exactly what you're saying. What both necessarily exists and necessarily does not exist?

As to the PWN, the only argument is that it is coherent. But we've not covered metaphysical possibility yet. There's nothing self-contradictory in saying "the prime minister is a prime number," but nevertheless there is no possible world in which one exists, since a necessary truth about persons is that they're not abstract objects. PWN can assume it is metaphysically possible only at the expense of (1) of the MOA. The difference is going to come down to plausibility. It is more plausible that: a) a maximally great being exists and hence there is no possible world in which nothing exists, or b) there is PWN and God is impossible. It won't be question-begging for the MOA proponent to state he believes God, as a maximally-great being, is possible; for he may do so on the basis of metaphysical or modal intuitions, experience, et al. I can't imagine what intuitions would tell one, strongly enough, that God is impossible on the basis of PWN's being possible. Instead, one will have to offer argument(s) for God's impossibility. Now if you're honestly suggesting you intuit that PWN is possible and God is impossible, that's fine. But what I would suggest is that the first condition is not really possible to intuit, as it's just imagining "nothing," which isn't to imagine anything at all, and so must be relied upon on the strength of some evidentiary claim--namely, that it is impossible for God to exist. But then it is that claim doing the work.

As to your other post, I would say yes--necessary is an entailment of maximally-great, but it's discovered throughout the course of the argument. It certainly can't be false (that's what it means to be an entailment) but deductive arguments don't require their entailments to be known and affirmed in order for the major premise to be known or affirmed. If they did, all deductive arguments would be utterly useless, since all valid arguments contain their conclusions in their major premises and would require believing those conclusions first. Finally, stating "it is possible that a necessary, maximally great being exists," is logically equivalent to saying "it is possible that it is necessary that a maximally great being exists." Interestingly, your only defense here is to affirm that one need not accept the entailment in order to affirm a premise, which is precisely my point.
jbiemans
Posted 02/14/12 Reply with quote  #13 
Quote:
But what I would suggest is that the first condition is not really possible to intuit, as it's just imagining "nothing," which isn't to imagine anything at all, and so must be relied upon on the strength of some evidentiary claim--namely, that it is impossible for God to exist. But then it is that claim doing the work.

But if you can say that 'metaphysical or modal intuitions, experience, et al.' is sufficient for you to believe it is possible that God exists, whats to stop me from using the same reasoning to think its possible that nothing exists.

Quote:
As to your other post, I would say yes--necessary is an entailment of maximally-great, but it's discovered throughout the course of the argument. It certainly can't be false (that's what it means to be an entailment) but deductive arguments don't require their entailments to be known and affirmed in order for the major premise to be known or affirmed. If they did, all deductive arguments would be utterly useless, since all valid arguments contain their conclusions in their major premises and would require believing those conclusions first. Finally, stating "it is possible that a necessary, maximally great being exists," is logically equivalent to saying "it is possible that it is necessary that a maximally great being exists." Interestingly, your only defense here is to affirm that one need not accept the entailment in order to affirm a premise, which is precisely my point. 

I was not disagreeing with the entailment, but rather I was disagreeing with the way that you phrased what I said.  Now that I look at it, I can see your point, that they are the same, but the wording makes them look odd.

Quote:
One need not believe "It is possible that it is necessary that a maximally great being exists" in order to believe, metaphysically, "it is possible that a maximally great being exists."

In this case, one must believe "It is possible that it is necessary that a maximally great being exists" in order to believe, metaphysically, "it is possible that a maximally great being exists."

since maximally great being = necessary maximally great being.  To argue that it need not be included in the premise seems dishonest.  If one does not = the other, then it is possible that a maximally great being is not necessary; which I am fine with, are you ?

In this case, the conclusion is "existence", so if necessary entails existence, then the first premise begs the question since an MBG is necessary necessary, and anything that is necessary must exist.  So to say that it is possible for an MBG to exist is equilivent to saying that an MGB exists.
RandyE
Posted 02/14/12 Reply with quote  #14 

Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans

Quote:
But what I would suggest is that the first condition is not really possible to intuit, as it's just imagining "nothing," which isn't to imagine anything at all, and so must be relied upon on the strength of some evidentiary claim--namely, that it is impossible for God to exist. But then it is that claim doing the work.


But if you can say that 'metaphysical or modal intuitions, experience, et al.' is sufficient for you to believe it is possible that God exists, whats to stop me from using the same reasoning to think its possible that nothing exists.
The italicized portion indicates you wouldn't be intuiting anything at all, by definition. Besides, do you believe you intuit that there is such a possible world? If not, then it's really trivial. If you think you do, how do you overcome the "intuiting nothingness" bit, and how does it distinguish frmo epistemic possibility only? (essentially these two are the same question)
 

Quote:
In this case, one must believe "It is possible that it is necessary that a maximally great being exists" in order to believe, metaphysically, "it is possible that a maximally great being exists."

since maximally great being = necessary maximally great being.  To argue that it need not be included in the premise seems dishonest.  If one does not = the other, then it is possible that a maximally great being is not necessary; which I am fine with, are you ?
 
But that plainly doesn't follow! One may not say, "I think that possibly, a maximally great being exists, on the basis of X, Y, and Z. I do not know that it entails necessary existence or not. Therefore, it is possible that a maximally great being is not necessary," and mean every possibility in a metaphysical sense. In fact, the second sense could be epistemic. For all I know, maximal greatness entails necessary existence, or it may not. Now what makes the first possibility not merely epistemic is that one thinks of some great making property (only need one) and decides if it makes sense to take it in a maximal way. If there is one, he is at least justified (as opposed to warranted) in saying it is possible (metaphysical) that a maximally great being exists, wholly apart from considerations of what that entails. Suppose after this that one discovers a great-making property that, when taken in a maximal way, is incoherent, or incompatible with another great-making property. At that point, if we've reasoned correctly, either one of these are not great-making properties or we've disproven the metaphysical possibility of the MGB after all, in which case we've lost our justification for its affirmation. The whole point of that exercise is just to show that the first premise and its concomitant entailments are separate, and the first premise can be justifiably believed without knowing what those entailments are.

 
 
Quote:
In this case, the conclusion is "existence", so if necessary entails existence, then the first premise begs the question since an MBG is necessary necessary, and anything that is necessary must exist.  So to say that it is possible for an MBG to exist is equilivent to saying that an MGB exists.

But we've already discussed that begging the question only occurs if the person making the argument only affirms a premise on the basis of the conclusion. An argument is not question-begging if the major premise entails the conclusion (as every major premise in a valid deductive argument does, and can be reduced to its conclusion). Since someone may affirm the first premise on modal intuitions or the seeming coherency of a great-making property taken in a maximal way, and since neither of these just are the conclusion, the charge of question-begging is avoided.
jbiemans
Posted 02/14/12 Reply with quote  #15 
But can you really say that it is possible that a MGB exists without knowing that MBG entails necessary ?

Perhaps rather then saying there is a possible world that contains nothing, i will change that.

Instead, I would like to propose that there is a possible world that contains no beings, only inaninmanate objecs.

I think that there is strong warant for this to be a possibility, espscially given how rare beings are whitin this universe, and how unlkely beings are to exist within our universe.
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