| EGreg |
| Posted 05/01/11 at 12:24 PM | Reply with quote #1 |
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Normally I am very impressed by Dr. Craig and I am reading his book Reasonable Faith right now.
I watched this debate, and in this case I was left a bit wanting. Mostly I think the problem lies in the disingenous use of the word "objective", while predicating the argument on a human construction in the first place. Dr. Craig rightly points out the is-ought problem in Harris's argument, but sidesteps the is-ought problem in his own argument by defining "objective moral values" by fiat!
I think Dr. Craig attempted to keep it strictly on the path of his popular argument:
"If objective moral values exist, then God exists" "Objective moral values exist."
"Therefore, God exists."
But in the debate, he did not accept any alternative foundation for ethics. He said that anything Sam Harris could come up with is not objective, and that what Sam Harris *did* come up with was a mere re-definition of what he considered to be *the* definitions of good and evil.
So let's stop to consider, what does Dr. Craig consider to be *the* definitions of good and evil? After all, the debate is about where good comes from, but we must first define it. Let's give Dr. Craig the complete freedom to define it:
Good is whatever God desires.
Well, then the debate is meaningless! If we let Dr. Craig define what good is, and he does not allow us to question that definition, then the question is closed. Good by definition comes from God, and no other definition is admissible.
On the other hand, if we allow that there might be some other definition of "good", then which one do we use? We introduce the question of "objective" moral values, yet the word "objective" is not specifically stated in the question: "Does good come from God?" Perhaps good is not such an objective concept after all. Witness:
1) Different societies. Today we think that killing babies is bad. Spartans thought it was good, both for the society at large, and for the babies who would otherwise grow up as "weaklings", or something. Killing baby girls was considered OK, because male heirs were preferable.
2) Different religions. Many muslims believe that Christians are committing sins every day and are probably going to go to hell. Many Christians believe that muslims are going to hell.
3) Christian values themselves. Is eating pork absolutely wrong? Working on the Sabbath day? How does Dr. Craig classify homosexual sex? Is it good or bad? How about putting people to death for it -- is that good or bad? What about merely telling homosexual people that they are despicable? Let us remember that second one was commanded in the Old Testament, and the third one was said by the apostle Paul:
For this reason God gave them over to degrading passions; for their women exchanged the natural function for that which is unnatural, and in the same way also the men abandoned the natural function of the woman and burned in their desire toward one another, men with men committing indecent acts and receiving in their own persons the due penalty of their error.
Surely, any given view of whether X is good or bad falls far short of Dr. Craig's definition of "objectivity" -- namely, independent of any human bias. For if I asked whether X is good or bad, all people in the world might reply the same way for some X. But why did they reply this way? Dr. Craig says that it is because it's an "objective moral value." But he hasn't proved this at all -- for he derides the very example Sam Harris gave of the worst world for everyone, but his students use the examples of a mother slowly and gleefully killing her own children. Dr. Craig has specifically defined "good" and "bad" as being completely independent of humans -- being from God -- and therefore any attempts of his to prove that objective moral values exist must fail by his own definition. So in this debate he undermined his own popular argument from ethics.
Now, Dr. Craig repeatedly says that he doesn't intend to give any "semantic" meaning to good or evil, and that his concerns are strictly "ontological". And yes, by the way he himself defined good and evil, it by definition can come only from God! But so what? Why should his definitions be of any use to someone who does not believe in the existence of a god? What if they are polytheists and believe in several gods who have differing viewpoints, or perhaps they are atheists who do not believe in a god at all? Is his definition not dependent on a belief system common to a group of people, just like Sam Harris' definition of good and evil?
Put more practically, let's assume that there is a God. How do we know that this God communicated with humans? How do we know if Christianity is right and not Islam? How do we know
I can fully appreciate that if I knew for SURE that there is a God and He commanded me to do something, I would try to do it. I appreciate that the Absolute Creator of the Universe is absolute good and worthy of being followed, IF we know what He wants from us. But that's a lot of IFs. The problem is that not everyone believes one side of the IF! So once again, we can only say that objective moral values come from God IF those things are true. For the other people, objective moral values simply do not exist, in the sense Dr. Craig wants them to exist.
But practically speaking, every single example that Dr. Craig or his students ever give for the existence of objective moral values, in his 3-part argument, has to do with the well-being of conscious creatures. Notice that working on the Sabbath day is never used as an example, despite clear and unambiguous prohibitions under the threat of death throughout the Old Testament. Can Dr. Craig appreciate that Jews (who do not believe the law was suddenly abolished) believe that God commanded them to observe the Sabbath day? The fact is, objective moral values do not exist if we use the way Dr. Craig defines "objective".
Finally, I want to illustrate the mirror opposite of this picture. Imagine Sam Harris had said (which he practically did) :
Good and Evil are concepts that come from the idea that the worst possible world for everyone is bad. If you accept that this idea is true, therefore by definition, Good and Evil come from it.
How is this any different from or less objective Craig's idea that there is a god? Empirical evidence has shown that almost everyone believes the worst possible world for everyone is bad, and that these are the people you would want to deal with, whereas not everyone holds the same religion! |
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| Shiloh |
| Posted 05/05/11 at 04:10 PM | Reply with quote #2 |
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I agree, I found it funny that at the outset Craig tried to set up Harris by forcing him to adhere to his definition. Craig said that they both agree that objective morals exist... and then proceeded to go down his usual routine.
The problem is that if Harris actually agreed with Craig's definition of 'Objective Moral Values' there would be no debate. Craig tries to force Harris to account for his definition of Objective Moral Values. Harris is an atheist and therefor by default cannot agree with Craig's definition since his definition inherently (ontologically) requires God.
Craig then just appeals to people's emotions when trying to prove there existence. Everybody has a sense of Objective Morals and if they do not exist then we cannot say that Hitler was wrong ---- of course we cannot do that based on his preconceived notions of Objectivity and what constitutes 'wrong' or 'good' --- i.e. what God says.
Craig is just good at controlling all the details and what is or is not allowed to be used in the discussion. He then primes the audience to go down the logical path he wants to secure and then dismisses all other roads. To me it is just a game of words and definitions/semantics that are all controlled by other words and semantics so you finally end up with having to prove something that is impossible to prove based upon the conditions set by Craig.
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| silentmatt |
| Posted 05/05/11 at 08:02 PM | Reply with quote #3 |
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Craig's notion of objective morality is a body of moral truth which exists independently of the opinion of observers in general, and with this Harris would agree. It is a further argument of Craig's that objective morality must be grounded in the commands of a supremely authoritative, morally perfect being.
Craig simply set out to show that if God existed, then objective moral values would exist, and if God does not exist, then they don't. I think it's obvious that if a supremely authoritative necessary being commands me to do something, I have a moral obligation to do it. Craig dismisses Harris' view because it does not deliver such entailments once all his atheistic positions are cashed out. A world where everybody suffers, where there is no authoritative prescriptive statement to abhor the conditions of such a world, cannot be considered wrong, since the mere fact of suffering itself does not logically entail an obligation to abhor or prevent it. So, Harris' view of the grounding of objective morality fails precisely where Craig's account succeeds.
I notice that you, in your further objections, forget the line between ontology and epistemology. Whether people are aware of the moral law or not, or whether they believe this or that account of the moral law, does not have any effect on whether the moral law exists, or what the moral law is. |
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| Shiloh |
| Posted 05/05/11 at 10:03 PM | Reply with quote #4 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by silentmattCraig's notion of objective morality is a body of moral truth which exists independently of the opinion of observers in general, and with this Harris would agree. It is a further argument of Craig's that objective morality must be grounded in the commands of a supremely authoritative, morally perfect being. Harris cannot agree because Craig's definition requires God. There is no further argument unless you think Objective Morals exist above or outside of God. This is why he grounds them in God's nature. Inherent in Craig's definition of God is that one of His attributes is Absolute Goodness - which entails these values. It is like saying if God exists then God exists. Objectivity for Harris is completely different than the way you or Craig are trying to define it. Harris's idea seems to be that we can arrive at a scientific objectivity or something similar that falls along the lines of a conditional 'ought.' If you want to X you ought to do y. You can arrive at these things by way of reason and understanding of human ontology and what humans desire and seek after as opposed to what they avoid - and yes in your sense you cannot say that is 'wrong' because wrong for you and Craig is that which God says to be so. Quote: Craig simply set out to show that if God existed, then objective moral values would exist, and if God does not exist, then they don't. I think it's obvious that if a supremely authoritative necessary being commands me to do something, I have a moral obligation to do it. Craig dismisses Harris' view because it does not deliver such entailments once all his atheistic positions are cashed out. A world where everybody suffers, where there is no authoritative prescriptive statement to abhor the conditions of such a world, cannot be considered wrong, since the mere fact of suffering itself does not logically entail an obligation to abhor or prevent it. So, Harris' view of the grounding of objective morality fails precisely where Craig's account succeeds. See above - that is because you control the definitions of what is 'good' and 'wrong' - what God says - how convenient. Once again Harris is not trying to ground your ideas of Objective Morals and goodness and wrongness in some transcendent being - it is contrary to his position - he is trying to give grounds for us to say that something is 'objective' in the sense of coming to an understanding (through various methodologies and disciplines) of what humanity seeks and needs and what actions can best support their survival and betterment. Studies in the area of primates, cognition, economics, brain chemistry, and brain structures have led to reasonable answers to these questions without invoking a Sky Judge. Objectivity: - ability to view things objectively: the ability to perceive or describe something without being influenced by personal emotions or prejudices
- accuracy: the fact or quality of being accurate, unbiased, and independent of individual perceptions
This is more along the lines of what Harris is getting at. And of course on your idea of Absolute good and wrong - we cannot say that it is 'wrong' - but guess what we are not trying to do so according to your concepts.
Quote: I notice that you, in your further objections, forget the line between ontology and epistemology. Whether people are aware of the moral law or not, or whether they believe this or that account of the moral law, does not have any effect on whether the moral law exists, or what the moral law is. I do not forget - it is just that one eventually comes to the other when fleshing out Craig's Divine Command Theory. Craig's isolation of these things is another attempt to hide things that would be helpful to the people when they step back and get a broader view of the whole system in which Craig operates rather than the myopic nit-picking that he engages in every time he debates these things. For example - your attempt, at the beginning of this post, to separate the existence and grounding of these objective moral values when the two go hand in hand. |
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| silentmatt |
| Posted 05/06/11 at 12:03 AM | Reply with quote #5 |
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Quote: Objectivity for Harris is completely different than the way you or Craig are trying to define it. Harris's idea seems to be that we can arrive at a scientific objectivity or something similar that falls along the lines of a conditional 'ought.' If you want to X you ought to do y.
Craig doesn't dispute that you can arrive at "conditional oughts." He just says that these oughts are not morally binding, and it's true- no moral obligation is entailed. Just because the statement "if I wanted to do X, the best way to accomplish X is Y," is true, doesn't entail that I actually ought to do Y.
Harris recognizes (watch his last answer to the Q&A in his and Craig's debate) this problem when he says that suffering is evil simply as a matter of axiomatic fact- akin to mathematics, or logic. I agree with him on this. I think, however, that the prescriptive nature of moral axioms entails the existence of a God to make those prescriptions.
Quote: You can arrive at these things by way of reason and understanding of human ontology and what humans desire and seek after as opposed to what they avoid - and yes in your sense you cannot say that is 'wrong' because wrong for you and Craig is that which God says to be so.
For something to be wrong, one would have to violate a moral obligation in doing it. If you can suggest a ground for moral obligation other than God's commands, I'm all ears. The reason that we think that obligation is the essence of moral law is that it seems essential to the common use of right and wrong.
For instance, to say that causing unjustified suffering is evil, and also to affirm that one is not obligated to refrain from causing unjustified suffering, seems to be to assert a contradiction. On the other hand, where one does have an obligation to refrain from causing unjustified suffering, it seems to follow that it is evil to cause unjustified suffering.
Quote: Once again Harris is not trying to ground your ideas of Objective Morals and goodness and wrongness in some transcendent being - it is contrary to his position - he is trying to give grounds for us to say that something is 'objective' in the sense of coming to an understanding (through various methodologies and disciplines) of what humanity seeks and needs and what actions can best support their survival and betterment. Studies in the area of primates, cognition, economics, brain chemistry, and brain structures have led to reasonable answers to these questions without invoking a Sky Judge.
You say that like it's some great insight. Of course science can deliver these facts. It simply cannot conjure up moral obligations with respect to them.
Quote: Quote: And of course on your idea of Absolute good and wrong - we cannot say that it is 'wrong' - but guess what we are not trying to do so according to your concepts.
So... you're not trying to ground moral obligations, to figure out how it is that certain things could be good or evil? In other words, you're not trying to do meta-ethics anymore?
Quote: For example - your attempt, at the beginning of this post, to separate the existence and grounding of these objective moral values when the two go hand in hand.
They're closely related, but distinct. Something cannot exist unless it is grounded in whatever it's grounded in. However, it is possible to know that certain things exist, even if we don't know what they're grounded in. For example, a caveman and a chemist both know that water exists, but only the chemist knows that the properties of water are grounded in the properties of H2O.
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| Shiloh |
| Posted 05/06/11 at 02:12 AM | Reply with quote #6 |
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Quote: You say that like it's some great insight. Of course science can deliver these facts. It simply cannot conjure up moral obligations with respect to them.
No one is trying to conjure-up 'obligations' as defined by you or Craig - i.e. that these obligations are somehow transcendent and pressing in and upon humanity from outside of the Universe by God. If anything the 'obligation' is to reason and consistency with ones own humanity - i.e. you do not want to be killed - killing is painful and forceful - not good - me don't like - therefore others likewise feel the same. Yet nothing obligates one to do it - it just comports with reason and consistency to do so as well as the fact that to do so creates better environments for all those within a particular social sphere - many things have shown that social co-operation benefits both the individual as well as the group - both thrive. It is therefore not hard to come up with concepts to govern human actions that say things like - treat others as you would want to be treated - while using terms, no matter how ambiguous or metaphorical like 'ought to' or 'wrong' and 'good.' Craig just bullies people into thinking about these things in one way - although religious history has prejudiced our thoughts as well. Once again though there is no ultimate obligation and yet we could very well say that it is wrong, in many senses, other than it violating some external transcendent code from an eternal Being. Just because we cannot say it in your sense does not mean there is an equality among human actions or that we cannot arrive at some objectivity about what is the best way for individuals and society to act. The grounding for what is 'good' or 'bad' does not have to be transcendent nor does one have to find the source of obligation, if any, to do meta-ethics. The grounding could very well be ourselves - it is grounded in human ontology. Studying why people act and what they tend to act for and avoid and how they make choices towards those desires to act, the chemical processes behind it, the physical nature of pain avoidance, the basic conceptual categories of the mind - cause and effect, force dynamics, intention, abstraction, etc. give rise to other concepts like responsibility and an objectification of such basic wants and desires and is once again only human and natural. These human attributes explain our moral sense not some eternal transcendent objective code grounded in the nature of an invisible Judge. This is way more insightful and reasonable to conclude than relying on a deductive argument that has to appeal to a finite, physical, subjective creature's sense of objectivity to show that objectivity is transcendent and grounded in a Being called God. |
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| silentmatt |
| Posted 05/06/11 at 03:07 AM | Reply with quote #7 |
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Quote: If anything the 'obligation' is to reason and consistency with ones own humanity - i.e. you do not want to be killed - killing is painful and forceful - not good - me don't like - therefore others likewise feel the same.
I don't see the obligation here to be reasonable and consistent. Perhaps you might say that I am forced into it, or influenced to be like that by my society and my biology, but none of these really entails any sort of obligation to go along with these things.
Quote: Yet nothing obligates one to do it - it just comports with reason and consistency to do so as well as the fact that to do so creates better environments for all those within a particular social sphere - many things have shown that social co-operation benefits both the individual as well as the group - both thrive.
So, since there is no obligation to act reasonably, you think that someone who acts unreasonably- say a serial killer, or a terrorist- is not committing evil when he does so? Quote: Once again though there is no ultimate obligation and yet we could very well say that it is wrong, in many senses, other than it violating some external transcendent code from an eternal Being. Just because we cannot say it in your sense does not mean there is an equality among human actions or that we cannot arrive at some objectivity about what is the best way for individuals and society to act.
You haven't made your case very well that this could be the case. It seems to me that calling "my" morality "ultimate" is just to assume that there is such a thing as "non-ultimate" standards of morality which could give rise to moral value or obligation. But you've got no resources to support this assumption, it seems to me. How does one justify the moral value of different courses of action at all, on atheism?
Quote: The grounding could very well be ourselves - it is grounded in human ontology.
Really, now. So humans are authoritative prescribers for moral law? Does that mean that anything that anyone prescribes is moral?
Quote: Studying why people act and what they tend to act for and avoid and how they make choices towards those desires to act, the chemical processes behind it, the physical nature of pain avoidance, the basic conceptual categories of the mind - cause and effect, force dynamics, intention, abstraction, etc. give rise to other concepts like responsibility and an objectification of such basic wants and desires and is once again only human and natural.
Yeah, but it cannot give rise to obligations to value those wants or act on them. It can give an account of responsibility, and the feeling of being responsible, but not of the obligation to go along with that feeling and act on it. At the very best, such explanations explain away our moral intuitions, and only nihilism could be true.
Thankfully, I don't think that such arguments hold water. We could come up with a similar sort of just-so story about the development of perception, logic and mathematics, and indeed perhaps we could trace all of these faculties to occurrences in the brain. But that doesn't mean that our perception, logical or mathematical faculties are not veridical, and neither should it mean that our moral senses are not veridical. Quote: This is way more insightful and reasonable to conclude than relying on a deductive argument that has to appeal to a finite, physical, subjective creature's sense of objectivity to show that objectivity is transcendent and grounded in a Being called God.
You might want to rephrase this. As it is, it seems to be rather confused. What sense of finite and subjective are you using here? What do you mean by "sense of objectivity?" Certainly the theist's conclusion is not that all objectivity is dependent on God. |
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| Shiloh |
| Posted 05/06/11 at 01:34 PM | Reply with quote #8 |
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Quote: Originally Posted by silentmattQuote: If anything the 'obligation' is to reason and consistency with ones own humanity - i.e. you do not want to be killed - killing is painful and forceful - not good - me don't like - therefore others likewise feel the same.
Quote: I don't see the obligation here to be reasonable and consistent. Perhaps you might say that I am forced into it, or influenced to be like that by my society and my biology, but none of these really entails any sort of obligation to go along with these things. This is why I put the word in quotes - there is no obligation as you envision it. Humans act according to basic categories of the mind - which are quite ubiquitous apart from a few outliers. There are reasonable explanations, apart from the need to invoke a God, as to why humanity says 'it is ''wrong'' to kill' and other similar things. You must ask yourself why do they have this ubiquitous sense regarding these few moral principles? Coming up with a philosophical argument that has its definitions airtight does not answers this.
Quote: Yet nothing obligates one to do it - it just comports with reason and consistency to do so as well as the fact that to do so creates better environments for all those within a particular social sphere - many things have shown that social co-operation benefits both the individual as well as the group - both thrive.
Quote: So, since there is no obligation to act reasonably, you think that someone who acts unreasonably- say a serial killer, or a terrorist- is not committing evil when he does so? The problem is not that I can not attribute an act to being 'evil' (which probably has another God-necessitating definition) - the problem is that you claim objective morals and have not been able to demonstrates their existence and therefore the obligation to begin with. This is just an emotional appeal. Quote: Once again though there is no ultimate obligation and yet we could very well say that it is wrong, in many senses, other than it violating some external transcendent code from an eternal Being. Just because we cannot say it in your sense does not mean there is an equality among human actions or that we cannot arrive at some objectivity about what is the best way for individuals and society to act.
Quote: You haven't made your case very well that this could be the case. It seems to me that calling "my" morality "ultimate" is just to assume that there is such a thing as "non-ultimate" standards of morality which could give rise to moral value or obligation. But you've got no resources to support this assumption, it seems to me. How does one justify the moral value of different courses of action at all, on atheism? But this is the case - it is how humans act. It is why we say that certain things are wrong. It is why it is so ubiquitous - because the human mind is structured in a certain way. Stating that there are objective morals, without demonstrating that to be so, does not help in justifying anything on theism since your code, found in the Bible, does not anticipate all the varied circumstances one would find themselves in that would give rise to an exception to anyone of your rules. Once again, I am not trying to give an account of obligation in the sense you are using it. Why do I need to have some sort of external obligation pressing in upon me? Do you think that by believing in this obligation that this will keep people from acting in a certain way? Plenty of people do not want to murder, steal, or rape apart from this belief. So what if we cannot say 'but you have an ''obligation'' not to.' Why don't I want to - because that is who I am as a human - not because I am afraid of hell or not being able to say that some action was wrong according to some external code but based upon principles of the ubiquitous nature and moral sense in humanity.
Quote: The grounding could very well be ourselves - it is grounded in human ontology.
Quote: Really, now. So humans are authoritative prescribers for moral law? Does that mean that anything that anyone prescribes is moral? Yes, welcome to reality and human history. Now let's explore this a bit. No one is saying that we do not misjudge or violate our consciences regarding these ubiquitous sentiments about what is wrong or right - even Hitler had to dehumanize in order to justify his desire to go against what he knew he himself would not want as a human being. But how do we get people to understand that acting in certain ways is more beneficial to themselves and others rather than acting in other ways? The only way is through reason and knowledge about ourselves. Like I said before, just because there is no obligation does not mean we have to say that all actions are morally equivalent. We know on many levels what humans desire and seek out. We know that just on a purely utilitarian economic level that it is better for both the individual as well as the group to socially co-operate which then becomes the foundation for acquiring more of what we each desire and want rather than not co-operating. Just the fact that humans seeks to remove uneasiness in all things gives rise to desired actions that promote these ends. Now add to this the fact that the mind has some competing impulses - the more reasoned oriented centers versus the more empathetic centers (I am sure there are other factors at play as well). A person must then calculate and weigh these competing impulses when making decisions about what action to take. Damage to these parts of the brain or induced stimulus to them reduce or create moral sentiments. It is becoming more and more clear that our moral sense of what is wrong and right (what is desired and avoided) is Brain Centered and based on collective knowledge of what works and what does not in allowing people to acquire these desires without negating them for others. Our actions do not just have to matter for eternity but the here and now and to say that they do not carry over to eternity does not diminish the value of certain actions for the here and now. Nor does it mean that we can not say that certain actions are more beneficial to us as a species and as individuals.
Quote: Studying why people act and what they tend to act for and avoid and how they make choices towards those desires to act, the chemical processes behind it, the physical nature of pain avoidance, the basic conceptual categories of the mind - cause and effect, force dynamics, intention, abstraction, etc. give rise to other concepts like responsibility and an objectification of such basic wants and desires and is once again only human and natural.
Quote: Yeah, but it cannot give rise to obligations to value those wants or act on them. It can give an account of responsibility, and the feeling of being responsible, but not of the obligation to go along with that feeling and act on it. At the very best, such explanations explain away our moral intuitions, and only nihilism could be true. Once again no need for an external obligation.
Quote: Thankfully, I don't think that such arguments hold water. We could come up with a similar sort of just-so story about the development of perception, logic and mathematics, and indeed perhaps we could trace all of these faculties to occurrences in the brain. But that doesn't mean that our perception, logical or mathematical faculties are not veridical, and neither should it mean that our moral senses are not veridical. We can disagree that veridical just means what is real. It does not have to correspond to some transcendent code for them to be veridical. The basis for their reality is in the structure and chemical aspects of the brain - just as real as language or emotions. There is no objective emotional value or some transcendent language code - is there? Yet despite all languages having manifold differences at certain levels there are ubiquitous aspects of language across all languages - why - not because of some transcendent code? Our moral sentiments are similarly built - some are so basic to who we our and how we think that they tend to be ubiquitous across time and culture. Quote: This is way more insightful and reasonable to conclude than relying on a deductive argument that has to appeal to a finite, physical, subjective creature's sense of objectivity to show that objectivity is transcendent and grounded in a Being called God.
Quote: You might want to rephrase this. As it is, it seems to be rather confused. What sense of finite and subjective are you using here? What do you mean by "sense of objectivity?" Certainly the theist's conclusion is not that all objectivity is dependent on God. Sorry for the confusion. Let me explain. In Craig's argument he just states that Objective morals exist in premise #2. But how does he go about demonstrating this? He usually will appeal to humanities sense of objectification - this is what I mean in regard to finite and subjective - the minds of these individuals. Which of course his objectivity must not include. He will also appeal to the emotions by asking how can we say something is wrong or derive an obligation - just as you have - as if to say that if we can not then all actions are equal and we can not arrive at some sort of understanding that certain actions are more and less beneficial to us as individuals and as a group. There does not have to be an obligation for us to arrive at such facts. It really is a matter of persuasion based on reason and knowledge about ourselves and what is best needed to, as Harris says, insure human well-being. You have not demonstrated that these objectives exist and therefore have not shown any need for obligation. Just appealing to emotions based on some undesired conclusion - no obligation to do something - then we are not going to want to or do 'good' is ridiculous. Most people understand that what they want for themsleves others do to - that alone gives rise to moral rules that make sense to us and seem to be objective because they are built upon core concepts in the mind that are extended to all other minds like our own. I do not see any need for and eternal objective obligation in order to do these things or justify them and you have not shown otherwise. |
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| silentmatt |
| Posted 05/06/11 at 02:52 PM | Reply with quote #9 |
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Quote: This is why I put the word in quotes - there is no obligation as you envision it.
It seems, given your proposed alternatives, that there is no sort of obligation at all.
Quote: There are reasonable explanations, apart from the need to invoke a God, as to why humanity says 'it is ''wrong'' to kill' and other similar things.
Of course there are. There are reasonable explanations apart from the need to invoke laws of logic or objective mathematical truths for why we reason logically and mathematically the way we do. But that doesn't mean there are no such truths, or that we can coherently argue that such truths don't exist. So, simply having such explanations does not and cannot count as evidence against the apparent veridicality of our moral intuitions.
Also, the question of definition and the grounding of moral values is distinct from the question of how we come to our moral conclusions. The question of moral ontology is not about the grounding of our moral opinions, but of moral truths, which those opinions are purportedly about.
Quote: The problem is not that I can not attribute an act to being 'evil' (which probably has another God-necessitating definition) - the problem is that you claim objective morals and have not been able to demonstrates their existence and therefore the obligation to begin with. This is just an emotional appeal.
No, it's not an emotional appeal. The point was that if your moral system cannot even produce the conclusion that any acts- even such uncontroversially evil acts- are evil, then it cannot form a grounding for moral truth at all, and is not in fact any sort of grounding for moral truth. What I think you are providing is an alternative account of our moral faculties that you think somehow undermines the apparent veridicality of those faculties.
If you think that the concept of "evil" requires the truth of theism in order to be instantiated, You in fact seem to assent to Craig's first premise- that, unless God exists, objective moral truths exist. You simply do not believe that there is evidence for his second premise- that objective moral truths exist.
Quote: Stating that there are objective morals, without demonstrating that to be so, does not help in justifying anything on theism since your code, found in the Bible, does not anticipate all the varied circumstances one would find themselves in that would give rise to an exception to anyone of your rules.
What makes you think that theists rely exclusively on special revelation for morality?
Quote: is why we say that certain things are wrong. It is why it is so ubiquitous - because the human mind is structured in a certain way.
Unless calling something "wrong" can be a true statement, explaining why we say something is wrong can't provide a grounding for moral truths.
Quote: Once again, I am not trying to give an account of obligation in the sense you are using it. Why do I need to have some sort of external obligation pressing in upon me?
In what sense, then, are you arguing for obligations at all? If you're not, how can you claim to be giving an alternative account of moral ontology? Are you arguing for nihilism?
Quote: Do you think that by believing in this obligation that this will keep people from acting in a certain way? Plenty of people do not want to murder, steal, or rape apart from this belief. So what if we cannot say 'but you have an ''obligation'' not to.'
Then we cannot say that murder, stealing, or rape is evil or wrong, and do not have any justification for punishing them. Of course, we could punish them anyway, because we want to and we can. We could tie our punishments to behaviours that reduce human wellbeing, but we're no more obligated to do this than to tie them to whether one wears glasses or not, so punishment ultimately boils down to what the powerful want. You're reducing moral law to coercive force and social pressure, the direction of which is determined by human whim, and that seems to fly in the face of moral experience.
Quote: Why don't I want to - because that is who I am as a human - not because I am afraid of hell or not being able to say that some action was wrong according to some external code but based upon principles of the ubiquitous nature and moral sense in humanity.
But, on your view, the human moral sense cannot give rise to actual obligations, and neither does the ubiquity of that sense. In that case, you can't claim that your human nature is morally significant, or a foundation upon which to build a moral law. Moral law is in fact a fiction to which no one has any real obligations. If, then, the point is not to show that you are somehow able to be moral on the atheistic view, why bring up what you want or don't want? It seems irrelevant.
Quote: Yes, welcome to reality and human history. Now let's explore this a bit. No one is saying that we do not misjudge or violate our consciences regarding these ubiquitous sentiments about what is wrong or right - even Hitler had to dehumanize in order to justify his desire to go against what he knew he himself would not want as a human being. But how do we get people to understand that acting in certain ways is more beneficial to themselves and others rather than acting in other ways? The only way is through reason and knowledge about ourselves. Like I said before, just because there is no obligation does not mean we have to say that all actions are morally equivalent. We know on many levels what humans desire and seek out. We know that just on a purely utilitarian economic level that it is better for both the individual as well as the group to socially co-operate which then becomes the foundation for acquiring more of what we each desire and want rather than not co-operating. Just the fact that humans seeks to remove uneasiness in all things gives rise to desired actions that promote these ends.
I'm not sure that this is relevant. If there is no obligation to remove suffering and unease, then the fact that we do remove suffering and unease, and have motivations for doing so doesn't entail that following those motivations is good, or that going with other motivations- say, to cause suffering for personal gain- is evil. What you've described here is merely the fact of what we do, and from this mass it doesn't follow that any of what is done is what ought to be done.
Quote: Now add to this the fact that the mind has some competing impulses - the more reasoned oriented centers versus the more empathetic centers (I am sure there are other factors at play as well). A person must then calculate and weigh these competing impulses when making decisions about what action to take. Damage to these parts of the brain or induced stimulus to them reduce or create moral sentiments. It is becoming more and more clear that our moral sense of what is wrong and right (what is desired and avoided) is Brain Centered and based on collective knowledge of what works and what does not in allowing people to acquire these desires without negating them for others.
That moral senses are in some sense grounded in the brain is, of course, undeniable. That doesn't mean that they're non-veridical, and don't report moral truths. Sufficient brain damage can cause malfunctions of one's rational faculty, or one's perceptive faculty, but that doesn't mean that therefore the laws of logic are not real, or that the external world which is perceived does not exist. Our capability of assessing what will happen given a certain course of action is not relevant to our assessment of what ought to happen. We might calculate that a given course of action will result in a decrease in another's suffering, for example, and it may be true that we also know that we want to decrease another's suffering. However, it also seems true that we ought to decrease another's suffering, even if we did not want to, and that is a different kind of judgement from the former two.
Quote: Our actions do not just have to matter for eternity but the here and now and to say that they do not carry over to eternity does not diminish the value of certain actions for the here and now. Nor does it mean that we can not say that certain actions are more beneficial to us as a species and as individuals.
The moral argument is perfectly compatible with monotheisms that do not provide for eternity, like that of the ancient Israelites, who had no concept of heaven and hardly a concept of Hell. This is because moral facts, on the theistic view, are grounded in the authority of God, not in the reward or punishment God metes out. On the theistic view, Heaven is just gravy, and Hell is deserved punishment, but neither is essential to God's moral authority.
Saying that there is no God absolutely diminishes the value of actions in the here and now, for there is no standard by which we may call beneficient actions better than detrimental actions. Pol Pot is in fact no worse a human being than St Francis of Assisi, if God does not exist. If all the world esteemed the former instead of the latter, if God does not exist, the world would not be wrong to do so.
Quote: Once again no need for an external obligation.
I'm not sure why you think we can make a distinction between an external obligation and an "internal" obligation. The difference between the two seems to be the difference between a real apple and an imaginary apple. The imaginary apple is not a kind of apple, and if only imaginary apples existed, apples would not exist. Similarly, a "non-external" obligation is not really any sort of obligation, so if you deny the existence of external obligations, you simply deny that obligations exist, which is nihilism.
Quote: It does not have to correspond to some transcendent code for them to be veridical. The basis for their reality is in the structure and chemical aspects of the brain - just as real as language or emotions. There is no objective emotional value or some transcendent language code - is there?
The moral sense does have to correspond to some external moral truth, since in order for there to be moral facts at all, moral obligations, and necessary, authoritative moral prescriptions, must exist. If no such things exist, then we do not in fact have the moral obligations we think we have to do or refrain from what is prescribed by our consciences, and therefore our consciences are mistaken about the existence of such moral truths, and our moral faculties would be non-veridical.
Language or emotion does not, on the other hand, have to correspond to some external reality in order to truly exist. Neither language nor emotion can be veridical, since neither is a truth-oriented faculty. It is certainly a veridical intuition that both language and emotion exist, just as it's a veridical intuition that a moral sense exists. However, that doesn't mean that the moral sense is equivalent in all relevant respects.
The moral sense purports to give us moral truth, which neither emotion nor language purport to do, and that's a relevant feature because a ubiquitous, purportedly truth-giving faculty needs to be seriously considered alongside other ubiquitous, truth-giving faculties like reason and perception. It does not bear comparing with the mere ubiquity of language or emotion.
Quote: In Craig's argument he just states that Objective morals exist in premise #2. But how does he go about demonstrating this? He usually will appeal to humanities sense of objectification - this is what I mean in regard to finite and subjective - the minds of these individuals. Which of course his objectivity must not include. He will also appeal to the emotions by asking how can we say something is wrong or derive an obligation - just as you have - as if to say that if we can not then all actions are equal and we can not arrive at some sort of understanding that certain actions are more and less beneficial to us as individuals and as a group. There does not have to be an obligation for us to arrive at such facts. It really is a matter of persuasion based on reason and knowledge about ourselves and what is best needed to, as Harris says, insure human well-being.
Humanity's "sense of what is objectively true" applies to all intuitions and faculties, not just moral ones. It's special pleading to say that, in the case of morality, our intuition about its objectivity is wrong, whereas, in the case of logic and mathematics, our intuition about its objectivity is right. Doubting that our sense of the objective and the subjective is veridical undermines all knowledge and argument, leading to total epistemic collapse, which is why Craig is quite right to regard it as reliable.
Harris, in fact, does not dispute our ability to take moral axioms as properly basic. When confronted with the justification for why he thought wellbeing ought to be promoted, he simply said that it seemed to be basically true, like mathematical and logical truths are true. And on this, I agree with him.
Craig's "appeal to emotions" is not such a thing but rather an appeal to the moral faculty that we all have. We just observe that some things ought to be done, and others ought not be done. It's easy to talk about abstractions, but when the case is shoved under one's nose one perceives the moral facts of the case just as one perceives the external world.
It seems certainly true that if God does not exist then all actions are morally equivalent- none of them have moral value or reprehensibility. It may be true that some actions are beneficial and others detrimental, if "beneficial" is defined as some pattern of functioning and "detrimental" another, but neither beneficial nor detrimental would bear any value as standards for moral judgement.
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| Shiloh |
| Posted 05/06/11 at 05:32 PM | Reply with quote #10 |
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Then all you have is a coherent argument. That's it. It does not demonstrate that Objective Morals exist other than one of the premises stating it to be so.
Now unless you demonstrate that Objective Moral Values exist then there is no reason why we should be able to say anyone has an obligation to this standard and to act in a certain way. I do not feel the Deductive argument helps me to arrive at that conclusion. I may take it on faith that this is what needs to exist but then why all the apologetics as if to show
objective veridical morals and obligations founded in God? Because as you and others say faith is not blind but based on knowledge of certain claimed facts. Well this leads to an epistemological nightmare in establishing the premise that objective morals exist.
I am just showing that certain studies and collective knowledge have shown us, in an objective sense, according to the definition set forth prior, that certain actions are more beneficial than others and that only through persuasion by reason can we structure society to guide us according to these basic principles. Those two things are just as good at getting people to act as the idea or concepts of a God and Objective morals that are punishable in hell if violated.
Our moral sense may perceive certain actions as violating this sense just like we perceive the external world as you said - but they do not perceive the laws just as we do not perceive the laws of physics - we discover them. Morals seem to be epiphenomena of the mind. I am not saying I agree with everything along these lines - just the direction in which it is pointing.
Here is a little article (it actually mentions Craig) you might find interesting http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/non-theistic-objective-morality/
Until you demonstrate that they exist I see no justification to obligate anyone to do anything.
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| silentmatt |
| Posted 05/06/11 at 08:16 PM | Reply with quote #11 |
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Quote: Now unless you demonstrate that Objective Moral Values exist then there is no reason why we should be able to say anyone has an obligation to this standard and to act in a certain way. I do not feel the Deductive argument helps me to arrive at that conclusion. I may take it on faith that this is what needs to exist but then why all the apologetics as if to show
objective veridical morals and obligations founded in God? Because as you and others say faith is not blind but based on knowledge of certain claimed facts. Well this leads to an epistemological nightmare in establishing the premise that objective morals exist.
Actually, I'd compare it to waking up from an epistemological nightmare, since straight thinking on this issue can really sort out whether our faculties in general are trustworthy or not. I think it can be demonstrated that the person who lacks a moral faculty is truly suffering from a cognitive malfunction, and that it is the person who doesn't believe his conscience who is living a lie.
If we can establish that it is rationally necessary to treat our moral sense as veridical, it follows that it is rationally necessary to accept that moral laws exist. And we can do this. Any reason which could cause us to doubt the veridicality of our moral faculties also causes us to doubt the veridicality of our other faculties, including the faculty of logic. Since this is the case, any argument against the veridicality of our moral faculties ultimately undermines the very logic that it uses to make its point, it must be irrational to argue for the non-veridicality of our moral faculties. A byproduct of this argument is the conclusive defeat of solipsism and total skepticism, since we can see why it is irrational to distrust our perception of the external world, that the external world exists and is as we see it.
Since our moral sense appears to be veridical, and no argument against it can exist which is not self-defeating, we are therefore rationally required to believe that our moral sense is veridical, and therefore that objective moral laws exist.
I think that the argument above for premise 2 is binding upon anybody with a moral sense, which is pretty much everybody, and provides good evidence even to those with no such faculty. Even the psychopath, who cannot perceive moral truth, can at least hear the testimony of the rest of society like a blind man hears the testimony of the sighted, and rationally conclude that such a thing as a moral law exists.
Quote: I am just showing that certain studies and collective knowledge have shown us, in an objective sense, according to the definition set forth prior, that certain actions are more beneficial than others and that only through persuasion by reason can we structure society to guide us according to these basic principles.
Firstly, that science can show us better ways of doing things in general is not in dispute. Certainly, we can always find better ways to accomplish certain moral aims, and our knowledge of the material facts can influence which moral facts we can bring to bear, since all moral laws apply to particular material facts, and do not apply if the material facts are found to be different that what they were supposed to be.
As to the second contention, I am not saying that morality is not susceptible to rational discourse! It would be like saying that, since my perception of the physical world is a basic faculty, that there cannot be rational discussions about the physical world that refine and even contradict our naive conclusions based on that perception! That would certainly be false. I am a big fan of moral discourse, which aims to break down a moral position into its component parts, and weighs them against each other and draws out all the implications of that view for consistency with other ethical principles, and also to investigate the material facts of the matter to determine whether or not a given moral law applies.
Hah. I actually have the article by Wielenberg which this article references. That was the last time I truly had to think hard about the success of the moral argument, but in the end I don't think the kind of moral Platonism Wielenberg (and this article!) advocates can work. The reason is the prescriptive quality of moral laws, which necessitates the existence of a prescriber. Abstract entities cannot prescribe, and so cannot be the source of the moral law. In order for there to be authoritative, necessarily existent prescriptions, which is what the moral law is, there must exist an authoritative, necessarily existent prescriber. |
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| Shiloh |
| Posted 05/06/11 at 10:42 PM | Reply with quote #12 |
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It seems then that we or you are back to the idea of what is or can be veridical - I do not think that for something to be veridical that it has to correspond to something transcendent like God - the term does not require this at all. You and another poster went at this on another thread and I think it once again comes down to these definitions and the strength of the 'links' between the senses and the source of that phenomena. Obviously, what I am saying can not be true in the sense that you and Craig use according to your definitions of 'objective' and 'ought' as being transcendent in the nature of God. I do not think we can arrive at that nor can you demonstrate it. I did give other definitions for both terms in certain contexts.
In your framework what is the link between these objective morals and our sense of them? How are we so intertwined and linked with this sense if it is not to be at some level a phenomena of the mind? You cannot just control the terminology and give me a nice deductive argument and think that you have demonstrated their existence or given reasons for their linkage to our senses by doing so.
If I say that it is wrong to rape someone I can say that it veridical because this corresponds to the reality that people shun rape - they avoid forceful sexual assaults - it is the reality of who we are - yes it is descriptive not prescriptive reality. 'Wrong' in this sense is not according to your definition which necessitates transcendence. It is just a metaphor for basic categories of the mind and the external world that impinges upon our existence - cause and effect, force dynamics, and pain and pleasure all govern the statement that it is 'wrong' to rape - the mind repels it because of how it is organized to deal with and survive in the physical world. But that is just the point we are not trying to account for this sense by linking it to some transcendent entity in order to give it a truthful and useful statement that would say that you are obligated or that you 'ought to' in the sense of categorical statement. But we can appeal to reason and the human condition to say that such action is wrong - it violates your own sense of what is desired and what is avoided. By acting contrary your own senses you are acting irrational and contradictory to your own ontology. Yes, there are people who lack this but they are outliers and we deal with them accordingly.
Anyway, so you liked the article? Here is another interesting article by Steven Pinker enjoy! http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-t.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2
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| silentmatt |
| Posted 05/06/11 at 11:16 PM | Reply with quote #13 |
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Quote: It seems then that we or you are back to the idea of what is or can be veridical - I do not think that for something to be veridical that it has to correspond to something transcendent like God - the term does not require this at all.
It does require something external to us to be veridical. The intuition that there are moral obligations, values and duties requires that values and duties actually exist. Values and duties cannot be the product of human fiat, and this is obvious, since human fiat never entails any obligations whatever, except where it borrows from existent values and duties.
The sense that I consider veridical- the sense that we have of moral truth, is distinct from the sense we have that we have a sense of moral truth. The latter can certainly be veridical without there being an objective referent for the former, but the former can only be veridical if objective moral values and duties truly do exist.
We can return to my apple illustration. My intuition that I have an intuition about the existence of an apple is of course veridical, and its veridicality does not depend on whether an apple actually exists or not. However, my intuition that an apple actually does exist is only veridical if an apple actually does exist. So, if I do have a veridical intuition that an apple exists, the apple must exist. My intuition that I have an intuition that an apple exists cannot on its own inform my actions with respect to the apple, unless my intuition that the apple exists is veridical. Replace "apple" with "moral law," and you see why I think that, because we cannot rationally believe our moral sense to be non-veridical itself, we cannot rationally disbelieve in objective morality, if we have a moral sense.
Quote: Obviously, what I am saying can not be true in the sense that you and Craig use according to your definitions of 'objective' and 'ought' as being transcendent in the nature of God. I do not think we can arrive at that nor can you demonstrate it. I did give other definitions for both terms in certain contexts.
The problem is that your view is indistinguishable from nihilism. Wielenberg's moral platonism, at least, is indeed distinguishable from nihilism, if not, in my view, ultimately successful.
Quote: In your framework what is the link between these objective morals and our sense of them?
I'm not sure, to be honest. What is the link between my mathematical sense and mathematical truths? Between my logical sense and logical truths? I don't think I need to give an account of this link, any more than I need to give an account of how my subjective experience of perception is linked to my physical brain to know that my subjective experience of perception corresponds to reality.
Quote: If I say that it is wrong to rape someone I can say that it veridical because this corresponds to the reality that people shun rape - they avoid forceful sexual assaults - it is the reality of who we are - yes it is descriptive not prescriptive reality.
On your view, wrongness doesn't entail an obligation to avoid rape. That's a drastic redefinition of wrongness from the common usage, is indistinguishable from nihilism, and it goes against moral experience. Surely we observe that there is indeed an obligation to refrain from rape, and to condemn and punish it when it does happen. That's just part and parcel of having a conscience.
Quote: It is just a metaphor for basic categories of the mind and the external world that impinges upon our existence - cause and effect, force dynamics, and pain and pleasure all govern the statement that it is 'wrong' to rape - the mind repels it because of how it is organized to deal with and survive in the physical world.
This simply account simply assumes that the moral obligations we observe are illusions created by our strong dislike of rape and other such things. But why believe it to be an illusion? I don't think there are good arguments for this belief, and indeed there cannot be, since any such arguments equally undermine our belief in the external world and more importantly in the very laws of logic that govern reasoning. For example, if we theorize that our sense of moral reality is merely a non-veridical illusion brought on by adaptive neurology, we must for consistency's sake say that our sense of logical necessity is likewise an illusion brought on by adaptive neurology, because we've got the same grounds for thinking the latter as the former. However, if logic itself is an illusion by this argument, the argument becomes fatally self-undermining.
Quote: But we can appeal to reason and the human condition to say that such action is wrong - it violates your own sense of what is desired and what is avoided. By acting contrary your own senses you are acting irrational and contradictory to your own ontology.
If there's no obligation to follow my sense, then I can't call anything wrong, since no obligations are violated in opposing me. Disagreeing about the desirability of rape is no different in terms of moral significance from disagreeing about the desirability of cheese, it seems to me, on your view.
Further, if there's no obligation to act rational or to be consistent with my own "ontology" (I am pretty sure this is a misuse of the word), then there's no real moral wrongness in acting irrationally.
Quote: Yes, there are people who lack this but they are outliers and we deal with them accordingly.
On your view, it seems that such punishments are no more justified than the crimes that the psychopath commits.
As to that article by Pinker, I enjoyed it considerably less than the one which referenced Wielenberg's work. His analysis of the moral instinct is interesting, but his suggestions about replacing prescription and obligation with if-thens is still nothing but nihilism, since there would really be nothing wrong with those who opt to be irrational or unreasonable. Also, his flippant and laughably crude dismissal of divine command ethics via Euthyphro was particularly disappointing. |
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| Shiloh |
| Posted 05/07/11 at 12:03 AM | Reply with quote #14 |
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Then please demonstrate that there exist this Veridical Objective Moral Apple. The VOMA 
I do not think we do have a sense of a Moral Law - we have a sense of what we don't like and do like. We then ascribe moral language to these actions and states of existence which we objectify based on our reasoning of similar minds. We do not and have not discovered the Moral Laws as in physics or logic. That is why I think the moral sense are along the lines of epiphenomena. I in no way think about Objective Laws of Morality when I sense something to be wrong - it is subjectivity objectified and covered over with cultural language and responsibility. Like I said where is this link in your framework?
By the way I have not come to any hard and fast conclusion about Nihilism or Wielenberg's ideas. I am just going in these directions - who knows where I will end up. I just do not see the demonstration of this apple and therefore no justification for an obligation along the lines you suggest. Actually the moral sense is probably not as foundational as the logical mind. We may logically discern cause and effect in regard to human action and from there ascribe responsibility in some sense but to say that it corresponds to a LAW that says it is wrong is not established it is just another step up in talking about our sensibilities and categorizing those actions - from there it is not far to have consensus and punishment for such actions.
Anyway, I will read your next post (if it is today) but I will not be able to respond after that for awhile - I do appreciate your thoughts and do consider them respectfully - thanks for the insights. I may come back to it but after a stretch it does sort of loose its grip.
Peace.
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| silentmatt |
| Posted 05/07/11 at 12:55 AM | Reply with quote #15 |
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Quote: Then please demonstrate that there exist this Veridical Objective Moral Apple
Just something to clear up: only faculties can be veridical. It doesn't make sense to say that an apple is veridical, only that the faculty by which we perceive the apple is veridical.
Quote: I do not think we do have a sense of a Moral Law - we have a sense of what we don't like and do like.
It's obvious that when people call something good or evil, right or wrong, they don't simply mean that they like or dislike it. They really see these things as good and evil, right and wrong. When someone perceives something to be wrong, they certainly wouldn't mean that they simply dislike it. They think that people have obligations not to do that thing. The moral sense cannot be a mere statement of preference. Even if it's false, it is an illusion with a different content than mere preference.
Quote: We then ascribe moral language to these actions and states of existence which we objectify based on our reasoning of similar minds. We do not and have not discovered the Moral Laws as in physics or logic.
This seems to me to be a sort of post-hoc rationalization. Sure, if moral laws do not exist, then our perception of it must be the result of ascribing moral language to these actions and states of existence- you think we're just deluding ourselves about whether there is such a thing as the moral obligations that moral language talks about as applying to actions or states of affairs.
However, as I have argued before, it seems to be special pleading to apply such reasoning to moral obligations, and not to other faculties. Consistently applied, we see that this kind of argument is ultimately self-defeating. Perhaps the logical relations we observe and conceive of are not real, only a feature of our cognitive structure. Perhaps the external world which we talk bout as existing is merely an illusion, a subjective phenomenon externalized as real. Such argument, as you can see, fatally undermines our ability to make arguments in general, and so are irrational to make.
Furthermore, even if our moral instincts are the result of ascribing moral language to things, that doesn't mean that those instincts are not nonetheless veridical, or not likely to be veridical. After all, if a moral law and thus a moral God truly exists, it's pretty likely that we'd come to know that law, since a moral God would communicate His will to us. Unless we assume without justification that our desires cannot also correspond to genuine moral truth, there's no reason to suppose that simply because our moral knowledge arises from deep-seated desires that that moral knowledge is non-veridical.
Quote: That is why I think the moral sense are along the lines of epiphenomena. I in no way think about Objective Laws of Morality when I sense something to be wrong - it is subjectivity objectified and covered over with cultural language and responsibility.
When you sense something to be wrong, surely you must think that there is an obligation not to do something. At the very least, you must understand the meaning of "wrong" and apply it to a situation in order to perceive a situation as wrong. Of course, it could be that you don't really perceive anything as wrong, and only have preferences one way or another, but that seems quite unlikely.
Quote: I just do not see the demonstration of this apple and therefore no justification for an obligation along the lines you suggest.
The existence of apples is demonstrated by our perception of them. The existence of a particular moral law is, similarly, demonstrated by our perception of it. It may be, in either case, that the perception is an illusion, but the only way that our intuitions about the existence of particular material or moral objects could be shown to be false would be still more strongly established intuitions about the material and moral worlds. To argue that the body of truths about the material world or about morality don't exist in fact is very difficult, since all such arguments seem to be fatally self-undermining.
Quote: Quote: Actually the moral sense is probably not as foundational as the logical mind. We may logically discern cause and effect in regard to human action and from there ascribe responsibility in some sense but to say that it corresponds to a LAW that says it is wrong is not established it is just another step up in talking about our sensibilities and categorizing those actions [/QUOTE]
To say this is just to say that our perception of moral law is not an extension of our perception of logical relations, and I would agree with you. That doesn't mean it's any less basically true. For example, most philosophers today agree that mathematics doesn't reduce to logic, but that doesn't mean our intuitions about numbers and such are any less basic than our intuitions about logic.
If I might suggest a good lecture you could listen to on this topic when you've got a spare couple of hours, here's Peter S. Williams on the moral argument for the existence of God, and he lays things out very nice and clear.
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