| Tisthammerw |
| Posted 06/19/11 at 06:47 PM | Reply with quote #541 |
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The Recap
Symbolism recap: - R = Our cognitive faculties are reliable
- N = Naturalism is true (the supernatural does not exist; only the natural realm is real)
- SE = Semantic epiphenomenalism (defined in post #1) is true.
- RA = the cognitive faculties of the aliens (mentioned in post #1) are reliable.
- RC = the cognitive faculties of Clint (mentioned in post #1) are reliable
Recap of the "main" argument: - If Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable, then N&E serves as a defeater for R.
- Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable.
- Therefore, N&E serves as a defeater for R.
Premise (1) is the Defeater Thesis and premise (2) is the Probability Thesis. Categorization of sub-arguments (see for post #1 more on this):
(1.1) If RC is defeated in the Clint Scenario, then RA is defeated in the Alien Scenario.
(1.2) If RA is defeated in the Alien Scenario, then R is defeated in the Probability Thesis scenario.
(1.3) RC is defeated in the Clint Scenario.
(1.4) Therefore, R is defeated in the Probability Thesis scenario.
(2.1) N&E entails SE.
(2.2) If (N&E entails SE) then N&E entails N&E&SE.
(2.3) N&E entails N&E&SE (follows from 2.1 and 2.2).
(2.4) If Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable, then Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable (follows from 2.3; since N&E entails N&E&SE anyway).
(2.5) Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable.
(2.6) Therefore, Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable (follows from 2.4 and 2.5). The Post
Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
When A-properties supervene on B-properties, that is to say that B-properties determine (i.e. always yield the same) A-properties. Nomic supervenience refers to the supervenience relation obtaining by nomic necessity. This type of supervenience seems to fit what you had in mind for “bridge laws.” Okay, but as the SEoP states: Quote: Supervenience claims, by themselves, do nothing more than state that certain patterns of property (or fact) variation hold. They are silent about why those patterns hold, and about the precise nature of the dependency involved (see Kim 1993, 167; 1998, 9-15; Blackburn 1984, 186; Schiffer 1987, 153-154; and McGinn 1993, 57). But supervenience theses are not plausibly brute, that is, unexplainable. It is natural to look further, and to try to explain why A-properties supervene on B-properties. When such supervenience is explainable, there is ‘superdupervenience’ (a term coined by William Lycan; see also Schiffer 1987; Horgan 1993; and Wilson 1999). So, just supervenience alone is not sufficient to say that there are bridge laws.
Fair enough, but nomic supervenience does seem to entail that there are bridge laws.
Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
H3 is a combination of claims: (a) nomic supervenience must be real (though we are ignorant of the specific nomic laws); and (b) R is true (via the type of nomic supervenience we have). I’m willing to grant the naturalist (a), but assuming (b) under naturalism would be a bit question begging in EAAN discussions. You can’t just assume the defeatee to defeat the defeater. I don't see how you can reject (b) since we assume (b) in order to argue against the naturalist. If we didn't accept R as true, then what is the point of the EAAN?
Kind of my objection is assuming H3 (particularly, H3(b)) after seeing EAAN and then just assuming the defeatee to defeat the defeater. But we seem to agree on this:
Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1
I think a better way to state this is (b') R within the context of N&E is true. I think here I agree with you that we don't have to accept (b'). Next,
Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
You’re forgetting something: the bridge laws could yield any semantic belief at all without affecting behavior; hence, A is still true here and Pr(RA|N&E&SE) still appears low. At some low level that may be true. For example, let's say for argument sake that nomic necessity ties semantic belief with neural correlates at some low level bridge laws as follows: Bridge Laws (BL): a) n->N b) o->O c) p->P d) q->Q In this case, n,o,p,q are neural correlate states that produce semantic content, and N, O, P, Q, are primitive semantic "colors" (or belief). Now, N, O, P, Q could be anything. However, this relation is fixed, so n cannot produce O, P, Q -- it can only produce N; o cannot produce N, P, Q -- it can only produce O; p cannot produce P, O, Q; q cannot produce N, O, P -- it can only produce Q. The bridge laws in this case would ensure that by natural selection acting on n, o, p, q the selection would also happen on N, O, P, Q. If natural selection produced a neural correlate sequence such as nopqqononnnpooqnq...on; then natural selection would also produce a semantic content with the same corresponding belief: NOPQQONONNNPOOQNQ..ON. In this case, the bridge laws would produce a very restricted semantic content sequence. Sure, but kind of my point is that the nomic supervenience relation could yield any semantic beliefs at all and it wouldn’t matter. When a frog gets a fly, the bridge laws could be such that the frog thinks “this fly will give me nourishment” or “2 + 2 = 5” or anything else without affecting the decisions of natural selection.
Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
First, I deny that one can replace 2.5 with a different true premise and get a conclusion that is logically contradictory to 2.6, i.e. get a conclusion 2.6’ such that it’s logically impossible for both 2.6 and 2.6’ to be true. For example, suppose you replace the premises with different true premises such that 2.6’ is “Pr(R|N&E) is low or Pr(R|N&E) is high.” Is 2.6’ logically inconsistent with 2.6? No, one logically possible way both could be true is if “Pr(R|N&E) is low” is true. But, part of what the EAAN is saying is that Pr(R|N&E) cannot be high.
No, that’s not what EAAN (e.g. in 2.6) says or implies.
Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
Second, a sound argument is by definition one that is both valid and has all true premises. So if an argument is both valid and has all true premises, the argument is sound, period. As long as those two conditions are met, it matters not whether e.g. a different conclusion can be made with different premises. So are you saying that Pr(R|N&E) can be both high and not high?
No, I never said nor implied that.
Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1
What's wrong is that you are conflating warrant with justification. We might be justified in saying that 2.6 and 2.6' is logically true. For example, both of these are true:
1) Either I ate at least one hamburger last year or I ate the NG 1300 galaxy.
1') Either I ate at least one hamburger last year or I ate the M31 galaxy.
We are logically justified in saying either. But, we are not epistemically warranted to make these statements about what I actually ate last year since I'm only epistemically warranted to say the following about the past:
3) I ate at least one hamburger last year.
We are epistemically warranted into believing “at least one disjunct is true in both 1 and 1’; I tried to explain this sort of thing earlier but this seemed to only confuse you. What about my new, different justification for 2.5? |
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| harvey1 |
| Posted 06/20/11 at 12:56 AM | Reply with quote #542 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
Sure, but kind of my point is that the nomic supervenience relation could yield any semantic beliefs at all and it wouldn’t matter. When a frog gets a fly, the bridge laws could be such that the frog thinks “this fly will give me nourishment” or “2 + 2 = 5” or anything else without affecting the decisions of natural selection.
No, because let's say that "nopqqononnnpooqnq...on" is the neural correlate sequence for an indicator representation of the frog getting the fly. In that case, the semantic belief encoded by this semantic sequence "NOPQQONONNNPOOQNQ..ON" is the belief that the frog has just captured and eaten a fly. The semantic content (pictured here as "NOPQQONONNNPOOQNQ..ON") is nomically tied to the neural sequence. Now, I agreed with you that N, O, P, Q themselves as individual semantic primitive building blocks can be anything, but that's not where the semantic content obtains its meaning. It obtains its meaning from the semantic sequence of these building blocks. This sequence cannot mean anything since it is nomically produced by a combination of these building blocks.
As an example of this, think about the meaning of the primitive symbols in math (e.g., +, -, /, *, etc.). Their meaning is obtained by the formula (i.e., sequence) that defines their usage. I don't need to know what the plus operator means, it actually has no meaning, rather I only need to know what operations are performed with that operator and this provides meaning to any well formed formula (WFF). The same is true for the DNA sequence. The individual DNA nucleotides can mean anything, however the sequence cannot mean anything since the meaning is restricted by nomic requirements and how the alphabet is encoded and decoded. In this case, the meaning of a belief is obtained by neural correlates firing in sequence and a subjective link exists nomically between each neural correlate and its semantic building block -- a basic element of content representation (i.e., N, O, P, Q).
Quote: Originally Posted by TistQuote: But, part of what the EAAN is saying is that Pr(R|N&E) cannot be high. No, that’s not what EAAN (e.g. in 2.6) says or implies.
Quote: According to EAAN, (a) P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, and (b) the naturalist who sees the truth of (a) has a (Humean) defeater for R (ND, p.220).
Quote: Furthermore, reflection on EAAN shows that Pr(R/N&E) is at best inscrutable. Once I see and reflect on this, I will acquire a Humean defeater for R, and thus for my other beliefs as well. In reflective moods, I simply won't know what to believe; I realize that ordinarily I can't help forming belief in the ordinary way, which includes the assumption that R is true (and the fact is I have a defeater for that belief too); but I also believe that this is just an imposition upon me by my nature, an imposition such that the probability of its being connected with truth is not high. (ND, p.235)
Thus, the EAAN is saying that Pr(R|N&E) cannot be high otherwise the "naturalist who sees the truth of (a)" wouldn't have a defeater for R.
Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
No, I never said nor implied that.
But, you are saying that 2.6 and 2.6' are both sound arguments. So, if they are deductively sound, then you must be implying this. Which premise is in error if you say that 2.6 or 2.6' is an error?
Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
We are epistemically warranted into believing “at least one disjunct is true in both 1 and 1’; I tried to explain this sort of thing earlier but this seemed to only confuse you. What about my new, different justification for 2.5?
I think Plantinga is correct that, "reflection on EAAN shows that Pr(R/N&E) is at best inscrutable" and "that the probability of its being connected with truth is not high." Why don't you just accept this about the EAAN? Don't you think it's odd that Plantinga never mentions using disjunctive addition?
I think we are coming to the end of our discussion, Tisthammerw. Sorry to say. |
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| Tisthammerw |
| Posted 06/22/11 at 11:29 PM | Reply with quote #543 |
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The Recap
Symbolism recap: - R = Our cognitive faculties are reliable
- N = Naturalism is true (the supernatural does not exist; only the natural realm is real)
- SE = Semantic epiphenomenalism (defined in post #1) is true.
- RA = the cognitive faculties of the aliens (mentioned in post #1) are reliable.
- RC = the cognitive faculties of Clint (mentioned in post #1) are reliable
Recap of the "main" argument: - If Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable, then N&E serves as a defeater for R.
- Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable.
- Therefore, N&E serves as a defeater for R.
Premise (1) is the Defeater Thesis and premise (2) is the Probability Thesis. Categorization of sub-arguments (see for post #1 more on this):
(1.1) If RC is defeated in the Clint Scenario, then RA is defeated in the Alien Scenario.
(1.2) If RA is defeated in the Alien Scenario, then R is defeated in the Probability Thesis scenario.
(1.3) RC is defeated in the Clint Scenario.
(1.4) Therefore, R is defeated in the Probability Thesis scenario.
(2.1) N&E entails SE.
(2.2) If (N&E entails SE) then N&E entails N&E&SE.
(2.3) N&E entails N&E&SE (follows from 2.1 and 2.2).
(2.4) If Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable, then Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable (follows from 2.3; since N&E entails N&E&SE anyway).
(2.5) Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable.
(2.6) Therefore, Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable (follows from 2.4 and 2.5). A: the semantic properties of the beliefs could literally be anything at all and it wouldn’t matter (e.g. if semantics supervenes on syntax, this supervenience relation could yield any semantic belief and it wouldn’t matter) with regard to how we behave.
(2.5a) If (N&E&SE entails A), then (Pr(RA|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable) (2.5b) If Pr(RA|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable, then Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable. (2.5c) N&E&SE entails A. (2.5) Therefore, Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable The Post Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
Sure, but kind of my point is that the nomic supervenience relation could yield any semantic beliefs at all and it wouldn’t matter. When a frog gets a fly, the bridge laws could be such that the frog thinks “this fly will give me nourishment” or “2 + 2 = 5” or anything else without affecting the decisions of natural selection. No, because let's say that "nopqqononnnpooqnq...on" is the neural correlate sequence for an indicator representation of the frog getting the fly. In that case, the semantic belief encoded by this semantic sequence "NOPQQONONNNPOOQNQ..ON" is the belief that the frog has just captured and eaten a fly. The semantic content (pictured here as "NOPQQONONNNPOOQNQ..ON") is nomically tied to the neural sequence. Now, I agreed with you that N, O, P, Q themselves as individual semantic primitive building blocks can be anything, but that's not where the semantic content obtains its meaning. It obtains its meaning from the semantic sequence of these building blocks. This sequence cannot mean anything since it is nomically produced by a combination of these building blocks.
It has occurred to me that I may not have done a sufficiently good job explaining my position, so this time I’ll try to be more rigorous. Let s be some syntax, and SL() be a supervenience law such that SL(s) yields some semantic belief B. Let [All]x symbolize “For any x” and [Ex]x symbolize “there exists an x.” Let A be a predicate such that Ax means that x produces adaptive behavior and that x is/was selected by natural selection. Let p []->q represent the counterfactual conditional, “if p were true then q would be true,” and let -> symbolize the material conditional. My claim is as follows: (1) [All]s(As -> [All]B((SL(s) = B) []-> As)) For any given adaptive syntax, no matter what semantic belief the supervenience relation yielded the behavior would still have been adaptive and selected by natural selection. This, I think, is sufficient to reasonably conclude that Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low. Of course, I also believe something stronger. Let <> be the modal operator for metaphysical possibility. (2) [All]s(As -> [Ex]SL[All]B{<>B -> <>SL & <>(SL(s) = B) & ((SL(s) = B) []-> As)}) Hence, the semantics “could have been anything and it wouldn’t matter” in the above sense. If need be, we can weaken it to “just about anything.” Or else, simply stay at claim (1). For simplicity’s sake, let’s have A be (1).
Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1Quote: Originally Posted by TistQuote: But, part of what the EAAN is saying is that Pr(R|N&E) cannot be high. No, that’s not what EAAN (e.g. in 2.6) says or implies. Quote: According to EAAN, (a) P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, and (b) the naturalist who sees the truth of (a) has a (Humean) defeater for R (ND, p.220). Quote: Furthermore, reflection on EAAN shows that Pr(R/N&E) is at best inscrutable. Once I see and reflect on this, I will acquire a Humean defeater for R, and thus for my other beliefs as well. In reflective moods, I simply won't know what to believe; I realize that ordinarily I can't help forming belief in the ordinary way, which includes the assumption that R is true (and the fact is I have a defeater for that belief too); but I also believe that this is just an imposition upon me by my nature, an imposition such that the probability of its being connected with truth is not high. (ND, p.235) Thus, the EAAN is saying that Pr(R|N&E) cannot be high otherwise the "naturalist who sees the truth of (a)" wouldn't have a defeater for R.
Not quite. Plantinga as I believe that Pr(R|N&E) is at best inscrutable, but Pr(R|N&E) being inscrutable entails that Pr(R|N&E) could (epistemically) be high, we just wouldn’t have warrant for it being high.
Quote: harvey1: So are you saying that Pr(R|N&E) can be both high and not high? Tisthammerw: No, I never said nor implied that.
harvey1: But, you are saying that 2.6 and 2.6' are both sound arguments. So, if they are deductively sound, then you must be implying this.
Let’s construct those arguments to see if that’s really the case. (2.1) N&E entails SE.
(2.2) If (N&E entails SE) then N&E entails N&E&SE.
(2.3) N&E entails N&E&SE (follows from 2.1 and 2.2).
(2.4) If Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable, then Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable (follows from 2.3; since N&E entails N&E&SE anyway).
(2.5) Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable.
(2.6) Therefore, Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable (follows from 2.4 and 2.5). (2.1) N&E entails SE.
(2.2) If (N&E entails SE) then N&E entails N&E&SE.
(2.3) N&E entails N&E&SE (follows from 2.1 and 2.2).
(2.4’) If Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or high, then Pr(R|N&E) is low or high (follows from 2.3; since N&E entails N&E&SE anyway).
(2.5’) Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or high.
(2.6’) Therefore, Pr(R|N&E) is low or high (follows from 2.4 and 2.5). Are 2.6 and 2.6’ logically contradictory? No, it is logically possible for them to be both true via Pr(R|N&E) being low. The conjunction of 2.6 and 2.6’ does not at all entail that “Pr(R|N&E) can be both high and not high,” nor does it entail any other self-contradictory proposition. Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1
Don't you think it's odd that Plantinga never mentions using disjunctive addition?
No, because in hindsight his “at best it’s inscrutable” tactic was probably the best maneuver, particularly considering all the confusion my tactic has caused (hence my new justification for 2.5). |
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| harvey1 |
| Posted 06/23/11 at 08:05 AM | Reply with quote #544 |
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Tist,
Quote: but Pr(R|N&E) being inscrutable entails that Pr(R|N&E) could (epistemically) be high, we just wouldn’t have warrant for it being high.
I'm not talking about weak epistemically possible. I'm talking about strongly epistemic possibility. If we don't have warrant for it being high, then it means it cannot be high from a strongly epistemic possibility perspective since it's not reasonable to consider that. Are we on agreement on this? |
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| Tisthammerw |
| Posted 06/28/11 at 08:35 PM | Reply with quote #545 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1Tist, Quote: but Pr(R|N&E) being inscrutable entails that Pr(R|N&E) could (epistemically) be high, we just wouldn’t have warrant for it being high. I'm not talking about weak epistemically possible. I'm talking about strongly epistemic possibility. If we don't have warrant for it being high, then it means it cannot be high from a strongly epistemic possibility perspective since it's not reasonable to consider that. Are we on agreement on this?
No, not if by “strong epistemic possibility” you mean “that which is consistent with what we are properly justified in believing to be true.” Suppose Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable to me. It’s still the case that Pr(R|N&E) being inscrutable entails that Pr(R|N&E) being strongly epistemically possible. Why? Precisely because Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable to me, Pr(R|N&E) could for all I know be high (of course, it is also possible for it to be low). Yet, Pr(R|N&E) being inscrutable also entails that I have no warrant for Pr(R|N&E) being high, even though it being high is (epistemically) possible. |
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| harvey1 |
| Posted 06/28/11 at 11:00 PM | Reply with quote #546 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by Tisthammerw
No, not if by “strong epistemic possibility” you mean “that which is consistent with what we are properly justified in believing to be true.” Suppose Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable to me. It’s still the case that Pr(R|N&E) being inscrutable entails that Pr(R|N&E) being strongly epistemically possible. Why? Precisely because Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable to me, Pr(R|N&E) could for all I know be high (of course, it is also possible for it to be low).
If you have no warrant for it being high, then what does "Pr(R|N&E&SE) is high" lack such that it has no warrant? That is, in order to have warrant, it must have a source for that warrant. Lacking warrant means that it lacks a source for that warrant. According to Plantinga, sources of warrant are "memory, our knowledge of ourselves, and of others, testimony, a priori knowledge, induction, and epistemic probability." [Cf. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p.176.] If the epistemic probability is low, then it would not be strongly epistemically possible.
Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
[EP] Yet, Pr(R|N&E) being inscrutable also entails that I have no warrant for Pr(R|N&E) being high, even though it being high is (epistemically) possible.
I would say that:
EP': "Pr(R|N&E) being inscrutable also entails that I have no warrant for Pr(R|N&E) being high, even though (R|N&E) being high is (epistemically) possible."
The probability function is a function of our own certainty, and not a statement of what God knows (i.e., the actual truth of the matter). As I said before, we don't want to confuse these two things because the EAAN argument, imo, is only talking about what we are warranted to believe about R|N&E [hence, why we are concerned about P(R|N&E), and not what God knows].
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| Tisthammerw |
| Posted 07/02/11 at 08:05 PM | Reply with quote #547 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1Quote: Originally Posted by Tisthammerw
No, not if by “strong epistemic possibility” you mean “that which is consistent with what we are properly justified in believing to be true.” Suppose Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable to me. It’s still the case that Pr(R|N&E) being inscrutable entails that Pr(R|N&E) being strongly epistemically possible. Why? Precisely because Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable to me, Pr(R|N&E) could for all I know be high (of course, it is also possible for it to be low). If you have no warrant for it being high, then what does "Pr(R|N&E&SE) is high" lack such that it has no warrant? That is, in order to have warrant, it must have a source for that warrant. Lacking warrant means that it lacks a source for that warrant. According to Plantinga, sources of warrant are "memory, our knowledge of ourselves, and of others, testimony, a priori knowledge, induction, and epistemic probability." [Cf. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p.176.] If the epistemic probability is low, then it would not be strongly epistemically possible.
I agree, but notice I was saying that Pr(R|N&E) being inscrutable entails that Pr(R|N&E) is strongly epistemically possible. Why? Precisely because Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable to me, Pr(R|N&E) could for all I know be high (of course, it is also possible for it to be low). |
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| harvey1 |
| Posted 07/04/11 at 09:29 AM | Reply with quote #548 |
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| We have a conflict in how we define Pr(R|N&E). This represents our best estimate of the probability for the reliability of our cognitive faculties (R) which is wholly dependent on N&E. We must assign a probability based on the implications of what N&E entail for the reliability of our cognitive faculties. If "Pr(R|N&E) could for all I know be high," then what you are saying is that, "after carefully considering all the implications and whatnot about Pr(R|N&E), we are warranted in estimating the probability that the reliability of our cognitive faculties could be high for all we know." This is false. This is not what Plantinga would argue. He would say that after carefully considering all the implications and whatnot about Pr(R|N&E), we are not warranted in saying that the reliability of our cognitive faculties could be high for all we know. Rather, he would say that the reliability of our cognitive faculties is low or inscrutable -- that's it. The reason that Pr(R|N&E) is not high is because the epistemic probability for the "reliability of our cognitive faculties being high" is low. Since that epistemic probability is low, we are warranted in saying that Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable. Hence, it is not strongly epistemically possible for Pr(R|N&E) to be high, since a low epistemic probability is reason to rule that option out as (strongly) epistemically possible to believe. |
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| Tisthammerw |
| Posted 07/04/11 at 10:44 AM | Reply with quote #549 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1
We have a conflict in how we define Pr(R|N&E). This represents our best estimate of the probability for the reliability of our cognitive faculties (R) which is wholly dependent on N&E. We must assign a probability based on the implications of what N&E entail for the reliability of our cognitive faculties. If "Pr(R|N&E) could for all I know be high," then what you are saying is that, "after carefully considering all the implications and whatnot about Pr(R|N&E), we are warranted in estimating the probability that the reliability of our cognitive faculties could be high for all we know." This is false. This is not what Plantinga would argue. He would say that after carefully considering all the implications and whatnot about Pr(R|N&E), we are not warranted in saying that the reliability of our cognitive faculties could be high for all we know. Rather, he would say that the reliability of our cognitive faculties is low or inscrutable -- that's it.
I think there’s some ambiguity here. It seems to me that “Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable” entails that we are warranted in thinking that Pr(R|N&E) could for all we know be high precisely because Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable; but also that we are not warranted into thinking that Pr(R|N&E) is in fact high, again, precisely because Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable. |
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| harvey1 |
| Posted 07/05/11 at 01:58 PM | Reply with quote #550 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by Tisthammerw
It seems to me that “Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable” entails that we are warranted in thinking that Pr(R|N&E) could for all we know be high precisely because Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable;
No. “Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable” only entails R|N&E could obtain for all we know. If “Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable” entails ”Pr(R|N&E) could be high” then “Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable” entails the following EAAN defeater:
EAAN Defeater: "After carefully considering all the implications and whatnot about R|N&E, we are warranted in estimating the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable (given N&E) as high, for all we know."
This is clearly a defeater to the EAAN since if for all we know Pr(R|N&E) is high, then this is all we know. We can't conclude that there's reason to doubt "Pr(R|N&E) is high."
Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
...but also that we are not warranted into thinking that Pr(R|N&E) is in fact high, again, precisely because Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable.
It's not necessary to think Pr(R|N&E) is in fact high for the EAAN argument to fail. A defeater for the EAAN only needs to give us sufficient reason that the argument, for all we know, does in fact fail. If “Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable” entails the EAAN defeater, then the EAAN fails.
It might be useful to write in words what “Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable" actually means:
Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable: "After carefully considering all the implications and whatnot of R|N&E, we are warranted in estimating the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable (given N&E) at around 0.5."
Pr(R|N&E) is low: "After carefully considering all the implications and whatnot of R|N&E, we are warranted in estimating the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable (given N&E) somewhere comfortably below 0.5."
Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable: "After carefully considering all the implications and whatnot of R|N&E, we are warranted in estimating the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable (given N&E) somewhere at or below 0.5." |
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| afunugsamongus |
| Posted 07/07/11 at 03:02 PM | Reply with quote #551 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by Tisthammerw
Afunugsamongus, before we continue I’d like to thank you for our input. You seem to have a better-than-average sophistication when it comes to analytic philosophy and I’m grateful. Are you by any chance a philosophy student?
My pleasure, Tist! Your patience and persistence are commendable. I see myself as a philosophy student even though I haven't taken classes in the subject since finishing my minor (with physics major) a couple years ago.
Also, sorry to make you wait so long. I like to ripen my ideas before sharing em, and it's hard to find time to write posts I'm happy with.
Against (1.2 - RA defeat implies R defeat):
Quote:
What’s AS/PT symmetry exactly? What does “AS” and “PT” stand for?
AS/PT symmetry is similarity between the Alien Scenario (AS) and Probability Thesis (PT) in all 'relevant' aspects; it guarantees that your analogy and the resulting inference (1.2) succeed. I argue that there is a disanalogy or 'asymmetry' which undermines the inference from AS to PT.
Quote:
Is this statement metaphysical or epistemological? If it’s epistemological it doesn’t have much relevance to the type of reliability being referred to here. If it’s metaphysical, it doesn’t have much to do with the type of truth being referred to here.
The point was to call into question the importance of your types of reliability and truth.
Quote:
Certainly there are beliefs I believe correspond to the Real-World-Out-There (RWOT), e.g. the belief that the earth is older than 400 years old, and aren’t completely immune to skepticism. I recognize that it’s possible that the universe was created five minutes ago exactly as it then was, with false memories, faulty history books, fossils, etc. Nonetheless, I believe myself to be properly justified in believing that the RWOT isn’t like that.
While the metaphysics of truth aren’t particularly important with EAAN, we can for the moment say that it’s a correspondence theory of truth; a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to reality.
You didn't answer my concluding questions: "What is the point of this notion (objective reliability)?", and "Why should anybody be interested in it?". At the risk of straw-manning you, I take this to be the strongest reply: "Much of ordinary life presupposes that an objective reality impresses itself upon all human minds, and science requires this presupposition, so naturalists must take it seriously."
This reply fails to save the EAAN because of how warrant and defeat are subjective. The set of beliefs warranted/defeated for a person depends on that person's sensations/memories. For example, cogito ergo sum warrants Descartes' belief in his own existence while the analogous conclusion for other minds is weaker (because their thoughts are known only by a chain of inference). Similarly, my experience of coherent cognition warrants belief in my own R while the analogous conclusion for other minds is weaker. AS/PT symmetry is broken and premise (1.2) is false.
An obvious response is to fix the Alien Scenario so that we know as much about the aliens' experiences as they do. This response may restore AS/PT symmetry, but it makes the defeater for RA depend on our analysis of the alien experiences; an additional premise about the outcome of this analysis would be needed in order to ensure the defeater. You might insist that RA defeat is guaranteed by RC defeat, but my argument transfers neatly between scenarios to save RC: RC defeat depends on our analysis of Clint's experiences, which could go either way. Since accurate analogies between scenarios undermines the defeater, premises (1.1, 1.2, and 1.3) cannot all be true simultaneously.
Against (2.1 - N&E entails SE):
Quote:
Well, not quite. A certain kind of kinetic behavior is identical to heat. Heat is roughly the energy of random molecular motion. For the analogy to hold, every relevant factor would have to be held constant, which wouldn’t work here. It would be like starting with a container of 13 gallons of water and a few kilograms of hydrogen gas, and saying “remove every atom of hydrogen while keeping the amount of water constant.” While heat and a certain kind of kinetics refer to the same property, syntax and semantics refer to two different properties; here it is conceivable to vary one and keep the other constant.
It is a scientific fact that temperature (wateriness) is a kinetic (chemical) property, just as it is a scientific fact that belief is a neural property. Beliefs varying independently of neuron configuration is about as conceptually challenging as temperature (wateriness) varying while kinetics (chemical composition) is held fixed. All three superveniences here are due to scientific reductions, and I don't see any disanalogy.
Quote: Quote: Originally Posted by afunugsamongus
Were a given neural structure to have the same syntactic properties but different semantic properties, we would be forced to abandon the supervenience of semantics on syntax. Perhaps so, but it doesn’t really address the issue here. N&E entailing SE doesn’t entail that supervenience doesn’t exist. Nor does the argument for it N&E entailing SE. To recap that argument: 1. If holding the syntax of beliefs constant while varying the semantics of belief would not change behavior, then the semantics of the belief are not causally relevant to behavior, even if the syntax of the beliefs are. 2. Holding the syntax of beliefs constant while varying the semantics would not change behavior. 3. Therefore, the semantics of the belief are not causally relevant to behavior even if the syntax of the beliefs are (follows from 1 and 2). It might be that due to nomic supervenience, premise (1) is a counterpossible, i.e. a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. That doesn’t imply that the first premise is false, however. We can easily conceive a given neural structure having the same neurophysiological properties but having different semantic beliefs. If you do not believe the above argument is sound, which premise do you reject and why?
Here premise (2) is the antecedent of (1), so if (1) is counterpossible then (2) is false. I will argue that this is the case. (2) is also a conditional: "if semantics change but not syntax, then behavior will not change". So (1) is a nested conditional, and we should take care to distinguish which antecedent and which consequent we're talking about.
If, as the antecedent of (2) requires, we sever the supervenience of content on syntax, then we have to divide responsibility for behaviors between them. Some (decisions/thoughts/emotions) obviously depend on content - a man's mother is sad because she believes he died. Behavior will change if she believes otherwise, even if syntax doesn't change (this is possible because we've severed supervenience). (2) is false.
You might object that neurons which underlie or "code for" belief provide deeper explanation and are the true cause; but then the kinetic explanation must be the true cause of pain/expansion/melting, so there is no disanalogy. If you insist that only the deepest known explanations are causally relevant, then you are forced to implausibly deny that temperature causes anything.
I see no hope for (2) short of divorcing the meaning of beliefs from all human interests and activities.
Quote:
Thanks for clearing that up. I think we can make the argument clearer and more rigorous by having “message syntax” and “message semantics” to distinguish between “belief syntax” and “belief semantics.” The argument then goes as follows:
{1} Message semantics affects human behavior independently of message syntax. {premise}
{2} If message semantics affects human behavior independently of message syntax, then belief semantics affects human behavior independently of belief syntax. {premise}
{3} Belief semantics affects human behavior independently of belief syntax. {from 1&2}
{4} (2.1.2 - Holding the syntax of beliefs constant while varying the semantics would not change behavior.) is false. {from 3}
For premise {1}:
{1.1} The syntax of messages is their letter and word arrangement. {premise}
{1.2} The meaning of messages (message semantics) affects human behavior independently of letter and word arrangement (message syntax). {premise}
-example: when you discover a double meaning in a message, you react differently.
{1.3} The message semantics affects human behavior independently of message syntax. {from 1.1&1.2}
I accept your improved version.
Quote:
In this case the objector could attack premise 2 on the grounds that the relevant thought experiment confirms the antecedent and the corresponding relevant thought experiment for belief semantics/syntax disconfirms the consequent. What’s the relevant difference between the two scenarios? The message semantics ultimately translates into beliefs about what the message says. These beliefs have two different kinds of properties: syntactic and semantic. The semantic epiphenomenalist can say that message semantics are causally efficacious by virtue of their corresponding syntactic beliefs, not by their corresponding semantic beliefs.
This objection puts your semantic epiphenominalist in a very uncomfortable position. He admits that the meaning of a message causes our reactions but asserts that the meaning of the corresponding belief can't cause anything. He views meaning in beliefs as a useless side effect of certain neuron configurations. Memory helps us survive partly by alerting us to dangers and opportunities, so he insists that the encoding of these dangers and opportunities (the meaning) into our neurons plays no role at all. Or else he maintains epiphenominalism only by splitting the meaning of beliefs apart from all the perceptible features of belief, redefining it out of existence. In either case you're burdened not only with showing that he's not mistaken but also with showing that I am obliged to duplicate his apparent mistake.
one more... 
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| Tisthammerw |
| Posted 07/09/11 at 10:41 AM | Reply with quote #552 |
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The Recap
Symbolism recap: - R = Our cognitive faculties are reliable
- N = Naturalism is true (the supernatural does not exist; only the natural realm is real)
- SE = Semantic epiphenomenalism (defined in post #1) is true.
- RA = the cognitive faculties of the aliens (mentioned in post #1) are reliable.
- RC = the cognitive faculties of Clint (mentioned in post #1) are reliable
Recap of the "main" argument: - If Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable, then N&E serves as a defeater for R.
- Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable.
- Therefore, N&E serves as a defeater for R.
Premise (1) is the Defeater Thesis and premise (2) is the Probability Thesis. Categorization of sub-arguments (see for post #1 more on this):
(1.1) If RC is defeated in the Clint Scenario, then RA is defeated in the Alien Scenario.
(1.2) If RA is defeated in the Alien Scenario, then R is defeated in the Probability Thesis scenario.
(1.3) RC is defeated in the Clint Scenario.
(1.4) Therefore, R is defeated in the Probability Thesis scenario.
(2.1) N&E entails SE.
(2.2) If (N&E entails SE) then N&E entails N&E&SE.
(2.3) N&E entails N&E&SE (follows from 2.1 and 2.2).
(2.4) If Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable, then Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable (follows from 2.3; since N&E entails N&E&SE anyway).
(2.5) Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable.
(2.6) Therefore, Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable (follows from 2.4 and 2.5).
A: the semantic properties of the beliefs could literally be anything at all and it wouldn’t matter (e.g. if semantics supervenes on syntax, this supervenience relation could yield any semantic belief and it wouldn’t matter) with regard to how we behave.
(2.5a) If (N&E&SE entails A), then (Pr(RA|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable) (2.5b) If Pr(RA|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable, then Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable. (2.5c) N&E&SE entails A. (2.5) Therefore, Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable
The Post Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1Quote: Originally Posted by Tisthammerw
It seems to me that “Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable” entails that we are warranted in thinking that Pr(R|N&E) could for all we know be high precisely because Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable; No. “Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable” only entails R|N&E could obtain for all we know. If “Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable” entails ”Pr(R|N&E) could be high” then “Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable” entails the following EAAN defeater: EAAN Defeater: "After carefully considering all the implications and whatnot about R|N&E, we are warranted in estimating the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable (given N&E) as high, for all we know."
That doesn’t follow. I flip a coin that isn’t fair (it’s weighted to almost always come up on one side) but I do not see its outcome and I don’t know which side is “loaded” to come up. Let H be “it came up heads,” T be “it came up tails” and F be “I flipped the coin.” Pr(H|F) is inscrutable to me, as is Pr(T|F). Does “Pr(H|F) is inscrutable” imply I am warranted in believing that it came up heads? Obviously not. Am I warranted in believing it could come up heads? Yes. Similarly, if Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable, I am warranted in thinking it could be high, but I am not warranted in believing it is high. Perhaps “could be high” is, you think, sufficient to defeat the argument. But how on earth does it do that? Which premise of the argument would be false or undermined? Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1
This is clearly a defeater to the EAAN since if for all we know Pr(R|N&E) is high, then this is all we know. We can't conclude that there's reason to doubt "Pr(R|N&E) is high."
If Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable to us, we already have doubts that Pr(R|N&E) is high. We recognize it could be high for all we know, but if Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable to us we obviously aren’t warranted in thinking it is indeed high. Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
...but also that we are not warranted into thinking that Pr(R|N&E) is in fact high, again, precisely because Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable.
It's not necessary to think Pr(R|N&E) is in fact high for the EAAN argument to fail. A defeater for the EAAN only needs to give us sufficient reason that the argument, for all we know, does in fact fail. If “Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable” entails the EAAN defeater, then the EAAN fails.
It might be useful to write in words what “Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable" actually means:
Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable: "After carefully considering all the implications and whatnot of R|N&E, we are warranted in estimating the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable (given N&E) at around 0.5."
It doesn’t mean that at all. Suppose we are in a country with over a billion people and a disease has uniformly spread about throughout the entire country, natives and visitors alike. You are as likely to be infected as anyone else, but the infection at this stage shows no symptoms to the naked senses, but I have no idea what the likelihood is; it is inscrutable to me. Am I warranted in estimating the probability to be about 0.5? If so, I am warranted in estimating that half the country is infected, but even if by some chance I happened to be right, I clearly didn’t know the disease has infected about half the population; it was just a lucky guess. To use another analogy, suppose I know Clint takes drug XX that destroys the cognitive faculties of some who take it, but I forget the percentage of whom it affects. I have a defeater for my previous belief that Clint’s cognitive faculties are reliable, even though (due to the probability being inscrutable for me), Pr(RC|he took XX) could for all I know be high (though it could for all I know be very low). The same sort of thing would happen if I ingested drug XX myself. |
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| Tisthammerw |
| Posted 07/17/11 at 02:38 PM | Reply with quote #553 |
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The Recap
Symbolism recap: - R = Our cognitive faculties are reliable
- N = Naturalism is true (the supernatural does not exist; only the natural realm is real)
- SE = Semantic epiphenomenalism (defined in post #1) is true.
- RA = the cognitive faculties of the aliens (mentioned in post #1) are reliable.
- RC = the cognitive faculties of Clint (mentioned in post #1) are reliable
Recap of the "main" argument: - If Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable, then N&E serves as a defeater for R.
- Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable.
- Therefore, N&E serves as a defeater for R.
Premise (1) is the Defeater Thesis and premise (2) is the Probability Thesis. Categorization of sub-arguments (see for post #1 more on this):
(1.1) If RC is defeated in the Clint Scenario, then RA is defeated in the Alien Scenario.
(1.2) If RA is defeated in the Alien Scenario, then R is defeated in the Probability Thesis scenario.
(1.3) RC is defeated in the Clint Scenario.
(1.4) Therefore, R is defeated in the Probability Thesis scenario.
(2.1) N&E entails SE.
(2.2) If (N&E entails SE) then N&E entails N&E&SE.
(2.3) N&E entails N&E&SE (follows from 2.1 and 2.2).
(2.4) If Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable, then Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable (follows from 2.3; since N&E entails N&E&SE anyway).
(2.5) Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable.
(2.6) Therefore, Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable (follows from 2.4 and 2.5).
A: the semantic properties of the beliefs could literally be anything at all and it wouldn’t matter (e.g. if semantics supervenes on syntax, this supervenience relation could yield any semantic belief and it wouldn’t matter) with regard to how we behave.
(2.5a) If (N&E&SE entails A), then (Pr(RA|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable) (2.5b) If Pr(RA|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable, then Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable. (2.5c) N&E&SE entails A. (2.5) Therefore, Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable
The Post
Quote: Originally Posted by afunugsamongusQuote: Originally Posted by Tisthammerw
Afunugsamongus, before we continue I’d like to thank you for our input. You seem to have a better-than-average sophistication when it comes to analytic philosophy and I’m grateful. Are you by any chance a philosophy student?
My pleasure, Tist! Your patience and persistence are commendable. I see myself as a philosophy student even though I haven't taken classes in the subject since finishing my minor (with physics major) a couple years ago.
Majored in physics and minored in philosophy, while continuing to study the latter? I suppose that explains at least part of it.
Against (1.2 - RA defeat implies R defeat):
Quote: Originally Posted by afunugsamongusQuote:
What’s AS/PT symmetry exactly? What does “AS” and “PT” stand for?
AS/PT symmetry is similarity between the Alien Scenario (AS) and Probability Thesis (PT) in all 'relevant' aspects; it guarantees that your analogy and the resulting inference (1.2) succeed. I argue that there is a disanalogy or 'asymmetry' which undermines the inference from AS to PT.
Ah.
Quote: Originally Posted by afunugsamongusQuote: Certainly there are beliefs I believe correspond to the Real-World-Out-There (RWOT), e.g. the belief that the earth is older than 400 years old, and aren’t completely immune to skepticism. I recognize that it’s possible that the universe was created five minutes ago exactly as it then was, with false memories, faulty history books, fossils, etc. Nonetheless, I believe myself to be properly justified in believing that the RWOT isn’t like that.
While the metaphysics of truth aren’t particularly important with EAAN, we can for the moment say that it’s a correspondence theory of truth; a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to reality.
You didn't answer my concluding questions: "What is the point of this notion (objective reliability)?", and "Why should anybody be interested in it?". By “objective reliability” do you mean faculties being reliable in the sense that the substantial bulk of their beliefs about objective truths are objectively true? One point of course is that it among those objective truths is whether naturalism is true. Part of the point of EAAN is to show that N&E is self-defeating. Quote: Originally Posted by afunugsamongus
At the risk of straw-manning you, I take this to be the strongest reply: "Much of ordinary life presupposes that an objective reality impresses itself upon all human minds, and science requires this presupposition, so naturalists must take it seriously."
This reply fails to save the EAAN because of how warrant and defeat are subjective. The set of beliefs warranted/defeated for a person depends on that person's sensations/memories. For example, cogito ergo sum warrants Descartes' belief in his own existence while the analogous conclusion for other minds is weaker (because their thoughts are known only by a chain of inference). Similarly, my experience of coherent cognition warrants belief in my own R while the analogous conclusion for other minds is weaker.
I don’t think that works as a successful defeater-defeater. Suppose for example you take drug XX, a drug that destroys the reliability of the cognitive faculties to 90% of those who ingest it, and those unlucky 90% tend to mistakenly believe they have coherent cognition. Wouldn’t taking drug XX serve as a defeater for R with respect to you? There just doesn’t appear to be any relevant privileged access you have that provides a successful defeater-defeater.
Against (2.1 - N&E entails SE):
Quote: Originally Posted by afunugsamongusQuote: Well, not quite. A certain kind of kinetic behavior is identical to heat. Heat is roughly the energy of random molecular motion. For the analogy to hold, every relevant factor would have to be held constant, which wouldn’t work here. It would be like starting with a container of 13 gallons of water and a few kilograms of hydrogen gas, and saying “remove every atom of hydrogen while keeping the amount of water constant.” While heat and a certain kind of kinetics refer to the same property, syntax and semantics refer to two different properties; here it is conceivable to vary one and keep the other constant.
It is a scientific fact that temperature (wateriness) is a kinetic (chemical) property, just as it is a scientific fact that belief is a neural property. Beliefs varying independently of neuron configuration is about as conceptually challenging as temperature (wateriness) varying while kinetics (chemical composition) is held fixed. All three superveniences here are due to scientific reductions, and I don't see any disanalogy.
If we define water as H2O, it is logically impossible to remove every atom of hydrogen while keeping the amount of water constant in this scenario. In contrast, it is logically possible for different semantic beliefs to be associated with a given syntactic structure.
Quote: Originally Posted by afunugsamongusQuote: Quote: Originally Posted by afunugsamongus
Were a given neural structure to have the same syntactic properties but different semantic properties, we would be forced to abandon the supervenience of semantics on syntax. Perhaps so, but it doesn’t really address the issue here. N&E entailing SE doesn’t entail that supervenience doesn’t exist. Nor does the argument for it N&E entailing SE. To recap that argument: 1. If holding the syntax of beliefs constant while varying the semantics of belief would not change behavior, then the semantics of the belief are not causally relevant to behavior, even if the syntax of the beliefs are. 2. Holding the syntax of beliefs constant while varying the semantics would not change behavior. 3. Therefore, the semantics of the belief are not causally relevant to behavior even if the syntax of the beliefs are (follows from 1 and 2). It might be that due to nomic supervenience, premise (1) is a counterpossible, i.e. a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. That doesn’t imply that the first premise is false, however. We can easily conceive a given neural structure having the same neurophysiological properties but having different semantic beliefs. If you do not believe the above argument is sound, which premise do you reject and why? Here premise (2) is the antecedent of (1), so if (1) is counterpossible then (2) is false. I will argue that this is the case. (2) is also a conditional: "if semantics change but not syntax, then behavior will not change". So (1) is a nested conditional, and we should take care to distinguish which antecedent and which consequent we're talking about. If, as the antecedent of (2) requires, we sever the supervenience of content on syntax, then we have to divide responsibility for behaviors between them. Some (decisions/thoughts/emotions) obviously depend on content - a man's mother is sad because she believes he died. Behavior will change if she believes otherwise, even if syntax doesn't change (this is possible because we've severed supervenience). (2) is false.
The antecedent of (2) doesn’t require we sever supervenience at all. It could, for example, simply be a different supervenience relation. If the supervenience relation were different such that it yielded different semantic content whereas the syntactic structure were held constant, clearly the behavior would be the same (same electrochemical reactions delivering the same electrical impulses to the same muscles). Apart from that, it doesn’t follow that if supervenience goes out the window then SE does too. For example, it’s pretty easy to conceive of syntax indeterministically causing semantic states (indeterministic state/state causation). The only way I can see for behavior to be different with the same syntax is (1) randomness (which is too macro-level to work here); or (2) some extra-physical agency intervening in the physical world. Neither one works for naturalism. We can even rule out (1) with some slight modification (e.g. the probability distribution of behavior doesn’t change). Remember, with the same syntax we have the same electrochemical reactions in the brain, so it’s hard to see how we could end up with different behavior without (1) or (2) being true.
Quote: Originally Posted by afunugsamongusQuote: Thanks for clearing that up. I think we can make the argument clearer and more rigorous by having “message syntax” and “message semantics” to distinguish between “belief syntax” and “belief semantics.” The argument then goes as follows:
{1} Message semantics affects human behavior independently of message syntax. {premise}
{2} If message semantics affects human behavior independently of message syntax, then belief semantics affects human behavior independently of belief syntax. {premise}
{3} Belief semantics affects human behavior independently of belief syntax. {from 1&2}
{4} (2.1.2 - Holding the syntax of beliefs constant while varying the semantics would not change behavior.) is false. {from 3}
For premise {1}:
{1.1} The syntax of messages is their letter and word arrangement. {premise}
{1.2} The meaning of messages (message semantics) affects human behavior independently of letter and word arrangement (message syntax). {premise}
-example: when you discover a double meaning in a message, you react differently.
{1.3} The message semantics affects human behavior independently of message syntax. {from 1.1&1.2}
I accept your improved version. Quote:
In this case the objector could attack premise 2 on the grounds that the relevant thought experiment confirms the antecedent and the corresponding relevant thought experiment for belief semantics/syntax disconfirms the consequent. What’s the relevant difference between the two scenarios? The message semantics ultimately translates into beliefs about what the message says. These beliefs have two different kinds of properties: syntactic and semantic. The semantic epiphenomenalist can say that message semantics are causally efficacious by virtue of their corresponding syntactic beliefs, not by their corresponding semantic beliefs.
This objection puts your semantic epiphenominalist in a very uncomfortable position. He admits that the meaning of a message causes our reactions but asserts that the meaning of the corresponding belief can't cause anything. He views meaning in beliefs as a useless side effect of certain neuron configurations. Memory helps us survive partly by alerting us to dangers and opportunities, so he insists that the encoding of these dangers and opportunities (the meaning) into our neurons plays no role at all. Or else he maintains epiphenominalism only by splitting the meaning of beliefs apart from all the perceptible features of belief, redefining it out of existence. In either case you're burdened not only with showing that he's not mistaken but also with showing that I am obliged to duplicate his apparent mistake.
It is admittedly a bit awkward, but while I believe semantic epiphenomenalism is false I don’t see an inconsistency here, though one does have to be rather careful in distinguishing between semantics to avoid equivocation. The “message semantics” really corresponds to the “belief syntax” in terms of causal powers. For example, suppose a person seeing word arrangement WA1 causes belief syntax ST1 and semantics SM1, which in turn induces behavior B1. If WA1 causes belief syntax ST2 (due to different “message semantics”) and belief semantics SM2 to produce behavior B2, you or I might say SM2 is responsible but the semantic epiphenomenalist would say that ST2 is what’s responsible, such that if WA1 causes belief syntax ST2 but belief semantics SM1, behavior B1 would result because we have the same electrochemical reactions delivering the same electrical impulses to the same muscles. |
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| harvey1 |
| Posted 07/17/11 at 06:31 PM | Reply with quote #554 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by Tisthammerw
That doesn’t follow. I flip a coin that isn’t fair (it’s weighted to almost always come up on one side) but I do not see its outcome and I don’t know which side is “loaded” to come up. Let H be “it came up heads,” T be “it came up tails” and F be “I flipped the coin.” Pr(H|F) is inscrutable to me, as is Pr(T|F). Does “Pr(H|F) is inscrutable” imply I am warranted in believing that it came up heads? Obviously not.
No, but you are warranted that: "[H|F] could obtain for all we know."
Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
Am I warranted in believing it could come up heads? Yes. Similarly, if Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable, I am warranted in thinking it could be high, but I am not warranted in believing it is high.
You are warranted R|N&E could obtain (i.e., "Our cognitive faculties are reliable given N&E") but you are not warranted that P(R|N&E) could be high since by hypothesis P(R|N&E) is inscrutable. How could P(R|N&E) be inscrutable and "could be high" at the same time in our current place in our epistemic journey? If it could be high, then that's just declaring our EAAN defeater: "After carefully considering all the implications and whatnot about R|N&E, we are warranted in estimating the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable (given N&E) as high, for all we know."
Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
Perhaps “could be high” is, you think, sufficient to defeat the argument. But how on earth does it do that? Which premise of the argument would be false or undermined?
2.5 is defeated.
2.5 Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable.
2.5 entails that for all we know Pr(R|N&E&SE) is high. However, if Pr(R|N&E&SE) is high, then 2.5 is false. It is not true that Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable if Pr(R|N&E&SE) is in fact high.
Quote: Originally Posted by TistQuote: Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable: "After carefully considering all the implications and whatnot of R|N&E, we are warranted in estimating the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable (given N&E) at around 0.5." It doesn’t mean that at all. Suppose we are in a country with over a billion people and a disease has uniformly spread about throughout the entire country, natives and visitors alike. You are as likely to be infected as anyone else, but the infection at this stage shows no symptoms to the naked senses, but I have no idea what the likelihood is; it is inscrutable to me. Am I warranted in estimating the probability to be about 0.5? If so, I am warranted in estimating that half the country is infected, but even if by some chance I happened to be right, I clearly didn’t know the disease has infected about half the population; it was just a lucky guess.
No, my epistemic confidence about me being infected is 0.5 level of confidence. That is, I have no epistemic confidence that I'm infected, but I also have no epistemic confidence that I'm not infected. I simply don't know. Hence, "Pr(H|U) is inscrutable" (i.e., "I am highly infected in the context of a uniform spread of the disease throughout the entire country" has a confidence rating around 50% of epistemic certainty). For all I know, though, H|U obtains (i.e., "I am highly infected in the context of a uniform spread of the disease throughout the entire country"). If Pr(H|U) could be high, then it would be saying that my epistemic certainty of H|U could be high. However, that conflicts with "Pr(H|U) is inscrutable." We've already determined that my epistemic certainty of H|U is inscrutable so no way my epistemic confidence about H|U could also be high at the same point in my epistemic journey and knowledge.
Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
To use another analogy, suppose I know Clint takes drug XX that destroys the cognitive faculties of some who take it, but I forget the percentage of whom it affects. I have a defeater for my previous belief that Clint’s cognitive faculties are reliable, even though (due to the probability being inscrutable for me), Pr(RC|he took XX) could for all I know be high (though it could for all I know be very low). The same sort of thing would happen if I ingested drug XX myself.
No. Pr(RC|he took XX) is inscrutable with regard to our epistemic confidence in Clint's RC not obtaining. Our epistemic confidence cannot be high since we have no evidence to suggest that it is. Of course, RC might obtain for all I know (though it could for all I know not have obtained). But, this is what Pr(RC|he took XX) means -- we are not confident that RC obtains and we are not confident that RC doesn't obtain. We have 50% certainty with regard to (RC|he took XX). |
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| Tisthammerw |
| Posted 07/21/11 at 10:29 PM | Reply with quote #555 |
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The Recap
Symbolism recap: - R = Our cognitive faculties are reliable
- N = Naturalism is true (the supernatural does not exist; only the natural realm is real)
- SE = Semantic epiphenomenalism (defined in post #1) is true.
- RA = the cognitive faculties of the aliens (mentioned in post #1) are reliable.
- RC = the cognitive faculties of Clint (mentioned in post #1) are reliable
Recap of the "main" argument: - If Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable, then N&E serves as a defeater for R.
- Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable.
- Therefore, N&E serves as a defeater for R.
Premise (1) is the Defeater Thesis and premise (2) is the Probability Thesis. Categorization of sub-arguments (see for post #1 more on this):
(1.1) If RC is defeated in the Clint Scenario, then RA is defeated in the Alien Scenario.
(1.2) If RA is defeated in the Alien Scenario, then R is defeated in the Probability Thesis scenario.
(1.3) RC is defeated in the Clint Scenario.
(1.4) Therefore, R is defeated in the Probability Thesis scenario.
(2.1) N&E entails SE.
(2.2) If (N&E entails SE) then N&E entails N&E&SE.
(2.3) N&E entails N&E&SE (follows from 2.1 and 2.2).
(2.4) If Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable, then Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable (follows from 2.3; since N&E entails N&E&SE anyway).
(2.5) Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable.
(2.6) Therefore, Pr(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable (follows from 2.4 and 2.5).
A: the semantic properties of the beliefs could literally be anything at all and it wouldn’t matter (e.g. if semantics supervenes on syntax, this supervenience relation could yield any semantic belief and it wouldn’t matter) with regard to how we behave.
(2.5a) If (N&E&SE entails A), then (Pr(RA|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable) (2.5b) If Pr(RA|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable, then Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable. (2.5c) N&E&SE entails A. (2.5) Therefore, Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable
The Post Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1Quote: Originally Posted by Tisthammerw
That doesn’t follow. I flip a coin that isn’t fair (it’s weighted to almost always come up on one side) but I do not see its outcome and I don’t know which side is “loaded” to come up. Let H be “it came up heads,” T be “it came up tails” and F be “I flipped the coin.” Pr(H|F) is inscrutable to me, as is Pr(T|F). Does “Pr(H|F) is inscrutable” imply I am warranted in believing that it came up heads? Obviously not. No, but you are warranted that: "[H|F] could obtain for all we know."
I agree. Suppose the coin lands but I’m blindfolded so that I don’t know the outcome. Would this mean “I am not warranted in believing it turned up heads” is false? Obviously not.
Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
Am I warranted in believing it could come up heads? Yes. Similarly, if Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable, I am warranted in thinking it could be high, but I am not warranted in believing it is high. You are warranted R|N&E could obtain (i.e., "Our cognitive faculties are reliable given N&E") but you are not warranted that P(R|N&E) could be high since by hypothesis P(R|N&E) is inscrutable. How could P(R|N&E) be inscrutable and "could be high" at the same time in our current place in our epistemic journey? If it could be high, then that's just declaring our EAAN defeater: "After carefully considering all the implications and whatnot about R|N&E, we are warranted in estimating the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable (given N&E) as high, for all we know." Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
Perhaps “could be high” is, you think, sufficient to defeat the argument. But how on earth does it do that? Which premise of the argument would be false or undermined? 2.5 is defeated. 2.5 Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable. 2.5 entails that for all we know Pr(R|N&E&SE) is high. However, if Pr(R|N&E&SE) is high, then 2.5 is false. It is not true that Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable if Pr(R|N&E&SE) is in fact high.
Not necessarily, and a counterexample is easy to come by: suppose Pr(R|N&E&SE) is high but to me the actual probability is inscrutable. Here, “Pr(R|N&E&SE) is high” would be true but I would not have warrant for believing it to be true, and of course “Pr(R|N&E&SE) is inscrutable” entails “Pr(R|N&E&SE) is low or inscrutable” and premise 2.5 would be true.
Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1Quote: Originally Posted by TistQuote: Pr(R|N&E) is inscrutable: "After carefully considering all the implications and whatnot of R|N&E, we are warranted in estimating the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable (given N&E) at around 0.5." It doesn’t mean that at all. Suppose we are in a country with over a billion people and a disease has uniformly spread about throughout the entire country, natives and visitors alike. You are as likely to be infected as anyone else, but the infection at this stage shows no symptoms to the naked senses, but I have no idea what the likelihood is; it is inscrutable to me. Am I warranted in estimating the probability to be about 0.5? If so, I am warranted in estimating that half the country is infected, but even if by some chance I happened to be right, I clearly didn’t know the disease has infected about half the population; it was just a lucky guess. No, my epistemic confidence about me being infected is 0.5 level of confidence.
Previously you referred to 0.5 being probability; are you backing away from that claim to affirm something else? If so, what exactly?
Quote: Originally Posted by harvey1Quote: Originally Posted by Tist
To use another analogy, suppose I know Clint takes drug XX that destroys the cognitive faculties of some who take it, but I forget the percentage of whom it affects. I have a defeater for my previous belief that Clint’s cognitive faculties are reliable, even though (due to the probability being inscrutable for me), Pr(RC|he took XX) could for all I know be high (though it could for all I know be very low). The same sort of thing would happen if I ingested drug XX myself. No. Pr(RC|he took XX) is inscrutable with regard to our epistemic confidence in Clint's RC not obtaining. Our epistemic confidence cannot be high since we have no evidence to suggest that it is.
That’s true, but I was referring to objective probability, not the probability of the proposition based on the facts that I have. When I say that Pr(R|N&E&SE) could be high for all one knows (when Pr(R|N&E&SE) is inscrutable to one) I was referring to the objective probability being high. |
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