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emailestthoume
Reply with quote  #1 
Not trying to steal thunder from the other evolutionary argument against naturalism thread, but I thought of an objection to it that might be valid.

- To even give the EAAN, mustn't one assume that one's cognitive faculties are reliable? (such as the ones which result in trusting the premises of the argument) If so, does this mean that the EAAN is circular or invalid?
Jerome92085
Reply with quote  #2 
Maybe that's why Plantinga gave it haha. How does a theist have a leg up when it comes to truth?
Chris9809
Reply with quote  #3 
I think his objection is more of "If naturalism is all their is, then how can we know our cognitive faculties are reliable?" where as if there is a God, we can be sure they are reliable. At least that's what I think he's getting at.
emailestthoume
Reply with quote  #4 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Chris9809
I think his objection is more of "If naturalism is all their is, then how can we know our cognitive faculties are reliable?" where as if there is a God, we can be sure they are reliable. At least that's what I think he's getting at.


But doesn't the statement "if there is a God we can assume our cognitive faculties are reliable," already assume that our cognitive faculties are reliable? 
Chris9809
Reply with quote  #5 
Quote:
Originally Posted by emailestthoume
Quote:
Originally Posted by Chris9809
I think his objection is more of "If naturalism is all their is, then how can we know our cognitive faculties are reliable?" where as if there is a God, we can be sure they are reliable. At least that's what I think he's getting at.


But doesn't the statement "if there is a God we can assume our cognitive faculties are reliable," already assume that our cognitive faculties are reliable? 


Never said I agreed with him . Then again I never really have taken the time to actually examine the argument from all angles.
noseeum
Reply with quote  #6 
I don't think there is any part of the EAAN that assumes our cognitive faculties aren't reliable. Although it's difficult not to get sucked into that particular sink of philosophical scepticism, the argument assumes our cognitive faculties are reliable, and goes on from there. In fact, from memory it even says that having reliable cognitive faculties is consistent with both naturalism and theism. The argument is trying to provided a probability judgement of a sort to show it's not very reasonable to think naturalism is true.
Rostos
Reply with quote  #7 
If God exists and he designed, then our cognitive faculties are reliable...If God doesnt exist, then how can we trust our cognitive faculties if it is randomly put together by evolution...

I think the key is, "how can we trust" as opposed to, "we cannot trust"...

emailestthoume
Reply with quote  #8 
But do you guys see what I am saying that it sounds circular to say,

"assuming that our cognitive faculties are reliable, how can we trust our cognitive faculties?"

We are already trusting our cognitive faculties in order to question them. So it seems to me that we are not really questioning them at all since we must assume them to even formulate the question. (we must assume words mean what we think, other basic beliefs, etc… )

This seems to me to be different than assuming our cognitive faculties are reliable in other sorts of arguments, because this one questions the very reliability of the faculties.
noseeum
Reply with quote  #9 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Rostos
If God exists and he designed, then our cognitive faculties are reliable...If God doesnt exist, then how can we trust our cognitive faculties if it is randomly put together by evolution...

I think the key is, "how can we trust" as opposed to, "we cannot trust"...



That is not what Plantinga is saying in his EAAN paper. In fact, he outlines how evolution would produce cognitive faculties. Plantinga thinks evolution can produce reliable cognitive faculties all on it's own. He just thinks the relative probability of this happening on naturalism compared to theistic evolution is much diminished, thereby making theism a more rational position to take. It's more that our cognitive faculties present a difficulty for the naturalist, but do not on theism. 

This is absolutely not the same as saying "how can we rely on our cognitive faculties?" 

I think we obviously have reasons to believe our cognitive faculties are reliable wholly apart from theism or naturalism. How we justify this is not the point of the EAAN paper. 
hatsoff
Reply with quote  #10 

Actually, Plantinga is not making an inference to the best explanation here.  Rather he is claiming that one cannot be rational while accepting both naturalism (construed by him as physicalism) and evolution, because evolution gives the naturalist a "defeater" for the belief that one's cognitive faculties are reliable.

He argues by analogy.  For instance, suppose we learn of an extraordinary poison which usually (but not always) causes people to become almost completely irrational, so much that they can't even understand that their thinking is impaired.  Suppose further that we learn we have imbibed this poison ourselves.  This gives us, Plantinga argues, a defeater for R (the proposition that one's own cognitive faculties are reliable).  By analogy, the combination of E&N (evolution and naturalism) likewise gives a person a defeater for R.

(Please note that I cannot recall whether this PARTICULAR analogy is Plantinga's or one of his disciple's.  But either way, the point is the same.)

Personally, it seems to me that the analogy is flawed in at least two serious ways.  First, the poison is not comparable to evolution, because it is not true that we should expect evolution to result in unreliable cognitive faculties.  This is the tack that most critics seem to take to Plantinga's argument, and it is a good one.

However there is a second (and in my opinion more assured) reason, often overlooked, to reject Plantinga's argument:  Drinking the poison does not in fact give me a defeater for R, as long as the qualification remains that the poison does not always cause R to become false.  The same goes for other, similar analogies.  As long as it is our own cognitive faculties in question, we must trust them.  It doesn't appear to me that I have any choice in the matter.  In other words, we must take it as a basic assumption that R is true.

Now, turning finally to emailestthoume's question, I don't see any circularity in Plantinga's argument of the sort described.  It is true that we start off believing R.  Plantinga's argument presupposes R in that sense.  But with R in hand, Plantinga tries to show that the conjunction E&N gives a person a defeater for R.  Thus one is led (so Plantinga argues) inexorably to irrationality.  If he rejects R, then he cannot rationally believe anything, but if he accepts R, then he is led to reject R, a contradiction.  Either way the evolutionary naturalist is (so Plantinga argues) irrational.

MorleyMcMorson
Reply with quote  #11 
I don't think the EAAN is circular, as the entire form of the argument takes one through various states of rationality based on what one believes at a specific time.  He says that, assume that our minds are reliable and that they were formed through evolution and naturalism.  Then since N+E have no love for truth, you have an undercutter for your belief that you began with---rationality.  So all your beliefs are undercut and you start all over again.  As soon as you come to hold that set of beliefs again, your beliefs are all undercut again, and you start over.

Plantinga is not assuming rationality to prove rationality.  He's assuming rationality (as one must in any argument) to show that you can't have rationality given certain additional premises.  Since the conclusion is not identical with any of the assumptions/premises, it is not circular.
Lawlessone777
Reply with quote  #12 
The EANN isn't circular in that it doesn't presuppose naturalism. On naturalism if a caveman thought that, say, a tiger was a plush stuffed toy which desperately needed a hug, but thought the only way to give that tiger a hug was to run screaming away from it that belief would encourage survival and so would continue on into the species. As such any undirected evolution would entail a brain which is not hardwired for truth, but rather for survival. For example; cherries may not be red, your brain may only paint them red to make it easier to find them for food.

However on Plantiga himself presenting this argument it doesn't fall into a problem of arguing in a circle considering he's a staunch Christian. As a theist I'm perfectly comfortable with assuming my brain works just fine since I believe it was designed to be capable of discerning truth.
hasbeen
Reply with quote  #13 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Lawlessone777
For example; cherries may not be red, your brain may only paint them red to make it easier to find them for food.



This may not be on technically on topic but i found it fascinating and especially the testing at 5 mins that was incredible:

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