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Fhbradley
Posted 06/09/12 Reply with quote  #1 
Hi. Philosophers of language argue that definite descriptions do not have the same referent in every possible world. For example, "The man that won the election in 2008" is not necessarily identical with Barack Obama. My question is, what then about the definite description "The cause of the universe"? If definite descriptions do not have the same referent in every possible world, then there is some possible world where the cause of the universe was not God. Does this refute God's existence? Does God have to be the cause of the universe in every possible world? I think it's safe to think so. That's because there would be a greater conceivable being than him, namely one that causes every possible world.
emailestthoume
Posted 06/09/12 Reply with quote  #2 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Fhbradley
Hi. Philosophers of language argue that definite descriptions do not have the same referent in every possible world. 

I am no philosopher of language, but I am not sure this is the case. Imagine a definite description: a necessary being. A necessary being would either exist in all possible worlds or none. However, your only option is to say that this necessary being exists in one possible world, none, or all. However, this is a definition description, so it seems to me that it cannot be all, and it cannot be none, (since it is possible that a necessary being exists… and perhaps according to your statement above... notice I didn't mention cause of the universe), and it cannot be only 1 for then the concept of a necessary being would not be satisfied (as a necessary being exists in all possible worlds). Since we have found a contradiction, your logic would be shown to be flawed.

And if my argument above fails I still fail to see why a definite description must not have the same referent in all possible worlds. It seems to apriori exclude God… perhaps this is because this conclusion comes with some naturalistic presuppositions. (perhaps everything natural follows this rule… however, God is totally other so it shouldn't be suprising if he doesn't)
MorleyMcMorson
Posted 06/09/12 Reply with quote  #3 
email,

That's not a definite description as far as I know.  The key word being 'definite'.  'A' is the indefinite article in English, 'the' is the definite article.  Not saying your point can't be fixed, but from what I understand about definite descriptions your point is at least slightly off.

Fh,

I don't think it's true that definite descriptions necessarily have different referents in every possible world.  The reason it's that way for most things is that most things are contingent and variable.  This doesn't mean, of course, that everything is.  And theists, of course, would not accept this as being true of God or his causation of the universe (should there be one).  In any universe where there is a universe, 'the cause of the universe' picks out God.
Godboy
Posted 06/10/12 Reply with quote  #4 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Fhbradley
Hi. Philosophers of language argue that definite descriptions do not have the same referent in every possible world. For example, "The man that won the election in 2008" is not necessarily identical with Barack Obama. My question is, what then about the definite description "The cause of the universe"? If definite descriptions do not have the same referent in every possible world, then there is some possible world where the cause of the universe was not God. Does this refute God's existence? Does God have to be the cause of the universe in every possible world? I think it's safe to think so. That's because there would be a greater conceivable being than him, namely one that causes every possible world.

Sometimes a definite description can have only one referent, other times not.  For example, if W = our particular world, then "The 44th US President in W" can only stand for one thing, no matter what world the expression is used in.  On the other hand, you are correct that "The 44th US President" can have a different referent in some other possible world.

"Creator of the universe" isn't necessarily a definite description of God; however, that's not an argument against His existence, but rather it's just to say that He didn't necessarily create the universe.  And indeed, you can believe that God is a necessary being (and thus existent) without believing that it was necessary for Him to create the universe.
Fhbradley
Posted 06/10/12 Reply with quote  #5 
Email,
As Morley pointed out, any expression with the word 'a' in it is not a definite description, but rather it is an indefinite description (as Russell called them). Definite descriptions are under the form 'the so-and-so' or 'the x such that Fx'. 

Morley,
I think the problem with saying a definite description necessarily refers to some object rigidly is that it requires a tremendous metaphysical commitment, one that seems certainly false. If you say some person S is identical with some definite description D, you're saying,

Necessarily, person S has property P. 

(since definite descriptions give informational content about their referent in contrast with propers names, which are empty of content). 

For instance, if you say 

(1) Necessarily, Neil Armstrong is identical with the first man that walked on the moon. 

It must be the case that, 

(1') Necessarily, Neil Armstrong has the property of being the first man to walk on the moon.

This seems metaphysically implausible. Are we really going to contend that it's impossible that Neil Armstrong wasn't the first man to walk on the moon? It seems certain that (2) is true.

(2) Possibly, Neil Armstrong did not walk on the moon.

But if (2) is true, if follows that both (1) and (1') are false. 



Godboy,
Sure, you can believe God is a necessary being without believing that it was necessary for Him to be the cause of the universe, but is it true? I think the main problem is that the Theist is committed to (3)

(3) Possibly, the world exists, and God is not the cause of the world.

Prima facie, this doesn't seem compatible with Theism. The reason why is that it entails that the world could exist without God. This, I maintain, is incompatible with God's being the greatest conceivable being. I could imagine a greater conceivable being which is such that the world couldn't possibly exist without Him.
Godboy
Posted 06/10/12 Reply with quote  #6 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Fhbradley
Godboy,
Sure, you can believe God is a necessary being without believing that it was necessary for Him to be the cause of the universe, but is it true? I think the main problem is that the Theist is committed to (1)

(1) Possibly, the world exists, and God is not the cause of the world.

Prima facie, this doesn't seem compatible with Theism. The reason why is that it entails that (1') the world could exist without God. This, I maintain, is incompatible with God's being the greatest conceivable being. I could imagine a greater conceivable being which is such that (1'') the world couldn't possibly exist without Him.

Your mistake is the jump from (1) to (1').  It's possible that God exists, but that the universe was created by something other than God; this does not entail that it's possible that God doesn't exist.  Moreover, affirming (1'') is not necessarily inconsistent with affirming that God didn't create the universe; as the first cause, nothing could possibly exist without God, but that doesn't mean that God is the proximate cause of everything that exists.
hatsoff
Posted 06/10/12 Reply with quote  #7 
Welcome Fhbradley.

First of all, I don't see why God has to be the greatest conceivable being.  I realize that classically he has been thought as such, but classical theologians can easily be mistaken.  Denying that God is the greatest conceivable being might undermine certain reasons for believing in God, but it doesn't contradict the existence of God, so long as we have a suitable definition for God.

So then just what is a suitable definition?  Well that's tough to say.  Obviously, the further we get away from a classical understanding of God, the less appropriate it will be to call our construct "God."  Admittedly, saying that God may not be the greatest conceivable being is a step in the wrong direction.  However we can still define God thusly:  God is a very powerful and very knowledgeable conscious being who designed and created the universe.  One might add to the definition that on balance, God's knowledge and power greatly surpasses the knowledge and power of every other conscious being.  Furthermore, we could add that God is by definition a very moral being, perhaps supremely moral.  We could also say that God is omnipotent and omniscient.  Any of these definitions would be suitable for denying that God is the greatest conceivable being.

Even if God is taken to be the greatest conceivable being, it yet may be that a universe exists in every possible world and that God created the universe in every world.  That is to say, it need not be the case that the definite description "creator of the universe" has a different referent from world to world.  Philosophers only acknowledge that definite descriptions aren't guaranteed to have the same referent in every possible world, not that they never do.

Even if God didn't create the universe in some possible world, I don't see how this is a problem for theism.  For example it could be that in some possible world God didn't create anything, and so the only thing that exists is God himself.  I don't see how it would be any greater for God to create a universe than to abstain from creating a universe.  And if you do think that it's greater to create a universe, well, we don't need to define God as the greatest conceivable being.

Note that even if the definite description "creator of the universe" has no referent in some possible world, that doesn't mean there is a world where the universe exists and God did not create it.  In other words, it doesn't commit anyone to (3).  Although even if there were such a possible world, I don't see how that's a problem for theism either.  For again, it is not obviously greater for God to have created the universe than not, nor need God be the greatest conceivable being.
MorleyMcMorson
Posted 06/10/12 Reply with quote  #8 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Fhbradley

Morley,
I think the problem with saying a definite description necessarily refers to some object rigidly is that it requires a tremendous metaphysical commitment, one that seems certainly false. If you say some person S is identical with some definite description D, you're saying,

Necessarily, person S has property P. 

(since definite descriptions give informational content about their referent in contrast with propers names, which are empty of content). 

For instance, if you say 

(1) Necessarily, Neil Armstrong is identical with the first man that walked on the moon. 

It must be the case that, 

(1') Necessarily, Neil Armstrong has the property of being the first man to walk on the moon.

This seems metaphysically implausible. Are we really going to contend that it's impossible that Neil Armstrong wasn't the first man to walk on the moon? It seems certain that (2) is true.

(2) Possibly, Neil Armstrong did not walk on the moon.

But if (2) is true, if follows that both (1) and (1') are false. 



If you refer to my initial reply to you, you'll see that I accept your point in most cases.  I said above that, in most cases, definite descriptions do not hold stable across all possible worlds.  It seems clearly possible, for example, that somebody else have been the first person to walk on the moon.  Therefore, the definite description 'the first person to walk on the moon' doesn't rigidly pick out Neil Armstrong.  This doesn't prove, of course, that absolutely zero definite descriptions can be rigid, merely that very few/close to none are.  There is no reason to think that a being couldn't necessarily have a certain property P such that a given definite description is true of that being in all possible worlds.  For example, to adapt email's suggestion, 'the only necessary being' arguably picks out God in every possible world.  At the very least (allowing for Platonism, which I don't actually allow for) the definite description 'the only necessary concretum/concreta' picks out God, depending on your view of the Trinity, for example.

If you want a definite description that rigidly picks out God and refers to a specific action (like 'the being who creates the world'), then I'd say you're probably right, as I doubt any such definite description does rigidly pick out God since God, according to most Christians, didn't have to create the world.  He didn't have to do anything.  Therefore, there is no 'action' essential to God.  So the most I can say for your argument is that it works if we narrow the range of definite descriptions down to actions, but this is not troubling for Christians since they would agree that no 'action-based definite descriptions' rigidly pick out God since all his actions are contingent.
jbejon
Posted 06/10/12 Reply with quote  #9 
Quote:
Philosophers of language argue that definite descriptions do not have the same referent in every possible world….

OK, so I know nothing about philosophy of language.  But why think definite descriptions have the same referent in every possible world?  What would someone who held to this view make of, say, "The natural number between 2 and 4" or "The first word of this sentence"?  Are these not referents for some reason?
Fhbradley
Posted 06/11/12 Reply with quote  #10 
Quote:
Originally Posted by jbejon
Quote:
Philosophers of language argue that definite descriptions do not have the same referent in every possible world….

OK, so I know nothing about philosophy of language.  But why think definite descriptions have the same referent in every possible world?  What would someone who held to this view make of, say, "The natural number between 2 and 4" or "The first word of this sentence"?  Are these not referents for some reason?


Consider the truth value of the following sentences,

(1) Possibly, Neil Armstrong is not the first man to walk on the moon.

(2) Possibly, Neil Armstrong is not Neil Armstrong.

(1) seems to be true and (2) seems to be certainly false. The reason why is that in (1) we have an identity relationship between a proper name and a description but in (2) we have an identity relationship between two proper names. Identity statements between proper names and descriptions appear contingent, whereas identity statements between two proper names appear to be necessary. This is why we say that definite descriptions do not have the same referent in every possible world. On the other hand, propers names do. Proper names are what we may call rigid designators. They point out the same object in every world. So, although in another possible world Barack Obama may not be the man that won the election in 2008, he still is Barack Obama.
Fhbradley
Posted 06/11/12 Reply with quote  #11 
Quote:
Originally Posted by MorleyMcMorson


If you refer to my initial reply to you, you'll see that I accept your point in most cases.  I said above that, in most cases, definite descriptions do not hold stable across all possible worlds.  It seems clearly possible, for example, that somebody else have been the first person to walk on the moon.  Therefore, the definite description 'the first person to walk on the moon' doesn't rigidly pick out Neil Armstrong.  This doesn't prove, of course, that absolutely zero definite descriptions can be rigid, merely that very few/close to none are.  There is no reason to think that a being couldn't necessarily have a certain property P such that a given definite description is true of that being in all possible worlds.  For example, to adapt email's suggestion, 'the only necessary being' arguably picks out God in every possible world.  At the very least (allowing for Platonism, which I don't actually allow for) the definite description 'the only necessary concretum/concreta' picks out God, depending on your view of the Trinity, for example.

If you want a definite description that rigidly picks out God and refers to a specific action (like 'the being who creates the world'), then I'd say you're probably right, as I doubt any such definite description does rigidly pick out God since God, according to most Christians, didn't have to create the world.  He didn't have to do anything.  Therefore, there is no 'action' essential to God.  So the most I can say for your argument is that it works if we narrow the range of definite descriptions down to actions, but this is not troubling for Christians since they would agree that no 'action-based definite descriptions' rigidly pick out God since all his actions are contingent.

But what's the justification for believing "The necessary being" rigidly designates God? Wouldn't that just be begging the question? We might entertain another possible state of affairs where, say, "The necessary being" referred to something like Parmenides' the One. Or maybe just the universe itself. 
Fhbradley
Posted 06/11/12 Reply with quote  #12 
Quote:
Originally Posted by hatsoff
Welcome Fhbradley.

First of all, I don't see why God has to be the greatest conceivable being.  I realize that classically he has been thought as such, but classical theologians can easily be mistaken.  Denying that God is the greatest conceivable being might undermine certain reasons for believing in God, but it doesn't contradict the existence of God, so long as we have a suitable definition for God.

So then just what is a suitable definition?  Well that's tough to say.  Obviously, the further we get away from a classical understanding of God, the less appropriate it will be to call our construct "God."  Admittedly, saying that God may not be the greatest conceivable being is a step in the wrong direction.  However we can still define God thusly:  God is a very powerful and very knowledgeable conscious being who designed and created the universe.  One might add to the definition that on balance, God's knowledge and power greatly surpasses the knowledge and power of every other conscious being.  Furthermore, we could add that God is by definition a very moral being, perhaps supremely moral.  We could also say that God is omnipotent and omniscient.  Any of these definitions would be suitable for denying that God is the greatest conceivable being.




My problem with that is predicates like "is very..." are extremely vague and fall into the Sorites paradox. For instance, imagine an object x that is very powerful. What if it was just a little less powerful? Would it still be very powerful? Sure, since taking just a little less away wouldn't do anything. Subsequently, we get a general rule that says: for all x, if x is very powerful, then x-1 is very powerful. But the problem is that would eventually lead to x having no power at all! So we see that vague predicates are problematic and ought to be avoided. 
jbejon
Posted 06/11/12 Reply with quote  #13 
Quote:
Identity statements between proper names and descriptions appear contingent, whereas identity statements between two proper names appear to be necessary. This is why we say that definite descriptions do not have the same referent in every possible world. On the other hand, propers names do. Proper names are what we may call rigid designators. They point out the same object in every world. So, although in another possible world Barack Obama may not be the man that won the election in 2008, he still is Barack Obama.

OK.  So, let "3" be my proper name, and "The integer between 2 and 4" be my description.  The identity statement between the name and the description is then necessary, right?
MorleyMcMorson
Posted 06/11/12 Reply with quote  #14 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Fhbradley
Quote:
Originally Posted by MorleyMcMorson


If you refer to my initial reply to you, you'll see that I accept your point in most cases.  I said above that, in most cases, definite descriptions do not hold stable across all possible worlds.  It seems clearly possible, for example, that somebody else have been the first person to walk on the moon.  Therefore, the definite description 'the first person to walk on the moon' doesn't rigidly pick out Neil Armstrong.  This doesn't prove, of course, that absolutely zero definite descriptions can be rigid, merely that very few/close to none are.  There is no reason to think that a being couldn't necessarily have a certain property P such that a given definite description is true of that being in all possible worlds.  For example, to adapt email's suggestion, 'the only necessary being' arguably picks out God in every possible world.  At the very least (allowing for Platonism, which I don't actually allow for) the definite description 'the only necessary concretum/concreta' picks out God, depending on your view of the Trinity, for example.

If you want a definite description that rigidly picks out God and refers to a specific action (like 'the being who creates the world'), then I'd say you're probably right, as I doubt any such definite description does rigidly pick out God since God, according to most Christians, didn't have to create the world.  He didn't have to do anything.  Therefore, there is no 'action' essential to God.  So the most I can say for your argument is that it works if we narrow the range of definite descriptions down to actions, but this is not troubling for Christians since they would agree that no 'action-based definite descriptions' rigidly pick out God since all his actions are contingent.

But what's the justification for believing "The necessary being" rigidly designates God? Wouldn't that just be begging the question? We might entertain another possible state of affairs where, say, "The necessary being" referred to something like Parmenides' the One. Or maybe just the universe itself. 


Well, one could use the modal ontological argument or something to show this, and arguments against Platonism, something like that.

I'm not really arguing for it or begging the question, though.  Rather, if God exists, then at least some definite descriptions do not change referents across possible worlds, and I've pointed out a couple.  I think I've shown why your argument is initially plausible: almost all properties are held contingently.  This doesn't give any reason to believe that all are, though.  You haven't yet produced such an argument.  I imagine that this linguistic argument would only work for people who don't believe in necessary beings with essential properties, so basically you'd have to be a nominalist (see jbejon's posts and my above post where I allowed for Platonism...temporarily...) atheist who believes that nothing exists necessarily.

I doubt you believe in the One and I doubt you would want to accept both your argument and that 'the universe' has a necessary referent, since that would entail the universe doesn't exist! 
Fhbradley
Posted 06/11/12 Reply with quote  #15 
Quote:
Originally Posted by MorleyMcMorson



Well, one could use the modal ontological argument or something to show this, and arguments against Platonism, something like that.

I'm not really arguing for it or begging the question, though.  Rather, if God exists, then at least some definite descriptions do not change referents across possible worlds, and I've pointed out a couple.  I think I've shown why your argument is initially plausible: almost all properties are held contingently.  This doesn't give any reason to believe that all are, though.  You haven't yet produced such an argument.  I imagine that this linguistic argument would only work for people who don't believe in necessary beings with essential properties, so basically you'd have to be a nominalist (see jbejon's posts and my above post where I allowed for Platonism...temporarily...) atheist who believes that nothing exists necessarily.

I doubt you believe in the One and I doubt you would want to accept both your argument and that 'the universe' has a necessary referent, since that would entail the universe doesn't exist! 

I think jbejon makes a good case for identity statements to be necessary between numbers. I've come across objections like jbejon's a few times, and I'll admit that I cannot think of a possible world where 3 is not identical with the integer between 2 and 4. Surprisingly, I think this does a lot of good for my case. The reason why is that I can conceive of "the cause of the universe" not being God. I cannot conceive however that 3 was not the integer between 2 and 4. So let me reformulate my argument in the following way:

For all cases, if I can conceive that p is not the case, then there is a possible world W, such that p is false in W.

Therefore, since I can conceive the proposition "God is the cause of the universe" is not the case, there is a possible W, such that the proposition "God is the cause of the universe" is false in W.

To solve the problem of the identity relationship between numbers and other abstract objects we might say:

For all cases, if I cannot conceive that p is not the case, then there is no possible word W, such that p is false in W.
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