| CGWeaver |
| Posted 06/08/08 at 04:32 PM | Reply with quote #31 |
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Thanks for your reply BWalker. I do not think that Dr. Moreland has argued directly against the truth of divine conceptualism. The text you might be alluding to Universals [1], shows the primacy of a moderate platonism when trying to think about certain phenomena (e.g. predication, the nature of existence, etc.). Moreland tried to show that various types of nominalism do not farewell in dealing with these multifurious metaphysical and linguistic phenomena. This however does not necessarily mean that divine conceptualism is defecient, unless of course nominalism and divine conceptualism are logically equivalent enough such that the types of arguments against nominalism employed by Dr. Moreland apply equally as well to divine conceptualism. That argument has not been given yet. There have been attempts by "creationists" to show that divine contpaulism is incoherent, but (as I think I showed in the last EPS conference when I questioned one of these "creationists") these attempts have not succeded. Consider though the argument from ultimate value and meaning...Craig's axiological argument (when employed against Dr. Antony) seemed to appeal to moral responsibility (in the sense of real moral retribution for acts performed). Craig argued rather cogently that the life of finite human persons does not have ultimate "value", "meaning", and "purpose" because the morally praiseworthy acts committed in their finite lives receive no real retribution in a possible world in which there is no God and no immortality. What Craig means by "ultimate" plays a big role. This ould seem to me to be more like an argument from justice and just retribution (sort of like Kant's). The fact that many (if not all) finite lives lived will not be justly rewarded for good acts committed does seem to imply that acts performed in my life (that are of this type) really have no "LASTING" value. Thus, if the doctrnie of immortality is false then there is no ultimate lasting value to life. These are just preliminary thoughts, but I'd like to get your feedback.
[1] J.P. Moreland, Universals (Montreal, Canada: McGill University Press, 2001).
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| bwalker |
| Posted 06/08/08 at 09:31 PM | Reply with quote #32 |
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No, I am not referring to Moreland's Universals. |
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| CGWeaver |
| Posted 06/09/08 at 08:48 AM | Reply with quote #33 |
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Which sources are you referring to?
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| Tisthammerw |
| Posted 07/05/08 at 11:44 PM | Reply with quote #34 |
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| First I'll define a couple terms I’m using. An “ought-statement” is a statement that makes a claim of what ought to be rather than making a claim of what is, e.g. “people should not steal.” In the context being used here, “authority” is the power to make ought-statements true (as by a command), thereby being a specific type of ought-to-be-obeyed aspect. For example, suppose an Admiral has authority over the entire fleet and orders the Captain to turn his ship South. The statement “the Captain ought to turn the ship South” becomes true, and the Captain ought to obey the Admiral.
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Hi sensei, When you say the issue is abductive (“what is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral truths”), your answer to the abductive question turns out to be deductive or at least not allowing for there to be more than one possible explanation (i.e., you said, “My sole point was that the monotheistic Deity is the only plausible answer”). I am a bit confused here. Craig does the same thing, however, moving in the opposite direction. Later you say, “As soon as someone says there are moral truths that are independent of God, I'd immediately have to ask where they come from.” I am confused by the concern about a source. |
Look at it this way. Without God (or something like Him) who or what says how we ought to behave? True, we could say we should not commit rape because we ought to prevent the suffering of the individual. But who or what says "We ought to minimize human suffering"? It seems that somewhere along the line you're going to have to appeal to some type of sovereign metaphysical entity as a stopping point; some entity or force with supreme authority saying "this is how you ought to behave." Thus the question as to the foundation of objective morality: who or what says how we ought to behave? Whoever or whatever it is that says how we ought to behave, the basis of objective morality must possess the following characteristics: - Supremely transcendent authority. It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but the basis of morality must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it. Suppose for instance a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews. Is it the case that the subordinate ought to obey the Nazi? No, the subordinate ought to obey the dictates of morality instead, because the dictates of objective morality ought to be obeyed over the orders of any human. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people’s behavioral commands if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. This would include, for instance, transcending the authority of dictators who would order torture and genocide. Otherwise people ought to obey the dictator instead of morality. So the basis of objective morality not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supremely transcendent authority (transcending e.g. Hitler’s authority).
- Absolute. Goes along with the objective nature of morality. The basis of morality is not relative but absolute; both its existence and its moral truths are stone-cold facts and are independent of any arbitrary moral standards we humans might create. Additionally, as the supreme authority its existence and statements of how we ought to behave are completely unrestrained by any other would-be authorities (as governments). Try as they might have, the Nazis could not budge the fact that their anti-Semitism was immoral.
- Universally binding. Again, goes along with the nature of objective morality. The entity's authority must be universally binding in that it applies to everyone (e.g. all peoples in all governments) regardless of who, when, and where we are and regardless of what any human thinks, feels, and believes.
- Infallibly authoritative. The basis of morality also cannot be mistaken on what is morally right (else it would not be the basis of morality when it says what is moral), so it says how we ought to behave with infallible moral authority.
Objective morality implies the existence of some transcendent, absolute, universally binding entity with infallible and supreme moral authority in saying how we ought to behave such that everyone ought to always obey it. This entity certainly sounds like some type of God, even if it is not the God of traditional monotheism. |
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| bwalker |
| Posted 08/08/08 at 02:07 AM | Reply with quote #35 |
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When we say "rape is wrong" I remain puzzled why the truth of this judgment depends on some transcendent entity as opposed to the obvious truth that rape causes pyschological pain and violates a person's autonomy. When we ask why we ought ought not to rape a person, it is because of the pain and violation of the person's autonomy that rapes causes. It's that simple. Appealing to God is ad hoc. In all that you wrote, you failed to show what it is that God does to make ought statements true. Saying P is true does not make P true. God's authority factors in only epistemically. |
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| suedeuno |
| Posted 08/10/08 at 09:58 PM | Reply with quote #36 |
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New to the forum, but I have listened to the debate some time ago. I enjoy Craigs talks but I found him lumbering in a few points. While he pressed Antony a couple of times on her subjective view points I was hoping to see him press her more on the topic. Her subjective view of morality and values were weak in my opinion. The problem for this argument is that no one is under any obligation to following her views or any other views. She may find value in people but what about the next person? She had no answer for it and I thought she should have been pressed more. I remember Charles Manson stating that if there is no God then he is free to do whatever he chooses to fulfill his desires on any given day which is exactly what he did. Manson started with torturing small animals but soon got bored and began looking for bigger acts to meet his needs. Antony may say that it's wrong because it caused someone suffering but how does this fit into a naturalistic worldview where survival of the fittest is what got her where she is anyway? I don't see these statements agreeing with eachother. |
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| bwalker |
| Posted 08/11/08 at 02:59 AM | Reply with quote #37 |
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Not all naturalists are materialists and not all materialists are naturalists. If Antony presents a view of ethics in the subjective way that you state, then she does a poor job of defending ethics without God. There are plenty of competent folks out there who do a better job. It is amazing that most Christians try to ground ethics in God as if the Bible supports this metaphysical belief. Two giant figures in ethics, Kant and Mill, never did this. There is nothing to lose and no compromise to view ethics as autonomous. |
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| Tisthammerw |
| Posted 08/16/08 at 09:40 PM | Reply with quote #38 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by bwalker When we say "rape is wrong" I remain puzzled why the truth of this judgment depends on some transcendent entity as opposed to the obvious truth that rape causes pyschological pain and violates a person's autonomy. When we ask why we ought ought not to rape a person, it is because of the pain and violation of the person's autonomy that rapes causes.
That's great, but who or what says we ought to avoid such pain and violation to others? Providing that reason only pushes the problem back a step. Ultimately, we still don't have an answer to the question of who or what says how we ought to behave.
Quote: In all that you wrote, you failed to show what it is that God does to make ought statements true.
God is by definition the supreme authority in the universe. In the context being used here, “authority” is the power to command (i.e. put forth a statement of what to do, such as “do not steal”) and to imbue those commands with an ought-to-be-obeyed quality. An example would be an Admiral with authority over the entire fleet ordering a Captain to "turn your ship south" and the Captain ought to obey the Admiral's order because of the Admiral's authority. God's divine commands for our behavior would necessarily create true moral ought-statements (e.g."thou shalt not kill") because of what he is: the Supreme Authority. Put into further detail by Craig:
On the theistic view, objective moral values are rooted in God. God’s own holy and perfectly good nature supplies the absolute standard against which all actions and decisions are measured. God’s moral nature is what Plato called the “Good.” He is the locus and source of moral value. He is by nature loving, generous, just, faithful, kind, and so forth.
Moreover, God’s moral nature is expressed in relation to us in the form of divine commands which constitute our moral duties or obligations. Far from being arbitrary, these commands flow necessarily from His moral nature. In the Judaeo-Christian tradition, the whole moral duty of man can be summed up in the two great commandments: First, you shall love the Lord your God with all your strength and with all your soul and with all your heart and with all your mind, and, second, you shall love your neighbor as yourself. On this foundation we can affirm the objective goodness and rightness of love, generosity, self-sacrifice, and equality, and condemn as objectively evil and wrong selfishness, hatred, abuse, discrimination, and oppression.
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| bwalker |
| Posted 09/04/08 at 11:16 AM | Reply with quote #39 |
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Again, as I have tried to point out, you and others who hold a similar view of ethics makes ethical obligations arbitrary. After all, if a person needs God to command him not to rape a woman as opposed to seeing that rape is wrong, then ultimately rape is a matter of what God commands. The issues of pain and the violation of the woman's autonomy would be redundant. |
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| suedeuno |
| Posted 09/14/08 at 09:00 PM | Reply with quote #40 |
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If natural selection were true, pain and suffering would often be a neccessary consequence. So how is it that this suffering is allowable for the progress of evolution and at the same time somehow define moral boundaries? This seems to me a systemic contradiction. |
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| bwalker |
| Posted 09/21/08 at 01:32 AM | Reply with quote #41 |
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Suedeuno,
You are confused on a number of points here. First, you stated that pain and suffering may be required given natural selection. Is this the same as saying it is necessary? You need to say yes if there is a contradiction. More importantly though, you are confusing the intrinsic value of pain with the extrinsic value of pain. But this goes without saying. Even in a theistic universe, pain and suffering may be a modus operandi for conforming us into Christ image, but pain and suffering are not intrinsically valuable. In a converse way, pain could be extrinsically valuable in a naturalistic universe from the point of view of evolving complexity, but it obviously is not intrinsically valuable in a naturalistic universe.
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| suedeuno |
| Posted 09/23/08 at 05:58 PM | Reply with quote #42 |
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b,
Actually if you re-read what I posted I did use the word 'necessary'. Yes Christians will likely be called to suffer as Christ suffered but unlike Antony, I've never heard a Christian use suffering as a basis for their morality. Therefore making a comparison of suffering in both worldviews is pointless for this discussion. Whether or not suffering is desireable is also pointless because as I stated it is still likely 'necessary' in natural selection and certainly natural selection would ultimately be desired. If suffering is somewhow not desireable then it is the burden of the person holding that worldview to provide rational reasons for why it is not desireable because it is a part of the process by which everything owes it's current state and the very ability to reason on such concepts. I've never heard a rational response to this point and certainly Antony never supplied one.
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| bwalker |
| Posted 09/25/08 at 02:34 PM | Reply with quote #43 |
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I did read your post closely the first time and you said pain is often necessary. This implies that sometimes it is not. Anyway, Christians speak of pain in their ethical discourse all the time. The concept of courage, for example, requires fear. Again, I don't think any theist or atheist will speak of pain as intrinsically good, i.e., preferred all by itself. This would be absurd. Nevertheless, it is a necesarry evil for naturalism. But having said this, naturalists in no way would argue that pain is intrinsically good. As I said in the last post, you need to make a distinction between the extrinsic and intrinsic sense of pain. |
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| Tisthammerw |
| Posted 12/29/08 at 03:35 PM | Reply with quote #44 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by bwalker Again, as I have tried to point out, you and others who hold a similar view of ethics makes ethical obligations arbitrary. After all, if a person needs God to command him not to rape a woman as opposed to seeing that rape is wrong, then ultimately rape is a matter of what God commands. The two are not inconsistent. God is the proposed explanation of why rape is wrong, after all.
Quote: The issues of pain and the violation of the woman's autonomy would be redundant. They are not redundant, but neither are they sufficient for a basis of morality. Suppose what you have said is true and rape is wrong because it causes unnecessary pain and violates the woman's autonomy. Again, who or what says people shouldn't do that sort of thing? You still haven't identified the entity or force that imposes these prohibitions, whereas God would qualify as just such an entity.
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| Copleston |
| Posted 06/17/12 at 04:43 PM | Reply with quote #45 |
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Once again, an atheist debater has failed to explain how, on the atheistic world-view, our society can obtain objective moral values. Louise Antony made the remarkable statement that we can figure out moral values the same way we like chocolate! What about the people who absolutely hate chocolate? Antony's assertions were petty and failed miserably in the face of Dr. Craig's arguments.  |
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