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ReasonableFaith.org > Forums > Ontological Argument > MOA and possible worlds #2
 
 


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jbiemans
Posted 02/24/12 at 03:02 PM Reply with quote  #16 
Because that is how its defined.
RandyE
Posted 02/24/12 at 03:05 PM Reply with quote  #17 
Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
Because that is how its defined.


Well that seems ambiguous. What do you mean?
jbiemans
Posted 02/24/12 at 03:10 PM Reply with quote  #18 
It is defined as being necessary, therefore it is necessary.  I know it sounds vague, but what more can I really offer ?  Its coherent, and there is no necessary truth precluding it.
RandyE
Posted 02/24/12 at 03:14 PM Reply with quote  #19 

Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
It is defined as being necessary, therefore it is necessary.  I know it sounds vague, but what more can I really offer ?  Its coherent, and there is no necessary truth precluding it.

Seems circular to me. I don't even know what it means, to be honest.
jbiemans
Posted 02/24/12 at 03:27 PM Reply with quote  #20 
It means that I am proposing that there is a necessary leprechaun that exists.  Is it possible  ?  Sure, and if its possible, and its necessary, then it exists, right ?  

Perhaps rather then necessary, I should say that it is possible that a maximally great leprechaun exists, therefore it exists.

Or a maximally great car......
RandyE
Posted 02/24/12 at 03:36 PM Reply with quote  #21 
Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
It means that I am proposing that there is a necessary leprechaun that exists.  Is it possible  ?  Sure, and if its possible, and its necessary, then it exists, right ?  

Perhaps rather then necessary, I should say that it is possible that a maximally great leprechaun exists, therefore it exists.

Or a maximally great car......

Ah I see--maximal greatness. Well that is quite easy: I don't think any of those things are coherent. For they are physical, and rely on physicalism being necessarily true in order for it to derive its coherence. But since it seems obviously true that there could have been at least one different quark, then it seems the universe is not necessary. Of course, you could insist that every logically possible physical world actually exists, and that there is no possible world existing apart from the physical realm. But aside from being wildly counterintuitive, it in fact seems false, so that the gratuitous tacking on of necessarily-existent to physical objects only must be false, and hence is incoherent. Now one can object by saying, "oh no, what we mean is a maximally great leprechaun, car, etc." There are at least two problems with this: 1. In the case of a person, it's just renaming God, and then gratuitously tacking on physical properties (or in demanding there are none, simply just deciding to call God a leprechaun, which is odd). 2. In the cases of objects or animals, it seems obviously false. What makes a maximally great car? How can a car possess omniscience, moral perfection, etc.? It seems quite incoherent to me.

But these parodies are nonetheless quite beside the point.
jbiemans
Posted 02/24/12 at 03:57 PM Reply with quote  #22 
Something does not have to posses omnipotence and omniscience to be maximally great, all it has to do is exemplify the properties it does have to a maximal level.  

A maximally great car, would be the greatest conceivable car.  Now, like you argues, cars are physical, and therefore cannot exist, if the physical universe does not exist, therefore they are not necessary.  All that would mean is that a maximally great car is cannot exist in any possible world where cars cannot exist.  Which is logical

On that point, however, I would argue that beings are physical as well (at least all the ones we know of)

Quote:
But since it seems obviously true that there could have been at least one different quark, then it seems the universe is not necessary.

While it may be true that the matter that condensed out of the energy is contingent, there is no reason to think that the energy itself is not necessary.

What about the multiverse ? (MVSE = multiverse)

1. Possibly, MVSE exists.
2. If possibly, MVSE exists, then MVSE exists in at least one possible world.
3. If MVSE exists in a possible world, then MVSE exists in all possible worlds.
4. If MVSE exists in all possible worlds, then MVSE exists in the actual world.
5. Therefore, the MVSE exists in the actual world.
6. Therefore, the MVSE exists.
RandyE
Posted 02/24/12 at 04:41 PM Reply with quote  #23 

Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
Something does not have to posses omnipotence and omniscience to be maximally great, all it has to do is exemplify the properties it does have to a maximal level.

But then there would be a being greater, namely, the one that does possess these great-making properties. It just is in the definition of what it means to be a maximally-great being; possessing all great-making properties; properties better to have than to lack, and possessing them all at a maximal level. Otherwise, some creature having only one essential property, the property of, say, being red, could count as maximally great, which is not at all true.

Quote:
A maximally great car, would be the greatest conceivable car.  Now, like you argues, cars are physical, and therefore cannot exist, if the physical universe does not exist, therefore they are not necessary.  All that would mean is that a maximally great car is cannot exist in any possible world where cars cannot exist.  Which is logical
Except then it is not necessary, for there are possible worlds in which it does not exist, unless we presume physicalism, which would be begging the question against God's existence.

On that point, however, I would argue that beings are physical as well (at least all the ones we know of)

Quote:
While it may be true that the matter that condensed out of the energy is contingent, there is no reason to think that the energy itself is not necessary.
Sure there is: you yourself explicitly argued there is a possible world with nothing, and many atheists do. But we can't have it both ways!

Quote:
1. Possibly, MVSE exists.
2. If possibly, MVSE exists, then MVSE exists in at least one possible world.
3. If MVSE exists in a possible world, then MVSE exists in all possible worlds.
4. If MVSE exists in all possible worlds, then MVSE exists in the actual world.
5. Therefore, the MVSE exists in the actual world.
6. Therefore, the MVSE exists.

What about it? Unless you're a pantheist, it certainly doesn't disprove God. Besides, a la Plantinga, I happen to think modal realism is incoherent. It means every possible world is actual, and thus entails contradictory truths of actuality (i.e., it both is and is not the case that I went to the store on Tuesday in actuality)
jbiemans
Posted 02/24/12 at 05:15 PM Reply with quote  #24 
Quote:
What about it? Unless you're a pantheist, it certainly doesn't disprove God. Besides, a la Plantinga, I happen to think modal realism is incoherent. It means every possible world is actual, and thus entails contradictory truths of actuality (i.e., it both is and is not the case that I went to the store on Tuesday in actuality)

So then you agree that based on this argument that it must exist ?

Quote:
Sure there is: you yourself explicitly argued there is a possible world with nothing, and many atheists do. But we can't have it both ways!

But I thought that we agreed that a possible world with nothing is incoherent after that discussion.  I am confused.

Quote:
Except then it is not necessary, for there are possible worlds in which it does not exist, unless we presume physicalism, which would be begging the question against God's existence.


Is necessary something that exists in all possible worlds, or simply something that exists in all possible worlds where it is logically possible to exist ?  

Quote:
But then there would be a being greater, namely, the one that does possess these great-making properties. It just is in the definition of what it means to be a maximally-great being; possessing all great-making properties; properties better to have than to lack, and possessing them all at a maximal level. Otherwise, some creature having only one essential property, the property of, say, being red, could count as maximally great, which is not at all true.

Sure, but I was not talking about beings, I was talking about X.  If X is incapable of thought, it makes no sense to call X omniscient, even though it might be the Maximally great X.  There could exist a greatest conceivable video game, and it would not need to posses the property of omniscience. or omnipotence, yet still be the maximally great game.
RandyE
Posted 02/24/12 at 05:35 PM Reply with quote  #25 
Quote:
Originally Posted by jbiemans
Quote:
What about it? Unless you're a pantheist, it certainly doesn't disprove God. Besides, a la Plantinga, I happen to think modal realism is incoherent. It means every possible world is actual, and thus entails contradictory truths of actuality (i.e., it both is and is not the case that I went to the store on Tuesday in actuality)

So then you agree that based on this argument that it must exist ?
 
Not at all, for as I highlighted, I think modal realism is incoherent, and so the first premise is false. If you don't mean modal realism, then the argument is invalid, as there is no reason to suppose that a multiverse's possible existence entails existence across all possible worlds. If it does exist across all possible worlds, and does not mean to express modal realism, then nothing more controversial is expressed than the fact that every possibly true proposition has its modality necessarily. That is, every possibly true proposition is possibly true in every possible world.
Quote:
But I thought that we agreed that a possible world with nothing is incoherent after that discussion.  I am confused.
 
Ah, so we now admit that such a world is impossible. Of course, my argument for it was that God exists necessarily, and I assume you took a different route: the route of metaphysical conceivability. But I don't see any reason to think energy is necessary; only if we assume the laws of conservation apply as a metaphysical, rather than just physical, principle. But the only valid way of doing that is just to presume physicalism.

Quote:
Is necessary something that exists in all possible worlds, or simply something that exists in all possible worlds where it is logically possible to exist ?
 
Something is necessarily true/false or has necessary existence/nonexistence in the case that it is true/false or exists/does not exist in every possible world. So let's say there is a contingent person, like Hitler, and Hitler exists in one million possible worlds (just for sake of discussion). Let's say Hitler, in all one million possible worlds in which he exists, is left handed. But it is not true in every possible world that Hitler is left handed; indeed, all the worlds in which Hitler does not exist that proposition is false. Hence, the proposition "Hitler is lefthanded" is not necessary. However, the proposition "Hitler is lefthanded in every world in which he exists" is necessary, though that is a less-impressive type of necessity.
 
Now to the point this came from: a maximally great X will possess great-making properties, properties it is better to have than to lack. These properties will be exemplified in a maximal way. Necessary existence is a great-making property. But one does not possess necessary existence in the case that he exists in every world in which he exists. While that is a necessary truth, it's true of everyone (and not everyone is necessary). Further, the necessary truth isn't about one's existence per se, but rather about one's existence in worlds in which he exists.

Quote:
Sure, but I was not talking about beings, I was talking about X.  If X is incapable of thought, it makes no sense to call X omniscient, even though it might be the Maximally great X.  There could exist a greatest conceivable video game, and it would not need to posses the property of omniscience. or omnipotence, yet still be the maximally great game.

So then, you would admit this would be a category error, irrelevant to God as the maximally great being? Besides, though: what would it even mean to be the greatest conceivable car, video game, etc.?
jbiemans
Posted 02/24/12 at 08:12 PM Reply with quote  #26 
if the multi verse exists I cannot conceive of a possible world where it did not exist since it would be the source of all possible worlds.

as for energy I don't have to assume anything other then that our experience with energy is that it cannot be created or destroyed. (law of conservation). If intuitions can be trusted, why not here?

my statement was not that x exists in a possible world where x exists, but rather that x must exist in every possible world where it is possible that x exists. also isn't maximal a relitive term? when you say taken in a maximal way, do you mean the maximum possible in a given possible world, or the maximum logically possible in all worlds.

as for my examples they were not meant to be relevent to God but rather to show that given the moa, anything that has the property of maximally great must also exist.
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