| Killjoy |
| Posted 08/09/12 at 06:15 AM | Reply with quote #1 |
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I recently sent a letter to W.L.Craig's "letter of the week" concerning God's goodness. Needless to say it was not selected (in fairness to Dr Craig, he probably gets a lot of letters and can hardly be expected to answer all of them).
Nevertheless I thought I would post it here to see how theists and/or philosophers on this forum would respond. I quote the letter in full. Quote: Originally Posted by letter to WLCDear Dr Craig I hope you don't mind answering a question from an atheist if it is asked in all seriousness. My question concerns God and morality. I have heard you say that God is "essentially" good, by which I assume you mean that God's goodness is a necessary part of His being and character. I have also heard you say that being omnipotent does not involve an ability for God to go against His own nature. This would seem to imply that God is not able to do evil. So my first question is - Q1: Is God able to do evil? If the answer is "no" it is not clear to me how God can be said to be good, as surely an important part of being good is having the ability to do evil but choosing not to. If God is not able to do evil doesn't He become a sort of moral automaton, and not worthy of praise (at least in the moral sense)? If, on the other hand, the answer to Q1 is "yes, He can do evil but always chooses not to", this would mean that there is some "possible world" in which he does do evil (for what other meaning of the word "can" is there?). The question then becomes - Q2: How should inhabitants of those possible worlds respond to God's evil acts? Would evil become good in those worlds (a contradiction) or would God become evil (violating the necessity of His goodness)?
(I realise the above question suggests a misuse of "possible world" semantics, but I think you get my drift) In a "one shot" question format like this it is difficult to get into a meaningful discussion, so I hope you will forgive me if I try to preempt some of your possible answers and give a brief response to those. A1: Yes, God can do evil but there is no possible world in which He does do evil.
A1R1: It is hard to see what the word "can" even means in this context. A2: Yes, God can do evil but there is no possible world in which He wants to do evil.
A2R1: There would still be a possible world in which He does do evil, as even human beings are expected to do things contrary to their wants. A3: No God cannot do evil. But He is still worthy of praise simply because it is part of His essential nature to be worthy of praise.
A3R1: This means that God's goodness is an entirely different kind of goodness to that of human beings, who only become worthy of praise by virtue of the free choices they make. But how then are we to interpret the biblical notion that we are made in the image and likeness of God (which I have always taken to refer - at least in part - to our shared status as moral beings).
A3R2: This seems to make the whole notions of goodness and praiseworthiness rather meaningless as they apply to God. They become entirely detached from the meaning we normally attribute to these terms. Thank you for taking the time to consider my question.
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| depthcharge623 |
| Posted 08/09/12 at 07:27 AM | Reply with quote #2 |
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| The possibility to do evil is only a necessary condition of libertarian free will, not good. |
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| harvey1 |
| Posted 08/09/12 at 08:16 AM | Reply with quote #3 |
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Good question, KJ. I hope WLC takes this question.
I believe that God is omniscient with respect to whether a nonmoral proposition is true. However, the truth of a proposition is determined by God's omni-wise characteristic which is to say that God cannot fail to make the wisest decision in respect to labeling a decree good or bad based on his omniscient knowledge. Thus, moral propositions and moral acts are dependent on both God's omniscient nonmoral knowledge and God's omni-wise decision-making capability.
So, based on this background information, let's answer your questions:
Quote: So my first question is - Q1: Is God able to do evil?
Prima facie it is possible for God to do evil in that prior to God utilizing his omniscient knowledge and omni-wise nature, what is good and what is evil is undefined for some conceivable world. I say "conceivable" because if it turns out to be a world which would require going against God's omniscient or omni-wise properties, then such a world is only conceivable -- it is not actually a possible world. So, an evil world is "possible" up to some omni-wise point p, but then not possible from p. That's because God has decided that it is not a wise world because it is evil, and therefore it would be against God's omni-wise nature to move forward and create a world with evil.
Quote: Originally Posted by KJ
A1: Yes, God can do evil but there is no possible world in which He does do evil.
A1R1: It is hard to see what the word "can" even means in this context.
There exists a conceivable world where prior to p God judges "evil" (using God's omniscience of nonmoral propositions [GO] and God's omni-wise abilities [GW]). Prior to p, God can really do that "evil" if it turned out that God found a way to show that it was not really evil (according to GO and GW). All that "can" means here is that it is conceivable that God could do that action prior to p.
Quote: Originally Posted by KJ
A2: Yes, God can do evil but there is no possible world in which He wants to do evil.
A2R1: There would still be a possible world in which He does do evil, as even human beings are expected to do things contrary to their wants.
In order for a possible world to really be possible, we have to look at how the world looks to God from point p. Just because God has made a decision at p does not mean that God will create such a world. It just means that from p God judges that x is evil or x is good. Now, it remains to be seen if God actualizes a situation where x comes into existence. Thus, x is possible from p, but it is only conceivable prior to p. Thus, there is no possible world where God does evil. There is only a conceivable world where God does evil (and prior to p this is not "evil" it is only undefined action x). From p this action x is defined as either good or evil.
Quote: Originally Posted by KJ
A3: No God cannot do evil. But He is still worthy of praise simply because it is part of His essential nature to be worthy of praise.
A3R1: This means that God's goodness is an entirely different kind of goodness to that of human beings, who only become worthy of praise by virtue of the free choices they make. But how then are we to interpret the biblical notion that we are made in the image and likeness of God (which I have always taken to refer - at least in part - to our shared status as moral beings).
God is free at p to find x good or evil in that there are no restrictions that exist external to him which remove his libertarian free will. However, God expects us to use the wisdom and knowledge we have to make the right decisions to either do x or avoid x if we judge it to be evil based on the natural and divine revelations that we have available to us. We are compelled to choose rightly by having the highest character possible. Similarly, God judges x based on his character and does so even if there are horrendous costs in making those tough choices (e.g., sacrificing his own Son to death on the cross).
Quote: Originally Posted by KJ
A3R2: This seems to make the whole notions of goodness and praiseworthiness rather meaningless as they apply to God. They become entirely detached from the meaning we normally attribute to these terms.
No. God is praiseworthy because he is willing to stick to his divine character of goodness to make the right judgment even when there are horrendous costs in doing so (e.g., allowing innocents to die). It pains God to allow such evil to occur, but he does so for a higher purpose. Once this world is over and God reveals himself in full glory, we can be assured that we will forever be in the presence of goodness and will not have evil to fear anymore. |
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| lehmar |
| Posted 08/09/12 at 08:48 AM | Reply with quote #4 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by Killjoy A1: Yes, God can do evil but there is no possible world in which He does do evil. A1R1: It is hard to see what the word "can" even means in this context.
I might be wrong, but perhaps the distinction between possible and feasible worlds might help here. If we say that God can do evil, then there are possible worlds where God does, but we will also want to add that there are no feasible worlds where God does evil.
Quote: Originally Posted by Killjoy A2: Yes, God can do evil but there is no possible world in which He wants to do evil.
A2R1: There would still be a possible world in which He does do evil, as even human beings are expected to do things contrary to their wants.
Yup, but perhaps the distinction between possible and feasible worlds might help here. Then again, I could be wrong.
Quote: Originally Posted by Killjoy A3: No God cannot do evil. But He is still worthy of praise simply because it is part of His essential nature to be worthy of praise.
A3R1: This means that God's goodness is an entirely different kind of goodness to that of human beings, who only become worthy of praise by virtue of the free choices they make. But how then are we to interpret the biblical notion that we are made in the image and likeness of God (which I have always taken to refer - at least in part - to our shared status as moral beings).
A3R2: This seems to make the whole notions of goodness and praiseworthiness rather meaningless as they apply to God. They become entirely detached from the meaning we normally attribute to these terms.
He can still be worthy of praise for his other attributes, such as his omniscience, his omnipotence, and so forth. And I think it's plausible that goodness, especially perfect goodness, is intrinsically worthy of praise, even if that goodness couldn't be any other way. Indeed, maybe the fact that God's goodness couldn't be any other way makes it more worthy of praise. |
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| mazzgolf |
| Posted 08/09/12 at 08:55 AM | Reply with quote #5 |
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Dr. Craig probably didn't pick this question because this is a question that is popular and therefore is one he probably answered already (either on his website or in his books/articles). For example, see:
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/freedom-and-the-ability-to-choose-evil
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-evil-god-objection
And of course his arguments against the Problem of Evil.
While I don't think those above address your question directly, I think they are close enough to infer what his answer would be. Anyway, I can only guess that's why he didn't pick the question for the Q&A (and actually, if you see the one he DID pick for this week, it's related to his current research on divine aseity so he's probably biased for those questions since that's what he's currently working on). I read somewhere he gets like 50 or 100 questions a week (only one of mine have ever been picked, and I've sent lots!) |
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| MorleyMcMorson |
| Posted 08/09/12 at 09:32 AM | Reply with quote #6 |
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Hey, another argument for my position that powers don't equal possibilities!
Just accept my position there and the problem vanishes. |
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| Killjoy |
| Posted 08/09/12 at 10:36 AM | Reply with quote #7 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1
I believe that God is omniscient with respect to whether a nonmoral proposition is true. However, the truth of a proposition is determined by God's omni-wise characteristic which is to say that God cannot fail to make the wisest decision in respect to labeling a decree good or bad based on his omniscient knowledge. Thus, moral propositions and moral acts are dependent on both God's omniscient nonmoral knowledge and God's omni-wise decision-making capability.
I'm not sure that I have understood you here.
Does this mean that actions (or states of affairs) do not have intrinsic moral value until God assigns those values one way or the other? And if that is the case what is the basis of that assignment? You suggest that it is God's "omni-wise decision-making ability", but what meaning could be given to that phrase other than a "right" (for want of a better term) to make the assignment arbitrarily? If the action has no value prior to God assigning it a value, what does God's wisdom attach itself to? |
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| harvey1 |
| Posted 08/09/12 at 11:55 AM | Reply with quote #8 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by Killjoy
Does this mean that actions (or states of affairs) do not have intrinsic moral value until God assigns those values one way or the other?
The moral value is undermined until God weighs in on either a moral precept or some action (or states of affairs) that has moral implications. In Christian terminology, "God judges."
Quote: Originally Posted by kj
And if that is the case what is the basis of that assignment? You suggest that it is God's "omni-wise decision-making ability", but what meaning could be given to that phrase other than a "right" (for want of a better term) to make the assignment arbitrarily?
I'm not quite sure what you mean by: "what meaning could be given to that phrase other than a 'right'...to make the assignment arbitrary?" God's judgment is not made arbitrarily because it is based on being an objective observer (having all the appropriate capabilities and point of reference) to determine objective moral truth. Such moral truth cannot exist without God's involvement since moral propositions are mind-dependent. Objective moral propositions are "mind-dependent on an objective mind." |
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| Killjoy |
| Posted 08/09/12 at 05:47 PM | Reply with quote #9 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1
God's judgment is not made arbitrarily because it is based on being an objective observer (having all the appropriate capabilities and point of reference) to determine objective moral truth. Such moral truth cannot exist without God's involvement since moral propositions are mind-dependent. Objective moral propositions are "mind-dependent on an objective mind."
But there is no objective moral truth until God assigns it. As an objective observer (presumably of states of affairs in the world), what is it that God is observing that would determine His assignment of the labels "right" or "wrong" to specific states of affairs?
For example when God "judged" rape to be wrong, what was it about rape that made Him decide that it was wrong? Was it something intrinsic to rape, or was it something internal to God Himself? If it was internal to God Himself, how did that internal characteristic connect to the external act of rape other than by an arbitrary assignment?
I'm not trying to be argumentative here. I think these questions are fundamental to an understanding of the Moral Argument for God's existence. Many theists I know regard this argument as one of the most powerful arguments for God. To be totally honest I have always seen it as by far the weakest - so obviously I am missing something crucial. |
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| harvey1 |
| Posted 08/09/12 at 06:18 PM | Reply with quote #10 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by Killjoy
But there is no objective moral truth until God assigns it. As an objective observer (presumably of states of affairs in the world), what is it that God is observing that would determine His assignment of the labels "right" or "wrong" to specific states of affairs?
He's observing the consistency of those actions which conform to his moral knowledge of what God believes to be moral and consistent with the fruits of the Spirit (e.g., love, joy, peace, etc.). This involves both an analyzable component to moral truths which are necessary for x to be moral, and a non-analyzable reactionary component to moral goodness (i.e., a raw psychological impression) that God has as a primitive to his Being. He reacts to this moral data to form his impression of good and evil.
Thus, at some point p, God judges x based on the analyzable elements of x, but he also can react to the incoming moral data based on his feelings of right and wrong. Both of these components are "objective" in that insomuch as x is analyzable, God is objective in his analysis. Insomuch as x is unanalyzable his omni-wisdom is able to judge objectively.
Quote: Originally Posted by kj
For example when God "judged" rape to be wrong, what was it about rape that made Him decide that it was wrong? Was it something intrinsic to rape, or was it something internal to God Himself? If it was internal to God Himself, how did that internal characteristic connect to the external act of rape other than by an arbitrary assignment?
The analyzable elements of rape are the inconsistencies that crime has with building beautiful families, communities, civilizations. Since these aspects are analyzable, human beings are able to form similar opinions.The unanalyzable elements (incoming moral data) that God reacts to is something that humans can also experience and come to know something is wrong by the feeling we get by being exposed to it. Anyone exposed to the aftermath of rape are able to experience the evilness of the act.
Quote: Originally Posted by kj
Many theists I know regard this argument as one of the most powerful arguments for God.
It's the moral data that is so overwhelming for many people -- not just theists. Atheists will often accept moral realism even on insufficient grounds in order to avoid the implication that the moral data they experience is fictional (i.e., they inherently reject moral fictionalism). I think this is right, but I could see why moral fictionalism could appeal to those who are less sensitive to the implications of that philosophy. |
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| Killjoy |
| Posted 08/09/12 at 07:08 PM | Reply with quote #11 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1
It's the moral data that is so overwhelming for many people -- not just theists. Atheists will often accept moral realism even on insufficient grounds in order to avoid the implication that the moral data they experience is fictional (i.e., they inherently reject moral fictionalism). I think this is right, but I could see why moral fictionalism could appeal to those who are less sensitive to the implications of that philosophy.
My position on this, as an atheist, would be that the "insufficient" grounds on which atheists accept moral realism are not insufficient at all, but actually reflect the true objective basis on which moral judgments are made - whether by God or by any other moral agent. It is the theist's claim that moral terms can have no meaning or objective significance other than by God that I find objectionable about the Moral Argument.
It is still not at all clear to me, despite your best efforts to explain it, what it actually is that God does that imparts moral truth to a situation that would otherwise have none of its own. Or rather, I should say that it is not clear to me that God is required to do anything at all, given that some situations do, in fact, have moral significance on their own. |
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| Lawlessone777 |
| Posted 08/09/12 at 07:43 PM | Reply with quote #12 |
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Quote: My position on this, as an atheist, would be that the "insufficient" grounds on which atheists accept moral realism are not insufficient at all, but actually reflect the true objective basis on which moral judgments are made - whether by God or by any other moral agent. It is the theist's claim that moral terms can have no meaning or objective significance other than by God that I find objectionable about the Moral Argument.
It is still not at all clear to me, despite your best efforts to explain it, what it actually is that God does that imparts moral truth to a situation that would otherwise have none of its own. Or rather, I should say that it is not clear to me that God is required to do anything at all, given that some situations do, in fact, have moral significance on their own.
This is simply a question of epistemology versus ontology. On the moral argument what is being presented is the fact that on naturalism there is no such thing as objective good or evil. If naturalism is true, and life began through purely naturalistic processes, then we are effectively monkeys with delusions of grandeur. Objectively there is no intrinsic moral worth to human life. Killing a human is pretty well morally neutral and equal to killing, say, a dog or cat if naturalism is true. And so if we are truly nothing more than clumps of animate matter, there is no objective difference between me killing a person, or me killing an earwig.
Now on theism I think you misunderstand how God operates causally upon the existence of objective moral values. It is not that God is "doing something" to make a situation good, or evil, there is no operant mechanism which he's undertaking which somehow bestows intrinsic moral worth upon an individual. Rather, on theism, God is the locus of objective moral values not in that he does good, or commands good, but that he is quite literally the embodiment of goodness. If goodness was light, and evil was darkness, then God would quite simply be the light source.
And so, as such, there's a few ways we can glean the existence of objective moral values. One is personal experience, in that I've never met an atheist who can truly adhere to pure moral relativism. Typically I'll denote a scenario of extreme moral evil, such as raping and torturing a woman, which is offset by a naturalistic or physical balancer such as giving her a million dollars. In that circumstance, on naturalism and on moral relativism, I have actually increased the quality of her life and so my action was a "good" one. You see the kneejerk gut response you feel inside to someone attempting to justify rape is you reacting subconsciously to the reality of the situation that is the act of rape and torture is simply objectively morally evil and there is no excuse. |
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| einstein89 |
| Posted 08/09/12 at 08:28 PM | Reply with quote #13 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by Lawlessone777
This is simply a question of epistemology versus ontology. On the moral argument what is being presented is the fact that on naturalism there is no such thing as objective good or evil. If naturalism is true, and life began through purely naturalistic processes, then we are effectively monkeys with delusions of grandeur.
More precisely, we are highly evolved primates with highly evolved brains that dwarf the capability of everything else on this planet, and we feel a subjective sense of right and wrong that is in no way a delusion of grandeur, since our discriminating of moral actions as right and wrong in no way relies on our having a false belief that we are more 'valuable' than we really are. In fact, we are valuable to ourselves and to our friends, and our moral compass reflects that. We don't need to objectively matter to the universe to matter to each other.
Quote: Objectively there is no intrinsic moral worth to human life. Killing a human is pretty well morally neutral and equal to killing, say, a dog or cat if naturalism is true. And so if we are truly nothing more than clumps of animate matter, there is no objective difference between me killing a person, or me killing an earwig.
By objective you mean that morality has a significance that elevates higher than humans, correct? i.e. it's not enough that humans matter to each other for us to establish an objective intrinsic worth for humans?
Do you have evidence that such an objective morality even exists? What makes you think the murder of a living creature matters to anything but other living creatures? |
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| Killjoy |
| Posted 08/09/12 at 09:14 PM | Reply with quote #14 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by Lawlessone777
This is simply a question of epistemology versus ontology. On the moral argument what is being presented is the fact that on naturalism there is no such thing as objective good or evil. If naturalism is true, and life began through purely naturalistic processes, then we are effectively monkeys with delusions of grandeur. Objectively there is no intrinsic moral worth to human life. Killing a human is pretty well morally neutral and equal to killing, say, a dog or cat if naturalism is true. And so if we are truly nothing more than clumps of animate matter, there is no objective difference between me killing a person, or me killing an earwig.
I see no reason to believe that properties such as moral worth cannot be associated with things and situations in the physical world, any more that I see a reason to believe that mental properties (associated, for example, with brains) or properties like colour or temperature can't be associated with things in the physical world. The claim by theists that no such association is possible is gratuitous and totally unwarranted.
Given this, the rest of your post loses much of the impact it might otherwise have had, as does the Moral Argument itself.
Quote:
Typically I'll denote a scenario of extreme moral evil, such as raping and torturing a woman, which is offset by a naturalistic or physical balancer such as giving her a million dollars. In that circumstance, on naturalism and on moral relativism, I have actually increased the quality of her life and so my action was a "good" one. You see the kneejerk gut response you feel inside to someone attempting to justify rape is you reacting subconsciously to the reality of the situation that is the act of rape and torture is simply objectively morally evil and there is no excuse.
It is purely an assumption, and again an unwarranted one, that all naturalistic conceptions of morality will allow for monetary payment to offset a moral wrong in the way you describe. You only have to examine how atheists would typically react to this suggestion, which you did in the very next sentence, to call this assumption into question. |
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| harvey1 |
| Posted 08/09/12 at 09:43 PM | Reply with quote #15 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by Killjoy
It is still not at all clear to me, despite your best efforts to explain it, what it actually is that God does that imparts moral truth to a situation that would otherwise have none of its own. Or rather, I should say that it is not clear to me that God is required to do anything at all, given that some situations do, in fact, have moral significance on their own.
Morality is mind-dependent (i.e., in the absence of a mind there is nothing in nature that attributes moral oughtness to events or actions). If the mind that attributes morality to events or actions is not an objective mind, then all you have is a subjective declaration since a non-objective mind cannot establish objective features (i.e., another non-objective mind is free and welcome to disagree and be just as right as others). |
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